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Settling Accounts
When we neither punish nor reproach evildoers, we are not
simply protecting their trivial old age, we are thereby ripping
the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.
A. Solzhenitsyn1
INTRODUCTION
From Latin America to Asia, from Eastern Europe to Africa, long-en-
trenched dictatorships have given way to elected civilian governments. 2 The
trend has been sweeping and, at times, astonishing. The outcome of recent
transitions cannot yet be known, but it is now clear that nations emerging from
dictatorship face formidable challenges as they seek to establish or restore the
rule of law.
Many of the new governments replaced regimes responsible for brutal
crimes-forced "disappearances," political killings and torture-inflicted on a
staggering scale and with wholesale impunity. Whether these crimes should be
prosecuted has loomed as one of the most urgent, and agonizing, issues con-
fronting the nascent democracies. In some instances, security forces responsible
for the worst abuses retain substantial power, and make clear that they will not
brook any legal accounting.3 In several countries, governments have responded
by granting de facto impunity; in others, the military has insisted upon amnes-
ties which are designed, as one writer has observed, "to enforce a total amnesia
regarding [its] crimes."4 With a tenuous grip on power, some of the fledgling
democracies have been presented with a Hobson's choice between their very
survival and the principles upon which their existence was founded. How to
balance the demands of justice against the continued dangers of military or
other force presents issues to which no one has yet proposed generally satisfac-
tory resolutions.
While sharply divided over what policy would best promote a democratic
transition, commentators agree on the importance of identifying relevant
1. THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO 178 (T. Whitney trans. 1974).
2. Examples include Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Benin, the Philippines, South Korea,
Nepal, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the former German Democratic Republic, Albania,
Bulgaria, and Turkey. Significant liberalization, typically a precursor to the establishment of democratic
government, has begun in various other countries, including the U.S.S.R. and many African nations.
3. For example, when, after 16 years of military rule, General Augusto Pinochet prepared to turn the
Chilean government over to an elected civilian president, he warned: "No one is going to touch my people.
The day they do, the state of law will come to an end." AMERICAS WATCH, CHILE IN TRANSITION: HUMAN
RIGHTS SINCE THE PLEBISCITE 1988-1989, at 73 (1989) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH CHILE REPORT].
In some Eastern European countries, remnants of the Communist Party, although recently removed from
office, continue to exercise some autonomous power.
4. Weschler, Aftenvord, JUSTICE AND SOC'Y PROGRAM OF THE ASPEN INST., STATE CRIMES: PUNISH-
MENT OR PARDON 92 (1989) [hereinafter ASPEN INSTITUTE REPORT].
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principles of international laV.5 Are amnesty laws permissible? Does interna-
tional law impose any affirmative duties to punish human rights violations? If
so, are there any principles of law that "mitigate" the general duties in light
of the peculiar constraints prevailing in transitional societies? To the extent that
current law is not dispositive, is new law desirable? In addressing these ques-
tions, I will propose a resolution of critical aspects of the policy debate through
the elucidation of principles of international law heretofore misunderstood,
ignored, or simply unexamined.
I will argue (in Part I) that the central importance of the rule of law in
civilized societies requires, within defined but principled limits, prosecution of
especially atrocious crimes. I will also argue that international law itself helps
assure the survival of fragile democracies when its clear pronouncement
removes certain atrocious crimes from the provincial realm of a country's
internal politics and thereby places those crimes squarely within the scope of
universal concern and the conscience of all civilized people.
I next argue (in Part II) that recently developed principles of international
law, both customary6 and conventional, already impose significant obligations
in this regard. The most important conclusion in the sections analyzing conven-
tional law is that three comprehensive human rights treaties that do not explicit-
ly require States Parties to prosecute violations nonetheless impose a general
duty to investigate allegations of torture, extra-legal killings, and forced disap-
pearances, and, subject to evidentiary and other legitimate constraints, to
prosecute those who are responsible. A state's complete failure to punish
repeated or notorious instances of these offenses violates its obligations under
customary international law.
These duties represent a departure from the traditional approach of interna-
tional human rights law. While it has long been recognized that international
law requires states to respect and ensure human rights, that same law has gener-
5. See, e.g., A. Henkin, Conference Report, in ASPEN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-2.
Identification of relevant international legal standards will become increasingly important as challenges to
amnesty laws are considered by international bodies that supervise states' compliance with human rights
conventions. Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and Uruguay have
been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States.
The Commission has requested the Inter-American Court to accept a case challenging Suriname's amnesty
law. Case 10.150, Informe 3/90, OEA/ser.L./V/II.77, doc. 23 (1990). Although the issue of accountability
for past abuses has generated rich discussion, there has been relatively little analysis to date of applicable
rules of international law. But see Goldman, International Law and Amnesty Laws, HUM. RTs. INTERNET
REP., winter 1988, at 9; Rogers, Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Military Officials for Torture, 20
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 259 (1989); Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (1990); J. Terry, Domestic
Amnesties for Violators of International Human Rights: Sketching a Framework for International Legal
Regulation (May 19, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
6. Customary international law, which is binding on all states, arises from "a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)];
see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38( l)(b), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945) (sources of




ally allowed governments to determine how their obligations will be fulfilled.
But the measures used to secure human rights are no longer subject to the broad
discretion of governments when it comes to a core set of fundamental rights
that merit special protection. When torture, disappearances, and illegal killings
occur, governments must make good-faith efforts to bring the wrongdoers to
justice.
I next consider (in Part III) whether successor governments must prosecute
all such offenses committed by a previous regime.7 Analyzing the duties in
light of their underlying rationales, I conclude that both the treaty and custom-
ary obligations to punish atrocious crimes are consistent with a limited program
of prosecutions, but would be breached by wholesale impunity. Prosecutions
of those most responsible for designing and implementing a past system of state
violence or for the most notorious violations would best comport with common
standards of justice.
Finally, I consider (in Part IV) whether new law clarifying governments'
obligation to punish atrocious crimes should be developed. I support the current
trend, evident in recent human rights instruments, towara specifying a duty to
prosecute grave violations of physical integrity, and urge that future conventions
should establish procedural measures enabling victims of such crimes (or their
survivors) to act to ensure prosecution.
I. WHY PUNISH?
The debate over post-transition prosecutions' has focused on their potential
role in ending cycles of state violence and promoting consolidation of demo-
7. The legal analysis assumes that the violations were committed in the recent past, and does not
consider whether the passage of time could extinguish a duty to prosecute atrocious crimes. But see infra
notes 126, 252.
8. Human rights professionals have figured most prominently in the public debate. Other participants
have included journalists, academics, and political leaders. While divided on many issues, commentators
agree on two points. First, prosecutions for past crimes must accord with internationally recognized standards
of due process. The potential for abuse of the prosecution power-underscored by the summary trial and
execution of former Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife in December 1989-is cause for
concern even for those who generally favor prosecutions. Second, some crimes must be punished pursuant
to international law-a point conceded by those who oppose development of new law requiring governments
to prosecute abuses of predecessor regimes. See, e.g., Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations
Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in ASPEN INSTITUTE
REPORT, supra note 4, at 35, 41-42. There appears, however, to be a significant gap between existing law
requiring punishment and general perceptions of the law. Many analysts have assumed that international
law places few restraints on a government's discretion regarding punishment of a prior regime's crimes.
See, e.g., id. at 41-42; R. Teitel, How Are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing With the
Legacy of Past Human Rights Abuses? (May 10, 1990) (unpublished discussion paper prepared for Council
on Foreign Relations, Latin America Project, Issue Series #3); Transitions to Democracy and the Rule of
Law, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 965, 1080-81 (1990). In fact, however, current law imposes rather
significant requirements regarding punishment of atrocious crimes. See infra Part II. A chief reason for this
gap is that key sources of a duty to prosecute human rights crimes include conventions that do not explicitly
require States Parties to punish violations, but which have authoritatively been interpreted to do so. Looking
only at the text of the conventions, many have assumed that the treaties have no bearing on the question
of punishment.
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cratic transitions. These considerations have, in turn, informed a broader debate
about the role that international law should play in shaping governments' policy
toward violations of a prior regime.
A. The Case for Prosecutions
The fulcrum of the case for criminal punishment is that it is the most
effective insurance against future repression.9 By laying bare the truth about
violations of the past and condemning them, prosecutions can deter potential
lawbreakers and inoculate the public against future temptation to be complicit
in state-sponsored violence."l Trials may, as well, inspire societies that are re-
examining their basic values to affirm the fundamental principles of respect for
the rule of law and for the inherent dignity of individuals."
Above all, however, the case for prosecutions turns on the consequences
of failing to punish atrocious crimes committed by a prior regime on a sweep-
ing scale. If law is unavailable to punish widespread brutality of the recent past,
what lesson can be offered for the future? A complete failure of enforcement
vitiates the authority of law itself, sapping its power to deter proscribed con-
duct. 2 This may be tolerable when the law or the crime is of marginal conse-
quence, but there can be no scope for eviscerating wholesale laws that forbid
violence and that have been violated on a massive scale.13 Societies recently
scourged by lawlessness need look no farther than their own past to discover
the costs of impunity. Their history provides sobering cause to believe, with
William Pitt, that tyranny begins where law ends.
9. See Garro & Dahl, Legal Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Argentina: One Step
Forward and Two Steps Backward, 8 HUM. RTS. L.J. 283, 343 (1987); Malamud-Goti, Transitional
Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 12 (1990). It might be
objected that punishment of past crimes cannot be justified as necessary to deter future conduct. See R.
Teitel, supra note 8, at 7, 9. But it is precisely by imposing penalties after a crime has occurred-when
it is too late to deter the sanctioned conduct-that criminal law attempts to ensure future lawful behavior.
See Fingarette, Rethinking Criminal Law Excuses, 89 YALE L.J. 1002, 1013-16 (1980).
10. In this respect, Malamud-Goti asserts, post-transition prosecutions "address[] the community as
well as the potential offender, creating incentives for citizens to withdraw support from potential dictatorial
regimes." Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional Democratic
Governments, in ASPEN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82; cf. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE
336 (1961).
11. Citing Hannah Arendt's view that "the first step on the road to total domination is to kill the
juridicial person in man," David Remnick, the Moscow correspondent for The Washington Post, has
observed: "Likewise, the first essential step toward liberty is the revival of the legal impulse in man." L.
WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 242 (1990) (quoting Remnick).
12. Cf. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 287 (1968) ("respect for law generally
is likely to suffer if it is widely known that certain kinds of conduct, although nominally criminal, can be
practiced with relative impunity"); Fingarette, supra note 9, at 1014 (unless society imposes a sanction when
its laws are violated, the law "becomes functionally a mere appeal"; "the concept of law as a requirement
becomes unintelligible") (emphasis in original).
13. A paramount function of law-and, indeed, of government-is to protect citizens from harm,
particulary physical violence. See J. LOCKE, II Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 127-131 (G. Rutledge
ed. 1857); R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 25 (1942).
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The harmful effects of impunity are compounded when prosecutions are
foreclosed by an amnesty law 4 enacted by, or to appease, the military or other
autonomous sectors. For "[t]he essential precondition for the effectiveness of
law... is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation and
shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to be so without upholding its own...
criteria of equity . . . 15
Some proponents believe that governments should prosecute their predeces-
sors' atrocious crimes because the trials can advance a nation's transition to
democracy.16 By demonstrating that no sector is above the law, prosecutions
of state crimes can foster respect for democratic institutions and thereby deepen
a society's democratic culture. t7 Conversely, because law "is located in our
myths and stories as a powerful attribute of legitimate authority,"1 8 failure to
enforce the law may undermine the legitimacy of a new government and breed
cynicism toward civilian institutions.
Some analysts urge that prosecutions strengthen fragile democracies because
the rule of law is integral to democracy itself.19 This argument has several
strands: Enforcement of legal safeguards against arbitrary state action is essen-
tial to the full exercise of political rights.2" Moreover capitulations to military
demands for impunity reflect, and may enhance, the military's capacity to
exercise a veto power over government policies, thereby vitiating the sover-
14. The term "amnesty" usually refers to an official act prospectively barring criminal prosecutions,
and is often contrasted with pardons, which typically exempt convicted criminals from serving their
sentences, in whole or in part, without expunging the conviction. But these distinctions are inexact; pardons,
like amnesties, can be used to foreclose prosecutions, and amnesties sometimes cover persons serving prison
terms. See A. DAMicO, DEMOCRACY AND THE CASE FOR AMNESTY 5 (1975); K. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE,
MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 4-5 (1989). The word "amnesty"--like "amnesia"-derives from the
Greek "amnestia," which means "forgetfulness" or "oblivion"; an amnesty constitutes a declaration that
the government intends to obliterate (and not merely forgive) a crime. See K. MOORE, supra, at 5; Goldman,
Amnesty Laws, International Law and the American Convention on Human Rights, 6 THE LAW GROUP
DOCKET 1,3 (1989) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition of amnesty as "the abolition and forgetful-
ness of the offense," while "pardon is forgiveness").
15. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 263 (1975). A popular conception of the rule of law is
that a system of law replaces a private system of force. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 28 (1969).
Measured against this ideal, paralysis of legal institutions by an illegitimate threat of force is the very
antithesis of the rule of law.
16. E.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 10, at 81.
17. See id.; Garro &Dahl,supra note 9, at344. The Alfonsin government's prosecution of former junta
leaders for human rights violations had a profound effect on Argentine society. Many Argentines felt
enormous pride at their accomplishment in asserting the rule of law over former generals who had led the
country during a period of sweeping state violence. (I am indebted to Professor Owen Fiss of Yale Law
School for bringing this to my attention.)
18. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 179, 180 n.7.
19. Professor Dahl, in contrast, asserts that it is theoretically possible for a country to be democratic
without respecting the rule of law. He believes, nonetheless, that the political culture that supports stable
democracies is also likely to give rise to a high public valuation of principles of fairness, legality and due
process. R. Dahl, Democracy and Human Rights Under Different Conditions of Development 3 (June 20-23,
1988) (paper prepared for the Nobel Symposium on Human Rights).
20. Cf. S. Huntington, The Modest Meaning of Democracy 14 (Nov. 18, 1986) (consultation paper
prepared for Carter Center of Emory University Conference, Atlanta, Ga.) (harassment and jailing of political
opponents are incompatible with democracy).
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eignty of the national polity.2' In contrast, when a government prosecutes
military personnel for human rights violations, it affirms the supremacy of
publicly accountable civilian institutions.'
Because the values secured by trials are crucially important and the harmful
effects of impunity substantial, proponents of punishment believe that the
authority of international law should be brought to bear to assure prosecution
of atrocious crimes. Further, to the extent that a deterrence rationale justifies
prosecution of state crimes, the underlying objective is best served when
international law precludes the possibility of impunity.'
B. The Case Against Prosecutions
The chief argument against a general rule requiring prosecutions is that frag-
ile democracies may not be able to survive the destabilizing effects of political-
ly charged trials.24 Many countries emerging from dictatorship are polarized
and unstable, 5 and may be further fractured by prosecutions of the prior re-
gime's depredations. Under these circumstances, some urge, democratic consoli-
21. See AMERICAS WATCH, ASIA WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH- & THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 1987, at 2 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 REAGAN REVIEW]; Petras, Getting Away with Murder, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1990, at A27, col. 2 (as
long as Chilean armed forces determine "when and where and against whom laws will apply, Chile does
not measure up to any internationally accepted standard of democracy"); L. Whitehead, The Consolidation
of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations 26-28 (Nov. 18, 1986) (consultation paper prepared
for Caner Center of Emory University Conference, Atlanta, Ga.) (there can be no meaningful consolidation
of democracy when a civilian government has to assure the military that human rights prosecutions will
not be pursued).
22. Proponents also believe that prosecutions contribute to the rehabilitation of victims of past violations
and, indeed, of society itself. Human rights activist Aryeh Neier asserts that punishment fulfills society's
duty "to honor and redeem the suffering of the individual victim." L. WESCHLER, supra note 11, at 244;
see also Neier, What Should Be Done About the Guilty?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 1, 1990, at 34. Finally,
some advocates of prosecutions assert claims of an absolute duty, based upon fundamental conceptions of
justice, to punish atrocious crimes. See, e.g., Mignone, Estlund & Issacharoff, Dictatorship on Trial:
Prosecution of Human Rights Violations in Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 149 & n.119 (1984). See
generally R. Teitel, supra note 8.
23. I am indebted to Professor Alan Schwartz of Yale Law School for this insight. Cf. H. PACKER,
supra note 12, at 64 ("If people are to be deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by the punishment
of those who have done so in the past, it is important that the imposition of punishment be as nearly certain
as possible.").
24. See Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 27-28. A government's ability to prosecute a prior regime's abuses
is partly a function of the circumstances of the political transition. The widest scope for punishment exists
when the transition was brought about by external conquest, as happened in post-war Germany and Japan.
Less latitude for punishment exists if a retreating military has been discredited but still retains autonomous
power, and still less if the military relinquishes power to civilians when it could remain in power indefinite-
ly, and thus is in a position to dictate the terms of a transition. See id. at 46-47; see also Stepan, Paths
Toward Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUITHORI-
TARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 64 (G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter & L. Whitehead eds. 1986).
25. This is particularly true of countries, like the Philippines, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, in which
the armed forces committed grave violations against sectors perceived as political opponents of the state.
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dation can be furthered by implementing a policy of reconciliation embodied
in an amnesty law covering past violations.26
In countries where the military retains substantial power after relinquishing
office, efforts to prosecute past violations may provoke rebellions, or other
confrontations that could weaken the authority of the civilian government.'
And in countries where security forces have retained modest power relative to
an elected government, prosecutions may induce the military to "close
ranks."29 In these circumstances, prosecutions could reinforce the military's
propensity to challenge democratic institutions.3
In light of these constraints, some analysts believe that democratic consoli-
dation may be best served if a precarious government stays the hand of prose-
cution. Their argument rests, in large measure, on the claim that transitional
societies may not yet possess the attributes of a viable democracy-in particu-
26. E.g., Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 37-38; Lewis, Revenge or Reconciliation?, N.Y. Tines, Apr. 10,
1990, at A21, col. 4. Uruguayan President Julio Maria Sanguinetti justified an amnesty law covering abuses
of a previous military regime on this basis:
The Uruguayan government has decided to take measures of magnanimity or clemency utilizing
a mechanism provided for in the Constitution of the Republic (the amnesty). The 12 years of
dictatorship have left scars which will need a long time to heal and it is good to begin to do so.
The country needs reconciliation to face a difficult but promising future.
Letter from President Sanguinetti to Amnesty International (Mar. 31, 1987), reprinted in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, URUGUAY: LEGISLATION DEALING WTH PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, app. at 2
(1987), Al Index: AMR 52/02/87. For a contrasting view, see The Administration of Justice and the Human
Rights of Detainees, Question of the Human Rights of Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, Study on Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion of Human Rights,
37 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 9, para. 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/15 [hereinafter U.N.
Study on Amnesty Laws] (Special Rapporteur asserts that "an amnesty covering persons guilty of conduct
involving a serious infringement of human dignity.. ., far from encouraging national reconciliation, would
only increase tension ....").
27. Dissatisfaction with prosecutions of military officers for past human rights violations was a key
factor in three rebellions against the government of Argentine President Ratil Alfonsfn. See Argentine
Departs, Democracy Hardly Bankrupt, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1989, at 2, col. 1; Revolt by 400 Argentine
Troops Quelled, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 4. The Argentine military was prepared to accept
prosecution of its leaders, but some factions rebelled when the scope of prosecutions broadened. See infra
text accompanying note 271. The experience of other countries tends to refute the claim that impunity can
secure military acceptance of civilian rule. Emboldened by impunity, the military has continued to assert
control over the civilian governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Philippines; military factions
have launched coup attempts against the civilian governments in Guatemala, Haiti, and the Philippines.
28. A civilian government may risk a humiliating challenge to its authority if it seeks to bring a
recalcitrant military to account. This happened when Uruguayan courts summoned military defendants to
appear before them to answer charges relating to rights violations committed in the 1970's. In late 1986,
in the face of reports that the defendants would not respond to the summonses, the government of Uruguay-
an President Julio Maria Sanguinetti hastily pushed through Congress an amnesty law covering the contro-
verted prosecutions, thereby seeking to avert a challenge to the supremacy of civilian institutions which
the government was not prepared to face. See AMERICAS WATCH, CHALLENGING IMPUNITY: THE LEY DE
CADUCIDAD AND THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IN URUGUAY 14-15 (1989) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH
URUGUAY REPORT].
29. Prosecutions of military leaders undertaken by the government of Argentine President Radl Alfonsfn
are believed to have had this effect, reinforcing the military's tendency to operate autonomously. See
Malamud-Goti, supra note 9, at 13; Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 57.
30. For a general analysis of the threat to democratization posed by various dimensions of military
"prerogatives," see A. STEPAN, RETHINKING MILITARY POLITICS 68-92 (1988).
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lar, the new governments may lack the power to bring the military to ac-
count 3-- and holds that the international community should not press these
governments to act as though they were fully consolidated when in fact the
transition process has only begun. Stripped to its essence, their argument is one
of lesser evils. Opponents of law requiring prosecutions concede that impunity
erodes the rule of law. But, they argue, if a fragile democratic government
institutes prosecutions, it may provoke its overthrow by sectors that are ill-
disposed to respect human rights.3 2
C. The Role of International Law
As thus framed, the policy debate has tended to view the imperatives of the
rule of law as somehow fundamentally at odds with political reality. This
approach is unwarranted. The law itself can accommodate the constraints sur-
31. See L. Moreno Ocampo, About the Trials and Punishment of the Massive Violations of Human
Rights in Argentina § 2.1.1 (Mar. 4-8, 1990) (paper prepared for conference on the Transition to Democracy
in Argentina, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.); Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 27-28.
32. Still, opponents of prosecutions concede that a successor government cannot ignore the legacy of
dictatorship; a policy that meaningfully addresses past violations is necessary in order to draw a line between
the past and present, and to enable a scarred society to come to terms with its past so that it can begin the
process of healing. For this reason, even those who oppose prosecutions believe that governments that
succeed regimes responsible for atrocious and widespread abuses should investigate and officially ack-
nowledge the violations. See ASPEN INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4-5; Zalaquett, supra note 8, at
30-34. Many of the arguments advanced in support of an official accounting echo justifications voiced in
support of prosecutions. Like prosecutions, an official account of past violations serves an exemplary
function, stigmatizes those responsible for atrocious crimes, and, by illuminating the sphere of darkness in
which abuses can proliferate, prevents future violations. Because the objectives served by an official
truthtelling process resemble those associated with punishment, some analysts have suggested that the former
might obviate, or at any rate diminish, the perceived need for prosecutions. See R. Teitel, supra note 8, at
11-12.
Whatever salutary effects it can produce, an official truthtelling process is no substitute for enforcement
of criminal law through prosecutions. Indeed, to the extent that such an undertaking purports to replace
criminal punishment (rather than to promote distinct goals that punishment cannot serve), it diminishes the
authority of the legal process; it implicitly concedes that the machinery of justice is powerless to punish
even those crimes that any civilized society views as most pernicious. Further, the most authoritative
rendering of the truth is possible only as a result of judicial inquiry, and major prosecutions can generate
a comprehensive record of past violations. Cf. Report to the Presidentfrom Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief
of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Alis War Criminals, June 7, 1945, reprinted in 39
AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 184 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter Jackson Report] (stating that basis of case against major
war criminals at Nuremberg must be "a well-documented history of what we are convinced was a grand,
concerted pattern to incite and commit the aggressions and barbarities which have shocked the world," and
asserting, "Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and precision, we cannot blame the
future if in days of peace it finds incredible the accusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must
establish incredible events by credible evidence."); FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON
THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (Aug. 15, 1949) (written
by Telford Taylor, Brig. Gen., U.S.A., Chief of Counsel for War Crimes) [hereinafter TAYLOR REPORT]
(asserting that "[tlhe documents and testimony of the Nuernberg record can be of the greatest value in
showing the Germans the truth about the recent past."); R. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG xiii (1983)
(quoting Telford Taylor saying at Nuremberg trial, "We cannot here make history over again. But we can
see that it is written true.").
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rounding transitional societies while securing crucially important values.33
Addressing the dilemma of tenuous democracies through law assures that an
appropriate balance is struck between the demands of justice and potentially
conflicting values, such as political stability 34
The alternative-leaving the decision about prosecution to the unbridled
discretion of governments-does nothing to assure the bona fides of their
choice. Governments may forego trials to avert a perceived challenge to their
authority, however remote or speculative, even if long-term national interests
would be better served by prosecutions. 35 This consideration is by no means
hypothetical; although numerous countries have begun transitions from repres-
sive rule to democracy in recent years, relatively few successor governments
33. While an imprecise analogy, U.S. constitutional protection of speech provides an instructive example
of how legal standards can protect fundamental rights without imperiling crucial national interests. Speech
may be curbed, in narrow circumstances, if it poses an immediate threat to important governmental interests,
but U.S. constitutional law protects fundamental values associated with expressive activity by forbidding
interference with speech unless the restriction is justified by the appropriate legal standard-whether the
"clear and present danger" test first enunciated by Justice Holmes, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 627-28, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); or the
"incitement to imminent lawless action" test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam); or, as in the case of prior restraints on the press, upon proof that publication "will surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people," New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). While protecting overriding governmental
interests, all of these tests seek to assure a free society-even at the risk of making governance a more
precarious enterprise. Part III considers how relevant principles of international law can accommodate the
constraints faced by societies emerging from dictatorship.
34. International law does this both by prescribing standards of conduct that take account of threats
to public order and, at least with respect to conventional law, by establishing an oversight mechanism to
ensure good faith compliance with those standards. Multilateral human rights conventions typically establish
a body or bodies that are responsible for monitoring States Parties' compliance. These bodies have generally
accorded states substantial discretion to determine how they will satisfy their treaty obligations, but nonethe-
less ensure that governments do not invoke inappropriate excuses for noncompliance. For an example of
such treatment under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
[hereinafter "European Convention"I, see The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTs. 71-76,
paras. 152-65 (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.). See generally Higgins, Derogations Under Human Rights
Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 281 (1976-77).
35. See L. WESCHLER, supra note 11, at 244. Cf. Montealegre, The Compatibility of a State Party's
Derogation Under Human Rights Conventions with its Obligations Under Protocol 11 and Common Article
3,33 AM. U.L. REV. 41,49 (1983) ("the real purpose" of amnesties covering criminal acts committed during
internal conflicts, though ostensibly enacted to promote national reconciliation, "is to permit government
officials responsible for human rights violations to escape responsibility for their acts").
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have attempted prosecutions.36 While many have asserted that prosecutions
were impossible, the claim has typically been overstated.37
I am not, of course, suggesting that governments should press prosecutions
to the point of provoking their own collapse. Rather, I am suggesting that, by
generally requiring prosecutions, international law helps assure that governments
do not forego trials simply because it seems politically expedient to do so. A
critical distinction to be drawn here is between military insubordination and a
challenge that poses a genuine and serious threat to national life. Because trials
36. Amnesty laws or decrees have been adopted, inter alia, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia, and Suriname, and de facto impunity has been conferred in
other countries, including the Philippines and Haiti. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
IMPUNITY: PROSECUTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1991); LAWYERS COMMIT-
TEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PAPER LAWS, STEEL BAYONETS: BREAKDOWN OF THE RULE OF LAW IN HAITI
(1990). But see 16 Convicted in Philippine Assassination, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1990, at A15, col. 1; Top
Duvalier Aide, at a Rowdy Trial, Condemned To Die, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at Al, col. 2 (reporting
exceptional trials of abuses committed by prior regimes in Philippines and Haiti). Prosecutions for human
rights violations by predecessor regimes have been undertaken in Guinea, Nicaragua, and the Central African
Republic, see J. Terry, supra note 5, and investigations preparatory to prosecutions have been instituted in
Uganda. The governments of several Eastern European countries, including Romania, Bulgaria, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and Germany, have instituted or are considering initiating criminal prosecutions for violent
human rights crimes committed before the recent political transitions in those countries. See Upheaval in
the East: Army Executes Ceausescu and Wife for "Genocide" Role, Bucharest Says, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,
1989, at Al, col. 6; Evolution in Europe: Ceausescu's Fallen Heir Faces Court, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1990,
at 14, col. 4; Inquiry on Deaths Going Nowhere ii Romania, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1991, at A10, col. I;
Czechoslovakia Detains Ex-Communist Party Leader and 4 Others, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, at A10, col.
1; Bulgaria Presses Inquiries into the Communist Past, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1991, at AI5, col. 1; Bulgaria's
Ousted Dictator Agrees To Face His Accusers, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, at A6, col. 5; Poland Arrests
2 Police Generals in '84 Killing of Reformist Priest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1990, at AS, col. 3; Prosecutors
for Unified Germany Seize Former Communist Officials, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1990, at 14, col. 1; Honecker's
Arrest Sought in Berlin Wall Shootings, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1990, at 23, col. 1; Honecker Taken to Soviet
Union; Germany Demanding His Return, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1991, at Al, col. 1; 4 Ex-Officials of East
Germany Arrested, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1991, at A3, col. 4; Berlin Wall Guards Accused of Shooting
Escapees, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1991, at 6, col. 1; End of the Line: Leaders at Communism's Finish, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1990, at A16, col. 1.
37. For example, officials in the government of Philippine President Corazon Aquino justified their
failure to prosecute violations committed under the aegis of President Ferdinand Marcos on the basis that
the effort would have amounted to "political suicide." A former spokesman for President Aquino explained,
"This government had an obligation to survive." Warning: Joining the Bar Is Hazardous to Your Health,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 3, 1988, at 81. Yet the Aquino government enjoyed considerable power relative
to the armed forces in its early months in office, and was at that time in a position to press bold action
without provoking a viable threat of military rebellion. Moreover its failure to hold the military to account
scarcely assured stability; in its five years in office the Aquino government has weathered seven coup
attempts. See D. Orentlicher, The Philippines Experience (Nov. 4-6, 1988) (paper presented at conference
on State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Vye Woods Conference
Center).
Experts on Uruguay similarly believe that President Julio Maria Sanguinetti could have insisted upon
some prosecutions of the military for past violations without derailing his country's transition to democracy.
E.g., Telephone Interview with Professor Robert Kogod Goldman (May 21, 1990). In August 1984,
Uruguay's political parties and the military government entered into a pact governing the terms of a
transition to civilian rule. It is generally understood that the parties to the pact agreed that the executive
branch of the future government would not initiate prosecutions for rights violations committed under the
military government's auspices, but would not interfere with cases already before the courts. In August 1986,
President Sanguinetti introduced legislation that would have established a sweeping amnesty for past
violations. A different amnesty bill was enacted in December 1986. A subsequent effort to overturn the
amnesty by referendum failed to secure the necessary votes. See AMERICAS WATCH URUGUAY REPORT,
supra note 28, at 11-15.
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secure preeminent rights and values, governments should be expected to assume
reasonable risks associated with prosecutions, including a risk of military
discontent.38
If leaving prosecutions to governments' discretion fails to ensure appropriate
decisions, it also deprives governments that wish to restore the rule of law of
potentially crucial support. International law requiring punishment of atrocious
crimes-and, more to the point, international pressure for compliance-can
provide a counterweight to pressure from groups seeking impunity.3 9
On the other hand, a virtual certainty of punishment could deter some
abusive regimes from voluntarily relinquishing power. On balance, however,
this concern is outweighed by the more harmful effects of failing to establish
an effective deterrent to systematic violations of fundamental rights, in part
because the prospect of facing prosecutions is rarely, if ever, the decisive factor
in determining whether a transition will occur.40
Further, when prosecutions are undertaken pursuant to international law,
they are less likely to be perceived-and opposed-as political revanchism. It
is easy to believe that prosecutions are politically motivated when the decision
to institute them is a matter of unbridled discretion; justice is readily mistaken
for vengeance.4' When, however, international law insists upon punishment
of atrocious crimes, the prosecutions can, as Otto Kirchheimer said of the
Nuremberg prosecutions for crimes against humanity, "define where the realm
of politics ends or, rather, is transformed into the concerns of the human
condition, the survival of mankind in both its universality and diversity."'42
38. See Garro & Dahl, supra note 9, at 343-44; Malamud-Goti, supra note 10, at 76.
39. This point was underscored by Luis Moreno Ocampo, who in the mid-1980's prosecuted former
junta leaders for human rights violations committed in Argentina during the 1970's. Mr. Moreno Ocampo
subsequently stated that his work would have been made easier if the government's program of prosecutions
had been backed by the weight and authority of international law. (This observation was made during a
conference in Buenos Aires on Argentina's transition to democracy, sponsored by the Yale Law School,
during October and November 1989, in which the author participated.) Prosecutions based upon international
legal obligations-and expectations of their fulfillment-may, in any event, be less likely to provoke or-
ganized opposition than prosecutions the initiation of which is perceived as optional. It is not surprising
that outgoing military regimes have mounted strong opposition to prosecutions when the issue was under-
stood to be negotiable. It is less clear that opposition in those circumstances is a reliable indicator of how
the military would respond to mandatory prosecutions.
40. In Argentina, for example, the outgoing military regime opposed prosecutions but lacked the power
to insist on impunity as a pre-condition to civilian rule. The last of three successive military juntas enacted
a "self-amnesty" law, which was nullified by the Alfonsfn government. See Garro & Dahl, supra note 9,
at 301, 305-06.
41. For an example of this type of reasoning, see Lewis, Revenge or Reconciliation?, N.Y. Times, Apr.
10, 1990, at A21, col. 4.
42. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 10, at 341. Kirchheimer's views about the effects of the Nuremberg
prosecutions are instructive: "In spite of the Nuremberg trial's infirmities, the feeble beginning of transna-
tional control of the crime against the human condition raises the Nuremberg judgment a notch above the
level of political justice by fiat of a successor regime." Id. Precisely because the crimes prosecuted at
Nuremberg were made subject to the "control" of international law, the trials helped establish "that the most
atrocious offenses against the human condition lie beyond the pale of what may be considered contingent
and fortuitous political action, judgment on which may change from regime to regime." Id.
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While helping to "depoliticize" trials of human rights violators,4 3 interna-
tional law requiring prosecution does not prevent governments from instituting
policies of national reconciliation." The argument that amnesty laws may be
necessary to mend social divisions falsely assumes that such laws are the only
means of achieving reconciliation. There are other means.4 5 Further, amnesty
laws can be used to promote national reconciliation, provided they do not cover
atrocious crimes which international law requires states to punish.46
By drawing a bright line between crimes that must be punished and those
for which amnesties are permissible, international law helps answer an agoniz-
ing question confronting many transitional societies: How is it possible to seek
accountability without setting off an endless chain of divisive recriminations?
Writing of a proposal to purge Communist collaborators from formerly state-run
enterprises, Polish Solidarity activist Adam Michnik evokes the dilemma
confronting his nation in the wake of the prior regime's collapse:
The struggle for freedom is beautiful. Anyone who has taken part in this
struggle has felt, almost physically, how everything that is best and
most precious within him was awakened. Revenge has a different
psychology. Its logic is implacable. First, there is a purge of yesterday's
adversaries, the partisans of the old regime. Then comes the purge of
yesterday's fellow-oppositionists, who now oppose the idea of revenge.
Finally, there is a purge of those who defend them. A psychology of
vengeance and hatred develops. The mechanics of retaliation become
unappeasable .... 4
43. It is, of course, impossible fully to depoliticize prosecutions for human rights crimes-or for any
crime that attracts a high level of public interest. Part M explores measures that can be taken to minimize
the harmful political consequences of prosecutions.
44. Some analysts believe that forgiveness and national reconciliation cannot take place as long as
justice is foreclosed. See L. WESCHLER, supra note 1I, at 243 (quoting Hannah Arendt's view that "men
are unable to forgive what they cannot punish"); cf. Neier, Amnesty at the Point of a Gun Isn't Genuine,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A20, col. 5 (letter to the editor).
45. One of the most important measures taken by Nicaraguan President of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro
to bridge divisions between her government and that of the Sandinista party she defeated was to retain as
her defense minister Gen. Humberto Ortega Saavedra, who had served in the same capacity under the
previous Sandinista government. See Chamorro Takes Nicaragua Helm; Hails a New Era: Retains the
Army's Top Sandinista in a Gesture of Reconciliation, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
46. An example of such an amnesty is the Colombian Amnesty Law (No. 35) of November 19, 1982,
which did not apply to persons who killed noncombatants and those who otherwise behaved brutally. Sir
Francis Bacon drew a distinction between crimes that can be subject to amnesty and those that cannot:
[Tihe King may pardon any Offence whatever ... so far as the public is concerned in it, after
it is over, and consequently may prevent a popular Action or a Statute, by pardoning the Offence
before the suit is commenced; ....
But it seems agreed, that the King can by no previous Licence, Pardon or Dispensation, make
an Offence dispunishable which is Malum in se; as being against the Law of Nature, or so far
against the Public Good as to be indictable at Common Law, and that a Grant of this kind tending
to encourage the doing of Evil, which is the chief End of Government to prevent, is plainly
against Reason and the Common Good, and therefore void.
Goldman, supra note 14, at 3-4 (quoting Bacon).
47. weschler, A Reporter at Large, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 1990, at 127.
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Distinguishing "this sort of wholesale vengeance" from prosecutions for crimes,
Michnik suggests an answer to Poland's dilemma: "In cases where laws have
been broken," the perpetrators "should be indicted and tried, the law should
take its course. But we have to remain a nation of laws-that is of crucial
importance."4
II. THE DUTY To PUNISH UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
While analysts agree that governments confronting a legacy of state violence
should comply with established rules of international law, they have generally
demurred on the question of what, precisely, the law requires. 49 This tendency
toward vagueness can be readily explained: the implications of the most
pertinent areas of international law are not immediately obvious. International
human rights law traditionally has allowed governments substantial discretion
to determine the means they will use to ensure protected rights,50 while inter-
national penal law has often focused on the power-not duty-of governments
to punish violations committed outside their territorial jurisdiction.51 When
the law has required states to punish offenses committed in their territory, the
duty traditionally has applied principally to crimes committed against foreign
nationals.52
Increasingly, however, international law has required states to punish certain
human rights crimes committed in their territorial jurisdiction. Several human
rights treaties require States Parties to criminalize particular abuses, such as
genocide and torture, investigate violations and seek to punish the wrongdo-
ers.53 On their face the more comprehensive treaties, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,54 are silent about a duty to punish
violations of the rights they ensure. But authoritative interpretations of these
treaties make clear that a State Party fails in its duty to ensure the cluster of
rights protecting physical integrity if it does not investigate violations and seek
48. Id. at 126; cf. A. SOLZHIENITSYN, supra note 1, at 177 ("It is unthinkable in the twentieth century
to fail to distinguish between what constitutes an abominable atrocity that must be prosecuted and what
constitutes that 'past' which 'ought not to be stirred up."').
49. See supra note 8.
50. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam)
(Edwards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). International human rights undertakings have
typically emphasized "obligations of result," leaving to states the determination of means for protecting the
rights. See Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 311 (L. Henkin ed. 1981). Increasingly, however, international human rights treaties specify
"obligations of means" as well as result. Further, bodies that enforce human rights treaties have often
specified means that States Parties must use to fulfill their convention-based obligations of result. See infra
text accompanying notes 92-93.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
52. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
53. See Infra Section B.
54. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter "International Covenant"l.
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to punish those who are responsible." Moreover a state's failure to punish
repeated or notorious violations breaches the customary obligation to respect
the same set of preeminent rights.56
A. International Criminal Law
1. General Principles
Each duty examined below applies to human rights violations that interna-
tional law defines as criminal. While definitions of "international crimes"
vary,57 the term in its broadest sense comprises offenses which conventional
or customary law either authorizes58 or requires states to criminalize, prose-
cute, and/or punish. Although international law generally establishes rights and
duties between and among states, international criminal law imposes obligations
on individuals,59 making them liable to criminal punishment.6 It also impos-
55. See infra Section C.
56. See infra Section D.
57. Compare Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 56 (1947) (a crime
against international law is "an act committed with intent to violate a fundamental interest protected by
international law or with knowledge that the act will probably violate such an interest, and which may not
be adequately punished by the exercise of the normal criminal jurisdiction of any state") with Dinstein,
International Criminal Law, 20 ISR. L. REV. 206, 221 (1985) (while international crimes typically are grave
offenses that "harm fundamental interests of the whole international community," an offense becomes an
international crime only when defined as such by positive international law). Although it is not always clear
in writings of international law scholars what consequences are believed to attach to "international crimes,"
the term is often used to refer to crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Dickinson, Is
the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334,335-38 (1924-25). But see I. BROWNIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAV 305 (4th ed. 1990) (noting distinction drawn by some publicists between
breaches of international law that can be punished by any state, such as violations of the laws of war, and
other offenses established by municipal law which international law authorizes any state to punish, such
as piracy). The term "international criminal law" is sometimes used more broadly to refer to law pursuant
to which "individuals are personally held to account for violations of the international order." Ruy & Silving,
International Criminal Law-A Search for Meaning, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 25 (M. Bassiouni
& V. Nanda eds. 1973). The International Law Commission's draft articles on state responsibility use the
term "international crimes" to refer to the controversial concept of crimes of a state. Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, [19761 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) at 119, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4ISER.AII976IAdd.1; T.
MERON, HUM.AN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 210 (1989). In recent decades
the term has also been used to refer to crimes that would be punishable by an international criminal court
if one were established. See ifra note 66.
58. In general, international law recognizes a state's right to exercise criminal jurisdiction in situations
where it has a significant relationship to the case. Jurisdiction has been recognized, for example, under the
"territorial" principle, which applies when the crime occurred in the territory of the prosecuting state; the
"passive personality" principle, which applies when the victim is a national of the prosecuting state; the
"nationality" principle, which applies when the offender is a national of the prosecuting state; and the
principle of "protective" jurisdiction, which recognizes states' right to prosecute crimes that threaten their
national security or fundamental governmental functions, regardless of where the crimes were committed.
See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 300-05; Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TEx. L. REV. 785, 786-88 (1988). See generally Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935). But see S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (set.
A) No. 10 (international law, rather than prohibiting exercise of jurisdiction when territorial principle does
not apply, permits exercise of jurisdiction except when specifically prohibited).
59. But see supra note 57 (noting concept of crimes of a state).
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es duties on states with respect to matters usually left to their discretion.6
'Thus, an amnesty law or an exercise of prosecutorial .discretion that is valid
under domestic law may nonetheless breach a state's international obligations-
62
In the eighteenth century, offenses against the law of nations subject to
criminal punishment fell into two categories. One comprised a narrow class of
offenses, most notably piracy,63 that were viewed as a common concern of
nations and which states lacking a direct nexus to the crime could nonetheless
punish.' The other comprised offenses, such as violations of safe conduct and
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, which states were required to
punish when committed by one of their citizens against a foreign national.
Although different rationales supported international law's concern with these
60. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg asserted:
[I]ntemational law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States ....
[I]ndividuals can be punished for violations of international law. Crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.
International Military Tribunal, Judgment, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 220-21 (1947) [hereinafter
"IMT Judgment"]. As long ago as the eighteenth century it was well established that individuals were liable
to punishment for committing offenses against the law of nations. See infra note 65. But as positivist views
of international law gained ascendency in the nineteenth century, international law was widely seen as a
set of rules binding states in their mutual relations. Under this view, international law could not directly
impose obligations upon individuals; only municipal law could do that. See Schwarzenberger, The Problem
of an International Criminal Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIINAL LAW 3, 10, 16 (G. Mueller & E. Wise eds.
1965); see also Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence Contrary to the
Laws of War, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (1943); cf Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in
International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 530, 553-
56 (1943) (international law specifies some offenses as criminal, though enforcement is undertaken by
municipal courts). The concept of crimes against international law, the commission of which gives rise to
individual liability, acquired renewed support in the wake of World War II. See Wright, supra note 57, at
56. The development of international human rights law in the second half of the twentieth century has played
a significant part in reviving and fortifying the view that individuals can be subjects of international law.
See generally T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 33-36
(1987); Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61 (1984); Sohn, The
New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1982).
61. In the words of one writer, "When international law defines an act as an offence, the upshot is that
the decision whether or not to prosecute offenders is not left to the unfettered discretion of States, which
are subjected to international obligations in the matter." Dinstein, supra note 57, at 225.
62. Cf. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955) ("If a State...
possessles] such rules of Municipal Law as it is prohibited from having by the Law of Nations, it violates
an international legal duty."); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 23, 1969, art. 27,
U.N. Doc. A/C.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M 679 (1969) [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"); Greco-
Bulgarian Communities, 1930 P.C.I.J. (set. B) No. 17, at 23; Polish Nationals in Danzig, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 44, at 24; see also Goldman, supra note 14, at 4; Montealegre, supra note 35, at 50.
63. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
64. A variety of treaties prohibiting slave trade were adopted in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. See 1 INTERNATIONAL CRItMINAL LAW 506-10 (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973). Both slavery
and slave trade are now generally recognized to be subject to universal jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 6, § 702 reporters' note 4. The crime of brigandage, too, has long been subject to
universal jurisdiction. See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 177,
190-94 (1945).
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offenses," in each instance national courts were the fora in which the law of
nations was enforced,
In the wake of World War II, the concept of international crimes expanded
to include offenses subject to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.66
More recently, the trend has been toward adoption of conventions that require
States Parties to criminalize, prosecute, and/or punish certain offenses when
committed in their territorial jurisdiction or under other specified circumstanc-
es.17 These treaties, like the customary law of the eighteenth century, look to
65. Blackstone offered the following rationale for states' duty to punish offenses against the law of
nations:
[W]here the individuals of any state violate [the law of nations], it is then the interest as well as
duty of the government under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity,
that the peace of the world may be maintained. For in vain would nations in their collective
capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects were at liberty to break them at their
own discretion, and involve the two states in a war. It is therefore incumbent upon the nation
injured ... to demand satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to which
he belongs ....
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *68. Although Blackstone went on to identify three "principle offences
against the law of nations," id., the quoted passage appears relevant to only two: "violation of safe-
conducts," and "infringement of the rights ofembassadors." Id. These offenses, when committed by a state's
citizens, would have violated that state's duty toward the state whose nationals had been directly injured.
If the first state fails to punish its offending citizen, Blackstone reasoned, it becomes "an accomplice or
abettor of his subject's crime, and draws upon his community the calamities of foreign war." Id. Blackstone
offered a different rationale for punishment of piracy, recognizing a right (not duty) of states to punish non-
nationals (rather than their own citizens) for reasons of self-defense (rather than to redress an offense against
another nation):
As therefore [the pirate] has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has re-
duced himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by the rule of self-
defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a state of nature
have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his person or personal property.
Id. at *71. But see Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 482-88 (1989) (in eighteenth century, governments viewed enforcement of law of
nations as duty whose discharge was emblematic of civilized nations; while specific and varying interests
justified punishment of particular offenses against law of nations, states viewed it as their duty to enforce
law of nations as such).
66. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec.
9, 1948, art. VI, G.A. Res. 260 A (111), 78 U.N.T.S. 227 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter
"Genocide Convention"]; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, art. V, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII)), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at
75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974) (entered into force July 18, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter "Apartheid Convention"]. The only instances in which such jurisdiction has been exercised were the
prosecutions of major war criminals in Nuremberg by the International Military Tribunal established by the
four Allied Powers, and by a similar tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established
to try Japanese war criminals in Tokyo. Although efforts to establish a permanent international penal tribunal
have been unsuccessful, the prospect of establishing such a court has had a significant impact in shaping
the concept of international crimes. See generally 2 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
1-61 (1980); Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1952).
67. See Dinstein, supra note 57, at 216-21. Some of these conventions also include provisions es-
tablishing universal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, art. 5(2), reprinted in 23 LL.M.
1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1984), 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter "Convention Against Torture"], or authorizing interna-
tional tribunals to exercise criminal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 66, art. VI;
Apartheid Convention, supra note 66, art. V. For a comprehensive listing of post-war conventions establish-
ing crimes, see Clark, The hifluence of the Nuremberg Trial on the Development of International Law, in
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national courts for enforcement. But in contrast to the older law of nations
requiring states to provide legal redress for injury to foreign nationals, modern
treaties often require states to enforce the rights of their own citizens.
2. Human Rights Crimes
a. The Nuremberg Precedent
Although relatively few violations of human rights are international crimes,
international criminal law has played an important-indeed, foundational-role
in the development of human rights law. The principle of universality supported
the Allied Powers' assertion of jurisdiction over Nazi war criminals for crimes
against humanity," the prosecution of which inaugurated the branch of inter-
national law recognizing and protecting human rights.69
To the extent that they reached Nazi offenses against German nationals, the
Nuremberg prosecutions represented a radical innovation in international law.
With few and limited exceptions, international law had not previously addressed
a state's treatment of its own citizens,70 much less imposed criminal sanctions
for such conduct.7 The Nuremberg prosecutions thus broadened the scope of
international law in general, and of international criminal law in particular.
The Allied Powers and Nuremberg tribunals72 justified the innovation on
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 253-54 (G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavtsev eds. 1990).
68. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571,582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986);
Randall, supra note 58, at 789; see also Opening Statement of Prosecution, United States v. Ohlendorf (Case
No. 9), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 46-47 (1950) [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS].
69. Although the branch of international law concerned with human rights had several pre-war
antecedents, it was "born in, and out of the Second World War." Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 5 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).
70. Antecedents to modern international human rights law are described in id. at 3-5, and in T. FARER,
THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA 63-65 (1988).
71. As noted previously, older principles of international law requiring states to punish delicts of their
citizens committed in the states' territorial jurisdiction concerned conduct that violated the rights of other
states. See supra note 65.
72. In all, thirteen cases against war criminals were tried at Nuremberg. The first was prosecuted before
the International Military Tribunal (IMT), the judges and prosecutors of which were nationals of the four
Allied Powers. Twelve subsequent prosecutions were brought before U.S. Military Tribunals. Additional
war criminals were prosecuted before tribunals in German war zones occupied by other Allied nations;
before an international tribunal in Tokyo; by the U.S. Army before military courts under the jurisdiction
of the theater commander in Germany; by various other countries, including those that had been occupied
by German forces during the war; and, eventually, by German national courts.
The IMT trial began on November 14, 1945 and lasted nine and one-half months. Twenty-two leading
Nazi figures were prosecuted; all but three were convicted of various crimes within the jurisdiction of the
IMT. For comprehensive accounts of the proceedings, see R. CONOT, supra note 32; A. TUSA & J. TUSA,
THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1984). Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
established in Tokyo to try war criminals from Japan, are described in A. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER
NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987). For discussion of human
rights law generated by the Nuremberg trials, see infra Section E.
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several grounds,73 two of which are of interest here.74 First, crimes against
humanity could be punished by an international court because the conduct, by
its nature, offended humanity itself.75 Because the crime originated in "hu-
manity"--presumably under natural aw 76-its legal status and consequences
transcended the province of municipal law.77 A person who committed crimes
73. The following discussion addresses the Nuremberg tribunals' punishment of crimes against
humanity, and does not consider justifications for their assertion of jurisdiction over other crimes. But see
infra note 79.
74. The Allied nations' chief response to charges that they were applying ex post facto law was that
international law already recognized the human rights crimes for which Nazi war criminals were prosecuted
since those crimes violated principles common to the major legal systems of the world. See Jackson Report,
supra note 32, at 184, 186; United States v. von Leeb (Case No. 12), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 68, at 510; R. WOE'ZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1962); Clark, Crimes
Against Humanity, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193-94 (G. Ginsburgs & V.
Kudriavtsev eds. 1990). Proponents of the prosecutions also asserted that the extremely atrocious nature
of the crimes put the defendants on notice that their conduct offended the law of nations. See Wright, supra
note 57, at 61. Further, the prosecuting nations noted that murder was proscribed by German law, and that
the acts constituting crimes against humanity generally involved deliberate murders. See The Legal Basis
of the Nuremberg Trial, United States Department of State, Office of International Information (1945), at
XVIIA (also suggesting that, as sovereign power in Germany following unconditional surrender of German
government, Allies were entitled to enact retroactive laws).
75. This view was implicit in the tribunals' answer to charges that they were imposing "victors'
justice." The U.S. Military Tribunal asserted in the Einsatzgruppen Case:
The defendants are in court not as members of a defeated nation but because they are charged
with crime. They are being tried because they are accused of having offended against society
itself, and society, as represented by international law, has summoned them for explanation.
United States v. Ohlendorf (Case No. 9), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 462. Similarly,
the tribunal asserted: "Humanity is the sovereignty which has been offended and a tribunal is convoked
to determine why." Id. at 497; see also Opening Speech of Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for
the United States, Nov. 21, 1945, 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 155 (1947) [hereinafter TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS] (asserting to IMT, "The
real complaining party at your bar is Civilization.").
76. See The Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial, supra note 74, at XVIII (actions of defendants before
IMT "are certainly at least 'natural crimes' because they constitute inhuman acts"); see also Final Speech
of Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief Prosecutor for Great Britain, July 27, 1946, XIX TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 75, at 472; United States v. von Leeb (Case No. 12), XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 68, at 476 (both quoting or citing passage from Grotius, infra note 77).
77. More than three centuries before the Nuremberg trials, the eminent Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius
framed a natural law justification for foreign intervention that would support the prosecutions:
The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights equal to those kings,
have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against
themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but
excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.
2 H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS ch. XX, § XL, para. 1 (1625) (Carnegie trans. 1925). The British
jurist Richard Zouche similarly held that "when crimes are very atrocious and very plain," kings "have the
right to demand satisfaction not only for wrongs done to themselves or their subjects, but also for wrongs
to any person whomsoever, which are in flagrant violation of the law of nature and nations; since the power
of punishing is not merely derived from civil law, but comes from natural law also." 2 R. ZOUCHE, IURIs
ET IUDIcII FECIALIs, SIVE, IURIS INTER GENTES, ET QUAESTIONIM DE EODEM EXPLICATIO 116 (1650),
reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1911). The Swiss publicist Emerich de Vattel, too,
found justification for an exception to the general rule that states could punish only crimes against them-
selves if the offense were so heinous that it offended all mankind. E. DE VATTEL, I LE DROIT DES GENs,
ch. XIX, paras. 232-33 (1758).
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against humanity was, like the pirate, hostis humani generis--"an enemy
of all mankind"--over whom any state could assert criminal jurisdiction.
It was a short step from recognition of crimes against humanity as a
violation of international law to the assertion that such crimes could be pun-
ished by an international court.79 The U.S. Military Tribunal in the Einsatz-
gruppen Case reasoned:
Where law exists a court will rise .... It would be an admission of
incapacity, in contradiction of every self-evident reality, that mankind
.. should be unable to maintain a tribunal holding inviolable the law
of humanity, and, by doing so, preserve the human race itself."0
78. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *68 (quoting Sir Edward Coke); see also H. WHEATON,
ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (1866). The analogy of human rights criminals to pirates should
not be overdrawn; many of the justifications for establishing universal jurisdiction over piracy are absent
in the case of human rights violations. Those rationales include the fact that pirates' victims were genuinely
international, see Cowles, supra note 64, at 185-87, lending many states a legitimate interest in prosecuting
pirates; the notion (often factually incorrect) that pirates were stateless, see 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
62, at 609, thereby giving every state the right to assert jurisdiction; and the fact that piracy could disrupt
international commerce, see B. DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 62 (1980), giving states
generally a direct interest in deterring the crime through prosecution. In contrast, human rights crimes are,
with some exceptions, committed by state officials or agents against their own citizens in their own territory,
producing no direct injury to other states or their nationals. Accordingly, if universal jurisdiction was well
established in international law by 1945, its extension to human rights offenses nonetheless represented a
significant inroad into traditional notions of international law, which placed overwhelming emphasis on state
sovereignty. One rationale for universal jurisdiction that is equally applicable to pirates and human rights
violators is that both offenders commit acts so antithetical to common standards of civilization that they
have, in effect, renounced the right to be protected by its laws. Cf. 2 A. GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES
22 (1612) (J. Rolfe trans. 1932) ("malefactors do not enjoy the privileges of a law to which they are foes");
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *71 (a pirate can be punished because "he has renounced all the
benefits of society and government"). Moreover, in both instances international cooperation may be
necessary to ensure apprehension. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 338.
79. The IMT in fact had a hybrid character, reflecting diverse justifications cited for its assertion of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was based in part upon the long-established right of belligerents to prosecute their
enemies for violations of the laws of war committed during hostilities. See Wright, supra note 57, at 45,
49. Even this basis of jurisdiction was controverted, see Schick, The Nuremberg Trial and the International
Law of the Future, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 778-80 (1947), and the jurisdiction of the IMT in any event
covered conduct that could not even arguably be prosecuted on this basis. Jurisdiction was also based on
the prosecuting nations' status as occupying powers. See IMT Judgment, supra note 60, at 216 (the "making
of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German
Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied
territories has been recognized by the civilized world."); see also Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and
International Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 22 (1947); Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 178, 210 (1946); Wright, supra note 57, at 51. The IMT also purported to operate as an internation-
al court applying the law of nations. See IMT Judgment, supra note 60, at 216 (the "Charter is not an
arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious Nations, but in the view of the Tribunal.... it is
the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribu-
tion to international law."); see also R. WOETZEL, supra note 74, at 55-57. The IMT's status as an
international tribunal was reinforced by the fact that the Nuremberg Charter, though executed by the United
States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, was ratified by nineteen other nations. The defendants
were tried for crimes against international law, as codified in the Nuremberg Charter, without reference to
German law. See id. at 35-36. Indeed, the Charter explicitly provided that the IMT would have jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity "whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where per-
petrated." See infra text accompanying note 220.
80. United States v. Ohlendorf, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 499-500; cf. United
States v. von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 480 (since there is "no doubt of the
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Indeed, the notion that international judicial enforcement was the only means
of genuinely establishing the rule of international law was a central premise
of the Allied Powers' program of prosecution.81
Second, the Allied Powers sought to justify the novelty of judging matters
traditionally subject to the exclusive sovereign power of states by linking crimes
against humanity to conduct that had unambiguous international ramifica-
tions-international war. Crimes against humanity, the Allies asserted, are a
menace to world peace; World War II supplied ample justification for their
claim.82 The Allied nations hewed closely to this rationale in establishing the
jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal ("IMT") over crimes against
humanity. These could be prosecuted only when committed "in execution of
or in connection with" one of the other two crimes subject to IMT jurisdiction:
crimes against peace and war crimes.83
b. Post-Nuremberg Developments
In the wake of World War II, it may have seemed plausible to maintain that
the international community had an interest in suppressing crimes against
humanity because they threatened world peace. But in subsequent years, states
were more inclined to avoid pressing human rights concerns with other govern-
ments, in large part because they feared that such actions would actually exacer-
bate international tensions.84
criminality of the acts with which the defendants are charged," the fact that no court had previously been
established to try such violations is no bar to tribunal's assertion of jurisdiction).
81. See Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States
and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1987) (for parties and IMT,
"adjudication was to be the process by which 'enforcement' of international law occurred"). Telford Taylor,
who assisted in the prosecution of major war criminals before the IMT and led the subsequent prosecutions
before U.S. Military Tribunals in Nuremberg, made the point this way: "No principle deserves to be called
such unless men are willing to stake their consciences on its enforcement. That is the way law comes into
being, and that is what was done at Nuernberg." TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 32, at 112.
82. Statements by prosecutors representing the Allied Powers and the decisions of the tribunals make
constant reference to this theme. Telford Taylor stated the view succinctly in his final report on the U.S.
prosecutions in Nuremberg: "The Second World War abundantly proved that dictatorship is the most
constant and serious menace to world peace, as well as to the preservation of liberty and the maintenance
of moral standards." TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 32, at 104; see also United States v. Altstoetter (Case
No. 3), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 982.
83. CharteroftheInternationalMilitary Tribunal, art. 6(c),59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. No. 472,
82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. For further discussion of this subject, see infra text
accompanying notes 229-37.
84. It took little time for this concern to prevail over international efforts to promote human rights.
During its early years, as tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the United States mounted, the Commission
on Human Rights of the United Nations faced substantial opposition, from both Eastern-bloc and Western
nations, to its efforts to draft human rights conventions and to implement human rights guarantees. While
the Commission was able to draft the nonbinding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217,
U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71 (1948), in short order, it did not finish drafting the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, stipra note 54, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), both of which would be binding on States Parties, until the mid-1950s;
the covenants were not adopted by the General Assembly until 1966, and they did not enter into force until
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This reticence accounts for the failure of efforts, inspired by the Nuremberg
prosecutions and contemplated in the Genocide Convention, 5 to create a per-
manent international criminal court.85 Describing opposition to the creation
of such a tribunal by state representatives who helped draft the Genocide
Convention, one writer observed:
[S]ince the Convention envisaged that members of governments might
be authors of the crime [of genocide], there was the danger that the
attempt to punish offenders through an international tribunal might
jeopardize peace.87
In effect, then, one of the asserted justifications for the Nuremberg prosecu-
tions-the claim that the international community should prosecute crimes
against humanity because they threaten world peace-was turned on its head
in the post-war years.88 With this development, the vision nurtured by the
Nuremberg precedent-that of a system of international criminal law whose
authority depended upon its enforcement by a permanent international
court-evanesced. 89
1976.
85. Supra note 66.
86. The idea of establishing an international criminal court had been discussed for some decades before
the Nuremberg prosecutions, see Manner, supra note 60, at 428-32, and in 1937 the League of Nations
adopted a Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court. Although several states signed
the Convention, none ratified it, and the treaty never entered into force. See I B. FERENCZ, supra note 66,
at 54. Efforts to establish an international criminal court gained substantial momentum only after the
Nuremberg prosecution. In its wake, there was some enthusiasm within the United States Department of
State for establishing a permanent international court, but in a few short years that support dissipated.
Interview with Telford Taylor in New York City (June 21, 1990). See also 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 66,
at4-5. Subsequent efforts encountered especially strong antipathy during periods of pronounced international
tension. See generally id. A proposal to create an International Court of Human Rights, presented to the
working group that drafted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also was rejected. See
Pechota, The Development of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 49 (L. Henkin ed. 1981).
87. L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 37 (1982); cf. 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 66, at 46 (establishment of a
permanent international criminal court was opposed on the basis that its existence "might even impair the
possibilities of peace by interfering with the process of political conciliation").
88. This development was virtually inevitable; the prospect of states asserting a right even to criticize
other nations' treatment of their own citizens-let alone to prosecute such conduct-would be anathema
to governments long accustomed to nearly absolute sovereign prerogative in such matters. The fact that the
only precedent for such prosecutions had been tied so directly to conquest in war could only reinforce states'
inclination to associate international prosecutions with hostile inter-state relations. In this regard it is
noteworthy that the only significant prospect of international prosecutions since the Nuremberg trials has
also arisen in the wake of the prospective defendants' resounding defeat in war-this time, the Persian Gulf
war of January-March 1991.
89. States have also been reluctant to file inter-state complaints pursuant to human rights conventions
that establish such a procedure. As of May 30, 1991, the European Commission of Human Rights had
received, since 1953, only 11 inter-state complaints (submitted by 21 applicant states) alleging violations
of the European Convention, supra note 34. In the same period, it had received some 18,300 applications
from individuals, of which approximately 2,000 were still pending on May 30, 1991. To date, no state has
filed an inter-state complaint pursuant to Article 41 of the International Covenant, supra note 54. See de
Zayas, The Potential for the United States Joining the Covenant Family, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW
299, 302 (1990).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 2537
In contrast, the other justification for the Allies' prosecution of crimes
against humanity-the principle that every human being enjoys fundamental
rights independent of domestic law-gained broad acceptance in subsequent
decades. This principle has been affirmed in numerous international instruments,
and widespread adherence to human rights conventions has reinforced the claim
that human rights violations are a legitimate concern of all nations." As
human rights guarantees have acquired the status of positive international law,
the legal fictions invoked by the Allied Powers to justify the Nuremberg
prosecutions have diminished in importance-while, ironically, states' willing-
ness to prosecute human rights violations committed outside their territory has
dissipated."
c. Domestic Enforcement
While issues of jurisdictional power dominated early developments in
human rights law, more recent developments have emphasized domestic en-
forcement of international obligations. For example, human rights treaties
drafted in recent years have often specified domestic means of enforcing rights
recognized in earlier conventions, including criminal prosecution of violators.92
90. Virtually every nation has adhered to at least one international human rights agreement, Henkin,
supra note 69, at 1, and human rights is now a prominent subject of international diplomacy. See The Text
of the Political Declaration, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at A4, col. 4; The Group of 7 Statement: Concern
From East Europe to China, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1989, at 17, col. 1.
91. But see supra note 88 (noting possibility of international prosecutions for war crimes committed
during recent Persian Gulf war). States have, in general, been more willing to assert universal jurisdiction
to punish World War H criminals than to prosecute current offenders. A number of countries, including
Israel and Australia, have enacted laws vesting domestic courts with jurisdiction over Nazi war crimes. See
Study as regards ensuring the arrest, extradition and punishment of persons responsible for war crimes
and crimes against humanity and the exchange of documentation relating thereto: Report of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/983, at 10, paras. 25, 29 (1969) [hereinafter U.N. Study
on Punishment of War Criminals]. An Israeli court cited universal jurisdiction as one basis of its jurisdiction
over Adolf Eichmann, who was prosecuted in Israel in 1961 for Nazi war crimes, including crimes against
humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 L.R. 18, 26 (Isr.
Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961, aff' d, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). The Sixth Circuit cited the principle
of universal jurisdiction to justify extraditing another war criminal, John Ivan Demjanjuk, to Israel to face
charges of crimes against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d
571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The Israeli District Court in Jerusalem
convicted Demjanjuk and sentenced him to death in 1988. A French court apparently invoked the principle
of universality in rejecting a challenge to the legality of Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie's arrest by French
authorities in Guiana. The French Chambre d'accusation (of the Court of Appeal) found that the crimes
against humanity with which Barbie was charged "do not simply fall within the scope of French municipal
law but are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of frontiers and extradition rules
arising therefrom are completely foreign." Excerpted in Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 130 (1988). This finding was
affirmed by the Court of Cassation (Criminal Chamber) on October 6, 1983. See id. at 128-31. On July 4,
1987 Barbie was convicted by the Cour d'Assises du Rhone of 340 counts of 17 crimes against humanity,
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 78 I.L.R. 148 (1988) (editor's note).
92. The Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1984, specifies a series of legal measures that States Parties must adopt to ensure suppression of tor-
ture-a practice already proscribed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 84, and
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 54, which was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly in 1966. See J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
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Notably, bodies that monitor compliance with several human rights treaties that
are textually silent about punishment have made clear that investigation and
prosecution play a necessary part in States Parties' fulfillment of certain duties
under the conventions. 93
Although surprising in light of the treaties' failure to mention punishment,
these interpretations are a natural outgrowth of broad trends in international law,
as are recent conventions explicitly requiring punishment of human rights
crimes. International law has long relied upon criminal sanctions to secure
compliance with norms deemed essential to international order.94 When, more
recently, international law established human rights guarantees, 95 it was there-
fore natural that criminal law would play a role in securing rights that are of
paramount importance. And with the collapse of states' resolve to establish a
permanent international criminal court, it was also inevitable that human rights
law would revert to the older paradigm of international penal law, which
envisaged that domestic courts would enforce criminal prohibitions.96 Further,
since human rights can be fully assured only when there are adequate safe-
guards in domestic law, it is scarcely surprising that states' duty to secure
fundamental rights has been found to require an appropriate response by
national courts when violations occur.
While modern law favors enforcement by courts of the state in which
violations occur, that preference can be overridden if necessary to achieve the
paramount aim of human rights criminal law: to prevent atrocious crimes by
TORTURE 1 (1988); G.A. Res. 39/46 (1984), preambular para. 5 (General Assembly, adopting Convention
Against Torture, expresses its desire to achieve "a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition
under international and national law of the practice of torture.. ."). Similarly, the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, OEA/ser.A./42 (1986), 67 O.A.S.T.S., reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986) (entered into force 1987), which was adopted by the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States (O.A.S.) in 1985, sets forth measures that States Parties must adopt to
eradicate torture-a practice prohibited by the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Jan. 7, 1970,
O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser.K./XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. I, corr. 1 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) [hereinafter "American Convention"]. Although obligatory for States Parties, the duties specified
in these treaties are not the exclusive means states can use to enforce rights established by other sources
of international law.
93. This trend, which is examined in Section C, may be partly attributable to the fact that international
organizations, having drafted and promulgated major human rights treaties some decades ago, are now
increasingly concerned with monitoring implementation of the conventions. A more particular explanation
may have to do with the nature of human rights violations committed by many governments in recent
decades. Torture and extra-legal executions are often committed in secrecy, and a lack of government
accountability is an essential element of forced "disappearances." See Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The
Art and Science of Hnman Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 83, 94 (1990). As bodies that
monitor compliance with human rights treaties began to examine these violations, it became increasingly
important to identify states' affirmative duties to ensure fundamental rights, since direct state responsibility
for violations often could not be established conclusively.
94. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 90.
96. See supra text accompanying note 65. More generally, for purposes of establishing state responsi-
bility under international law, courts have long been regarded as organs of the state. See C. EAGLETON, T14E
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (1928); Kelsen, supra note 60, at 538. Consistent
with this approach, the performance of national courts in securing protected rights is one measure of a state's
compliance with its international human rights obligations.
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ensuring that offenders are punished. This scheme-a preference for domestic
enforcement with allowance for "fallback" international jurisdiction-is embod-
ied in several recent and draft conventions, which place primary responsibility
for punishing proscribed conduct on the state where the crime occurred, but
establish universal jurisdiction to ensure prosecution in the event that the
government most responsible for suppressing violations fails to bring offenders
to account.
97
B. Human Rights Conventions Specifying a Duty To Prosecute
The most explicit obligations to punish human rights crimes that are likely
to be relevant to societies emerging from dictatorship are established by the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide9
("Genocide Convention") and the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment99 ("Convention Against Tor-
ture").100 Although both require States Parties to prosecute the conduct they
proscribe, the two conventions embody profoundly different visions of interna-
97. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25; see also Clark, supra note 67, at 256.
98. See supra note 66. As of June 6, 1991, 101 countries had ratified the convention.
99. See supra note 67. As of June 6, 1991, 55 countries had ratified the convention.
100. Various other human rights treaties require States Parties to criminalize particular acts, e.g.,
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965,
art. 4, G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Apartheid Convention, supra note 66, art.
V, or to punish violations of a particular right, e.g., Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery,
the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted Sept. 7, 1956, 3 U.S.T. 3201,
T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 40,42-43. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 also require States Parties
to prosecute certain violations. Each of these conventions, which set forth standards of conduct relating to
armed conflict, identifies several prohibitions the violation of which is deemed a "grave breach" of the
convention. These include such acts as "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or
transfer or unlawful confinement .... Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see
also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.LA.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, art. 130, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The conventions require High Contracting Parties to "enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be commit-
ted, any of the grave breaches" to the conventions, Geneva Conventions of 1949, arts. 146/49/50/129, and
further provide:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers.... hand
such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Id. Although Article 3 common to all four conventions proscribes such conduct as torture and summary
execution in the context of non-international armed conflict, it is generally thought that the "grave
breaches" provisions apply only to acts committed during international armed conflicts. See, e.g., T.
MERON, supra note 57, at 33 n.93. Because this Article is concerned with the duty of successor
governments vis-a-vis abuses committed against their own citizens, the duty to punish under the Geneva
Conventions is not analyzed here.
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tional human rights lav. Drafted in the wake of World War II, the Genocide
Convention reflects a paradigm, inspired by the Nuremberg prosecutions, of
a world order in which internationally recognized rights are enforced by an
international tribunal. Establishment of a world court was a key objective of
the convention's chief proponents, but their efforts were built on an edifice that
was crumbling even as their labor progressed. By the time the drafters' work
was completed, support for an international penal tribunal had so dissipated" t
that the convention's provision for jurisdiction by such a court was little more
than an acknowledgment of a faded vision, and chief responsibility for prosecut-
ing genocide fell to the state most responsible for the crimes." z Thus the
Genocide Convention at once embodies a vanishing commitment to a system
of international enforcement and an early manifestation of the more modern
emphasis on domestic enforcement. 03
The Convention Against Torture, which the General Assembly adopted
thirty-six years after it adopted the Genocide Convention, reflects a pragmatic
acceptance of the limited role of international enforcement in securing protected
rights. No mention is made of an international tribunal. And while the Conven-
tion establishes a form of universal jurisdiction over torturers, chief respon-
sibility for punishing violations lies with the state in which the crime occurred.
1. The Genocide Convention
The principle purpose of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide was, as its name suggests, to prevent genocide0
4
by ensuring punishment of the crime."t 5 Virtually the entire convention is
101. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
104. Article II of the Genocide Convention, supra note 66, defines genocide as one of the following
acts when committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such":
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
105. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/3 at8 (1948) (remarks of United Nations Secretary General); U.N. GAOR,
178th, 179th plen. mtg., at 832 (1948) (remarks of delegate from Netherlands). While the travauxprepara-
toires suggest that one impetus behind the Convention was a desire to condemn World War II atrocities,
see, e.g., id. at 825 (remarks of delegate from France), the drafting records indicate that the overriding
purpose was to prevent a recurrence by assuring punishment of offenders. See, e.g., id. at 811 (remarks of
Soviet delegate); id. at 819 (remarks of delegate from Pakistan); id. at 820 (remarks of U.S. delegate); id.
at 823 (remarks of Australian delegate); id. at 840 (remarks of Polish delegate). Another impetus was a
desire to correct what many viewed as a serious shortcoming of the Nuremberg prosecutions: the IMT's
determination that it could convictNazis of crimes against humanity only when the offenses were committed
"in execution of or in connection with" crimes against peace or war crimes. See Office of United States
Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Opinion and
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal) 84 (1947), quoted in Genocide: A Commentary on the
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designed to serve this purpose. Pursuant to Article I, Contracting Parties "con-
firm that genocide... is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish," and Article III sets forth various forms of partici-
pation in genocide that "shall be punishable." Article IV provides that persons
"committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall
be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials
or private individuals," while Article V requires Contracting Parties to enact
legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention "and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide." Article VI specifies
the tribunals that should try cases of genocide:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Since the "international penal tribunal" contemplated by the Convention was
never created, the duty established by Article VI devolves upon the state in
which the crimes occurred.
What has widely been viewed as a major flaw in the Genocide Conven-
tion-its reliance on domestic courts for punishment t° 6-leaves unambiguous
Convention, 58 YALE L.J. 1142, 1143 (1949); U.N. GAOR, 178th, 179th plen. mtg., at 820 (1948)
(comments of U.S. delegate); id. at 822-23 (remarks of delegate from Australia). This limitation had pre-
cluded prosecution of abominations against Germany's Jewish population before 1939, see infra note 230
and accompanying text; the definition of genocide contained in the Genocide Convention imposes no re-
quirement of a nexus to war.
106. In the view of the U.S. delegate, "If the punishment of [genocide] was left to the State in question,
the convention on genocide would be in the nature of a fraud." U.N. GAOR, 178th, 179th plen. mtg., at
821 (1948). Other delegates voiced similar doubts about the willingness of national courts to prosecute
genocide. See, e.g., id. at 823 (remarks of delegate from Australia); id. at 829 (remarks of delegate from
Egypt); see also L. KUPER, supra note 87, at 37-38; Genocide: A Commentary on the Convention, supra
note 105, at 1147. But a "storm of protest" was directed against a draft provision that would have required
Contracting Parties to submit persons guilty of genocide for trial before an international court if 1) the states
were unwilling to try or extradite the offenders, or 2) the offenders were acting with the support or on behalf
of the state. L. KUPER, supra note 87, at 36-37. Opponents charged that an international court would infringe
national sovereignty, see U.N. GAOR, 178th, 179th plen. mtg., at 815 (1948) (remarks of Soviet representa-
tive); id. at 842 (remarks of delegate from Poland), and, as noted earlier, expressed concern that international
prosecution of offenders could jeopardize world peace. See text accompanying note 87, supra. While
delegates to the drafting committee doubted states' willingness to prosecute acts of genocide committed
in their territory, there was no question of Contracting Parties' duty to do so. Indeed, a proposal to include
a provision contemplating reparations for genocide was defeated because some delegates feared that the
draft provision would dilute the Convention's emphasis on criminal punishment. The provision had been
included in the original draft convention prepared by the Secretary General. Draft Convention on the Crime
of Genocide, art. XIII, U.N. Doe. E/447 (1947). Delegates who had opposed earlier proposals relating to
an international penal tribunal were willing to accept the final text in part because efforts to include in the
definition of genocide acts directed against "political groups" had been defeated. With this, the risk that
states would be brought to account for persecuting political opponents had significantly diminished. See
L. KUPER, supra note 87, at 38. Proposals to establish universal jurisdiction were also defeated. Again,
opponents claimed that allowing courts to punish officials of another state would infringe national sovereign-
ty and could provoke international tension. See N. ROBINsON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 31-32 (1960).
2564
1991] Settling Accounts 2565
Contracting Parties' duty to punish persons who commit genocide in the states'
territory.t07 In practice, however, few post-transition situations would be cov-
ered by the Convention. Systematic repression is often directed against per-
ceived or actual political opponents. But acts directed against "political groups"
were excluded from the Convention's definition of genocide. 08 Also, even
the most depraved violations would lie beyond the scope of the Convention
unless "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part," one of the speci-
fied groups "as such." 109
The jurisdiction established by the Genocide Convention is not exclusive.
Scholars and judicial bodies concur that customary law establishes universal
jurisdiction over genocide. t t Moreover there is substantial support for the
view that customary law requires states to prosecute acts of genocide committed
in their territory. The International Court of Justice has asserted, in an advisory
opinion, that the principles underlying the Genocide Convention "are recognized
by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obliga-
tion.""' Although the opinion does not specify which provisions reflect cus-
tomary norms, those requiring punishment pursuant to tne territorial princi-
ple,"' which are the heart of the Convention, surely are included. n 3 The
107. The duty probably would not arise under the Convention unless a state became a party before
the acts constituting genocide took place. See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 28 (establishing general
rule that treaty provisions do not apply to acts that took place before entry into force of treaty for relevant
party). An amnesty foreclosing prosecution of persons who committed genocide would, however, violate
a state's obligations under customary law. See infra text accompanying notes 111-15.
108. See supra note 106. Proposals to include "political groups" in the definition were rejected in large
part because delegates feared that their governments would face interference in their internal affairs if
genocide were defined to include acts committed to destroy political groups. See L. KUPER, supra note 87,
at 29. Kuper adds: "I think.. . that one may fairly say that the delegates, after all, represented governments
in power, and that many of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress political
opposition." Id. at 30.
109. Genocide Convention, supra note 66, art. II. For example, the majority of persons killed by the
Khmer Rouge, whose savage policies caused the deaths of over a million Cambodians in the 1970's, may
not have been victims of genocide because it is not clear that the Khmer Rouge intended to kill members
of a national group "as such." See generally B. Kiernan, The Cambodian Genocide: Issues and Responses
(paper presented at conference on Genocide: The Theory-The Reality, Yale Law School, New Haven,
Conn., Feb. 16, 1991). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Genocide has stated that the Khmer
Rouge was guilty of genocide "[e]ven under the most restricted definition, since the victims included target
groups such as the Chains (an Islamic minority) and the Buddhist monks." Revised and updated report on
the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide prepared by Mr. B. Whitaker, 38
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 10 n.17, U.N. Doe. EICN.4/Sub.2/1985/6.
110. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 39 (Isr. Dist. Ct.-Jerusalem 1961),
aft'd, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. Sup. CL 1962): RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 404, reporters' note I
(1987); Randall, supra note 58, at 836.
111. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951
I.C.I 15, at 23.
112. See supra note 58.
113. In a passage preceding the above-quoted language, the Court observed that "it was the intention
of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under international law .... ' Id. The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES suggests that the Conven-
tion's definition of genocide also reflects customary law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 702
comment d.
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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States supports this
view:
A state violates customary law if it practices or encourages genocide,
fails to make genocide a crime or to punish persons guilty of it, or
otherwise condones genocide. Parties to the Genocide Convention are
bound also by the provisions requiring states to punish persons guilty
of conspiracy, direct and public incitement, or attempt to commit geno-
cide, or complicity in genocide, and to extradite persons accused of
genocide.114
In this view, customary law requires all states to punish persons who commit
genocide in their territorial jurisdiction,"' while Parties to the Genocide Con-
vention are additionally required to punish persons who participate less directly
in the crime.
2. The Convention Against Torture
Like the Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture imposes
an unambiguous duty to prosecute the acts it defines as criminal.11 6 States
Parties pledge to "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under [their]
criminal law,"117 and, under specified circumstances, to undertake measures
to establish jurisdiction over such offenses." 8 Article 7 requires that States
Parties either extradite an alleged torturer or "submit the case to [their] com-
petent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."1 9
In contrast to the analogous provision in the Genocide Convention, the duty
established by Article 7 was understood to be a practical and effective means
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. For reasons indicated infra note 198 and text accompanying notes 198-99, it is possible that the
customary duty framed by the Restatement would be violated only by a complete failure to punish genocide,
and not by a failure to punish every individual who participated in the crime.
116. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 92, similarly requires
States Parties to criminalize torture and to punish violations. Id., arts. 6, 12.
117. Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, art. 4. Article 1 defines "torture" as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed,
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
118. Id., art. 5. This article effectively establishes a form of universal jurisdiction. See infra note 123
and accompanying text.
119. This provision was designed to ensure that "no offender would have the opportunity to escape
the consequences of his acts of torture." Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 36 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on
Hum. Rts. at 11, para. 61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1367 (1980).
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of suppressing torture.2 0 This much is evident both from statements of the
drafting committee 2' and from the text of the Convention, which establishes
an array of domestic measures designed to assure freedom from torture1 22
While focusing on domestic means of preventing torture, the Convention
also establishes a form of universal jurisdiction to ensure punishment in the
event a State Party fails to prosecute torturers. 25 Drafted primarily to address
situations in which a complicit government is unwilling to prosecute its officials
for torture, 24 this provision would also make it "more difficult for the per-
petrators to escape the consequences of their acts by fleeing to another coun-
try. 125
The explicit duty to institute criminal proceedings against alleged torturers
precludes adherents to the Convention Against Torture from enacting, or at least
applying, an amnesty law that forecloses prosecution of torturers. 21 The
committee established to monitor compliance with the Convention1 27 has
made clear, however, that the duty arises only when the alleged torture occurred
after the Convention entered into force with respect to the State Party. 28
120. This difference between the Convention Against Torture and the Genocide Convention stems from
the nature of the conduct proscribed in the two treaties. Genocide is, by its nature, likely to involve state
complicity. Although torture, too, is often committed pursuant to state policy, it is more likely than genocide
to be inflicted by state agents acting in contravention of official policy.
121. The first draft convention contained relatively weak language: "Each State Party shall, except [in
the case of extradition], ensure that criminal proceedings are instituted in accordance with its national law
.. " Summary Prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV),
35 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 16, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1314 (1978). The language of the final
text of Article 7 was substituted at the suggestion of the French delega:ion, which urged that it was
"essential to retain the principle of the advisability of instituting proceedings." Id. at 17, para. 81.
122. E.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, art. 14 (civil remedies for torture); id., art. 10
(training of law-enforcement personnel).
123. Id., art. 5(2). This provision would ensure that "[n]o one guilty of torture [would] feel safe from
prosecution." Summary Records of the 32nd Meeting, 40 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. (32d mtg.)
at 16, para. 85, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1984/SR.32 (delegate from Germany). Although some delegations were
at first reluctant to accept a provision establishing universal jurisdiction, by early 1984 no state opposed
its inclusion in the draft convention. See Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 40 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. (32d mtg.) at 5, para. 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72.
124. See Report of the Working Group on the Draft Convention Against Torture, 38 U.N. ESCOR
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 7, para. 40, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40.
125. J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 92, at 58.
126. Nevertheless, a State Party might be allowed to enact a statute oflimitations covering prosecutions
for torture, provided the torture did not constitute a crime against humanity. See infra note 252. It would,
however, probably be inconsistent with a State Party's obligations under the Convention to enact a statute
of limitations that failed to provide a reasonable time for instituting criminal proceedings. In a situation
where criminal prosecution was foreclosed because torture was carried out pursuant to state policy, the
statute of limitations should be considered to have tolled during the period when prosecutions were
effectively impossible.
127. Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, art. 17.
128. At its third session, the Committee Against Torture held inadmissible three communications
challenging the application of two laws enacted by the government of Argentina that precluded prosecution
of military authorities allegedly responsible for torturing to death relatives of the complainants. Both laws
were enacted after Argentina had signed and ratified the Convention Against Torture but before the
Convention entered into force, and the torture that was the basis of the communications had occurred before
the Convention was even drafted. The Committee held that the Convention did not apply to the acts,
including the legislative enactments, that occurred before the Convention entered into force, but observed
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C. Comprehensive Human Rights Conventions
In contrast to the conventions on torture and genocide, three comprehensive
human rights treaties-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("International Covenant"), 29 the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention"),1 30 and
the American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention") 131-do
not explicitly require States Parties to prosecute or punish violations of rights
set forth in the conventions. Authoritative interpretations make clear, however,
that these treaties require States Parties generally to investigate serious viola-
tions of physical integrity-in particular, torture, extra-legal executions, and
forced disappearances-and to bring to justice those who are responsible. The
rationale behind these duties is straightforward: prosecution and punishment
are the most effective-and therefore only adequate-means of ensuring a nar-
row class of rights that merit special protection.
The duties derive from States Parties' affirmative obligation to ensure rights
set forth in these conventions. Adherents to all three treaties pledge not only
to respect enumerated rights, but also to ensure that persons subject to their
jurisdiction enjoy the full exercise of those rights.132 The International Coven-
that the government of Argentina was nonetheless "morally bound to provide a remedy to victims of torture
and to their dependents." O.R., M.M. and M.S. v. Argentina, Comms. Nos. 1/1988, 211988 and 3/1988,
Decisions of the Committee against Torture under article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. CAT/Cf3/D/l, 2, and 3/1988, Annex,
par. 9 (1989).
129. See supra note 54. As of June 6, 1991, 95 countries had ratified this convention.
130. See supra note 34. The European Convention has been ratified by 23 states.
131. See supra note 92. As of 1990,22 of the 32 member states of the Organization of American States
had ratified the American Convention. This Article does not consider duties imposed by the Banjul Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/673/Rev. 5, reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter "Banjul Charter"], because the Charter does not explicitiy require States
Parties to investigate or prosecute violations of its substantive guarantees, and the commission established
to monitor States Parties' compliance has not yet rendered any decisions interpreting the Charter.
132. A Party to the International Covenant undertakes "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" in the convention. International Covenant,
supra note 54, art. 2(l). Parties to the American Convention similarly "undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognized [in the Convention] and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms .... " American Convention, supra note 92, art. I(1), and
Parties to the European Convention pledge to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms" set forth the Convention. European Convention, supra note 34, art. 1. Professor Buergenthal
writes that the duty to "ensure" rights set forth in the International Covenant "implies an affirmative
obligation by the state to take whatever measures are necessary to enable individuals to enjoy or exercise
the rights guaranteed in the Covenant, including the removal of governmental and possibly also some private
obstacles to the enjoyment of these rights." Buergenthal, To Respect and To Ensure: State Obligations and
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) (footnote
omitted). Although the Banjul Charter differs significantly from the other comprehensive conventions, it
too establishes affirmative obligations. The Charter provides that States Parties "shall recognize the rights,
duties and freedoms enshrined in [the] Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures
to give effect to them." Banjul Charter, supra note 131, art. I. It also declares that "[e]very individual shall
be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the... Charter.",
id., art. 2 (emphasis added), and shall have "the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts
violating his fundamental rights .... Id., art. 7(l)(a).
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ant and American Convention further require States Parties to adopt legislation
or other measures necessary to give effect to the rights and freedoms recognized
in the treaties, 33 and all three conventions require Parties to ensure that in-
dividuals whose rights are violated have an effective remedy before a competent
body, even if the violation was committed by someone acting in an official
capacity.t34 To underscore the importance of ensuring the right to life through
legal guarantees, each convention provides that the right to life shall be protect-
ed by law.1 35
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The possibility of requiring States Parties to punish violations was never
seriously considered by the drafters of the International Covenant. The United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, which drafted the Covenant, debated
extensively the nature of a State Party's duty under Article 2(3) to provide an
"effective remedy" for violations of the Covenant, and in this context briefly
considered explicitly requiring States Parties to punish violators. The delegate
from the Philippines proposed adding a new subparagraph to Article 2(3),
providing that "violators shall swiftly be brought to the law, especially when
they are public officials. ' 136 The proposal was rejected without significant
133. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 2(l); American Convention, supra note 92, art. 2.
134. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 2(3); American Convention, supra note 92, art. 25;
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 13. In cases challenging amnesty laws enacted in Argentina and
Uruguay that are currently pending before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, counsel for
the petitioners have argued that the laws breach the American Convention's guarantee of legal redress
(Article 25), as well as States Parties' affirmative duty under Article 1(1) to "ensure" rights enumerated
in the Convention. The cases are Case 10.240, E.S.M.A. (Argentina); Case 10.029, de los Santos Mendoza
(Uruguay); Case 10.036, Balbi (Uruguay); Case 10.305, Menotti Cobas et al. (Uruguay); Case 10.145,
Rodriguez Larreta (Uruguay); Case 10.372, Brieba (Uruguay); Case 10.372, Ortiz (Uruguay); Case 10.374,
Sanjurjo Casal (Uruguay); and Case 10.375, Paitta (Uruguay). The Commission's decisions on the merits
are expected to be rendered in September 1991.
135. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 6(1); American Convention, supra note 92, art. 4(1);
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 2(1). Article 6(1) of the International Covenant was intended to
ensure in particular that human life is protected "against unwarranted actions by public authorities as well
as by private persons." Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 10
U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 28, Part II) at 30, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). See also M.
BossurYT, GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PR8PARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 120 (1987). Interpreting Article 2(1) of the European Convention, a former President
of the European Commission of Human Rights has written that it could "reasonably be implied that the State
must make the deliberate taking of life by individuals a punishable offence." J. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (1987). Citing an early, unpublished decision,
Fawcett wrote that a Contracting State's failure to prosecute such offenses nonetheless could not "be made
the ground of an individual application to the Commission." Id., citing 809/60 Recueil (1962) i. More
recently, however, a state's failure to provide for prosecution of a rapist was the ground of an individual
application, resulting in a determination by the European Court of Human Rights that the state had breached
Article 8 (respect for private life) of the European Convention. See infra text accompanying notes 182-88.
136. 6 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 6, para. 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950). The
Philippine government had also prepared a proposal to add the following sentence to paragraph 2: "The
perpetrators shall be duly and swiftly repressed, especially when they are public officials." This proposal
was not voted upon. M. BOSSUM', supra note 135, at 65, citing U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365 (1950). The
Philippine delegation made the following statement in support of the proposed amendment: "This addition
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discussion, 137 but the general debate over Article 2(3) provides some insight
into the delegates' possible concerns.
First, the Commission sought to ensure the broadest possible range of
remedies for violations of human rights, and eschewed language implying that
judicial remedies were the exclusive form contemplated by the Covenant. 3 '
Second, delegates sought to avoid language that would give rise to the same
consequences regardless of the seriousness of a state's infraction.1 39 More
generally, Article 2(3) was designed principally to ensure that states provided
noncriminal remedies, such as restitution or an order to desist wrongful con-
duct, 4 ' and delegates may have viewed the Philippine proposal to be out of
place in such an article.'
places upon the State the responsibility of taking the initiative in the investigation and prosecution of abusive
acts. The victim is too often under the influence of fear, so the Government itself should act with energy
to bring the criminals swiftly to justice." Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights and on the Proposed Additional Articles, 6 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on
Hum. Rts. at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/365 (1950).
137. See 6 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 6, para. 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950). The
Summary Record of the meeting in which the vote occurred reports only that, following defeat of the
proposed amendment, the Philippine delegate "said that the vote should not be taken to mean that the
Commission was indifferent to the fate of violators of human rights." Id., para. 25.
138. An initial draft ensuring "an effective remedy before the competent national tribunals" was
opposed by the Chairwoman of the Commission, Eleanor Roosevelt, because it "appeared to imply that all
violations of the Covenant would take the form of justiciable issues subject to adjudication by the courts
or by the judicial process, with the usual relief given by courts, such as damages or injunctions." 6 U.N.
ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 20, para. 74, U.N. Doc. ECN.4/SR.138 (1950). But, she asserted, the
most effective remedy for violations might sometimes lie in the political realm, through legislative action.
Id. at 20-21, para. 74; see also 18 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. at 248, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1259 (1963)
(delegate from Chile asserts that expansion of remedies to include relief from "political" branches was "in
no way intended to make the political authorities the sole guardians and defenders of human rights, but
simply to make available to the victims of violations of human rights the greatest possible number of
remedies from the greatest possible number of authorities."); id. at 247-48, para. 8 (delegate from France
asserts that in some cases, the only remedy available might come from nonjudicial bodies).
139. Commenting on the early draft language requiring States Parties to provide a remedy before "the
competent national tribunals," see supra note 138, the Chairwoman said:
[W]here the exercise of discretion and judgment by administrative officials was involved it would
seem highly improper to penalize government officials for errors of judgment, as distinguished
from malicious misconduct. It would therefore be undesirable to require a penalty in such a case
without making due allowance for the facts involved.
6 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 21, para. 74, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.138 (1950). By implication,
the Chairwoman seemed to regard judicial penalties to be appropriate when infractions were the product
of "malicious conduct" and were otherwise appropriate in light of the "facts involved."
140. See, e.g., 18 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. at 247, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1259 (1963) (statement
of delegate from France).
141. In virtually every legal system, civil remedies and criminal prosecutions serve different functions.
One writer describes the distinction this way:
Criminal law is generally considered to be that field of jurisprudence which is concerned with
wrongs against society. Such a wrong may arise by reason of an act directed against an isolated
individual, but it is the tort against the social structure, resulting from such act, which is punish-
able. The trial of the wrongdoer is not for the purpose of furnishing redress to the person or
persons injured-that is left to the processes of the civil law. The purposes of the criminal law
are rather to punish the wrongdoer for his offense against the mores of society and to deter others
from acting likewise.
J. APPLEMAN, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMiEs 9 (1954); see also Koh, Civil Remedies
for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 169, 173 (1987) (while criminal sanctions are concerned solely with punishment and deterrence, civil
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But if the drafters did not seriously consider requiring States Parties to
prosecute violations of the Covenant,1 42 nothing in the drafting history is in-
consistent with such a duty. The text could, moreover, reasonably be interpreted
to require States Parties to ensure at least some rights through use of criminal
sanctions.143
The Human Rights Committee established to monitor compliance with the
Covenant has, in fact, repeatedly asserted that States Parties must investigate
summary executions, torture, and unresolved disappearances; bring to justice
those who are responsible; and provide compensation to victims. These pro-
nouncements stand in notable contrast to the Committee's more characteristic
practice of granting states substantial leeway to determine how they will
implement the Covenant 4 and to fashion an appropriate remedy when found
in breach of their treaty obligations.14 5
remedies are designed to compensate victims as well as to sanction and deter wrongdoers). Authoritative
interpretations make clear that the International Covenant imposes a duty criminally to prosecute certain
violations that is distinct from the duty to provide effective civil remedies. See infra text accompanying notes
147-48, 155-56, 160.
142. The most extensive consideration of punishment arose during debate over Article 15. That debate
reflected a strong consensus in favor of prosecuting certain violations, but the delegates were principally
concerned with punishment of war criminals pursuant to principles of international law established outside
the parameters of the Covenant, and not with domestic enforcement of the Covenant. Article 15(2) provides
that the general ex post facto proscription set forth in Article 15(1) shall not "prejudice the trial and
punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations." The initial impetus
behind this provision was the delegates' desire to ensure that Article 15(1) did not inadvertently call into
question the validity of the prosecutions of war criminals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. See 2 U.N. ESCOR
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.36 (1947); 6 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at
12, para. 57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.159 (1950). But as the drafting progressed, many delegates supported
the provision for more affirmative reasons as well: it would ensure that persons who committed crimes
against humanity did not escape punishment simply because national law did not recognize the offense. See
15 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. at 131, para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1007 (1960) (delegate from United
Kingdom, citing prospect of amnesty being granted for genocide, argues that if "such crimes against
humanity came to be considered a less serious crime than they were felt to be at present, criminals who
had been guilty of them might escape scot free. That must be avoided at all costs .... '9); 15 U.N. GAOR
3d Comm. at 134, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.31SR.1008 (1960) (delegate from Poland asserts that if war crimes
like those punished at Nuremberg "should be perpetrated in the future, they must be judged with the same
severity .... ); id. at 135, para. 14 (delegate from Yugoslavia supports Article 15(2), which "provided that
crimes against humanity should always be punished.").
143. That the duties set forth in the Covenant could be given greater precision through subsequent
interpretation clearly was contemplated by the delegates to the drafting committee. See, e.g., 9 U.N. GAOR
3d Comm. at 96, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.562 (1954). Several writers have found a duty to discipline
wrongdoers to be implicit in states' duty to "ensure" rights. Professor Buergenthal writes: "The obligation
to 'ensure' rights creates affirmative obligations on the state-for example, to discipline its officials... "
Buergenthal, supra note 132, at 77; see also Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 119 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) (States Parties to Covenant arguably
must exercise due diligence to prevent intentional deprivation of life by individuals, "as well as to apprehend
murderers and to prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life").
144. See CCPR/C/21, General comment 3/13, para. (I) (Human Rights Committee observes that the
International Covenant "generally leaves it to the States Parties concerned to choose their method of
implementation .... ").
145. See, e.g., Varela Nufiez v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 108/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex
XXIII, para. 1I, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (State Party must provide "effective remedies pursuant to article
2(3) of the Covenant" for violating right to travel by denying complainant a passport). The Committee has,
however, occasionally found that States Parties are required to perform specific acts, even when physical
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a. Torture
In "general comments"' 46 interpreting Article 7 of the Covenant, which
prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
Committee has asserted:
[I]t is not sufficient for the implementation of [article 7] to prohibit
[torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading] treatment or punishment
or to make it a crime. Most States have penal provisions which are ap-
plicable to cases of torture or similar practices. Because such cases
nevertheless occur, it follows from article 7, read together with article
2 of the Covenant, that States must ensure an effective protection
through some machinery of control. Complaints about ill-treatment must
be investigated effectively by competent authorities. Those found guilty
must be held responsible, and the alleged victims must themselves have
effective remedies at their disposal, including the right to obtain com-
pensation. t47
As this comment makes clear, a state's duty to investigate allegations of torture
and hold the wrongdoers responsible exists over and above its duty to provide
victims an effective civil remedy.14 1
harm is not threatened. In one case, finding a violation of the right to be free from arbitrary detention, the
Committee expressed the view that the offending State should provide the detainee a "fresh trial." Sendic
v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 63/1979, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex VII, para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(1982); see also Magana v. Zaire, Comm. No. 90/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XDX, para.
9, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (State Party is under obligation to return complainant's property). Moreover,
pursuant to the Covenant's explicit provision that persons unlawfully arrested or detained "shall have an
enforceable right to compensation" (Article 9(5)), the Committee has repeatedly found compensation due
to victims of arbitrary detention. E.g., Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 110/1981, 39 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 40) Annex XI, para. 15, U.N. Doe. A/39/40 (1984); Cdmpora v. Uruguay, Comm No. 66/1980,
36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex VIII, paras. 19 and 20, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). The Committee
has also repeatedly expressed the view that States Parties should provide immediate medical care to detainees
in cases where physical harm is threatened. See, e.g., Larrosa v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 88/1981, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XVI, para 13, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983); Nieto v. Uruguay, Comm. No.
92/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XX, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
146. States Parties undertake to prepare periodic reports describing measures they have taken to
implement the Covenant, and the Committee is directed to transmit both the reports and "such general
comments as it may consider appropriate" to the States Parties and, if it wishes, to the Economic and Social
Council. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 40. Professor Schachter notes that some States Parties'
compliance reports have made reference to "the role of procurators, ombudsmen and comparable officials
who have the responsibility of investigating and instituting action against authorities who have abused their
power or otherwise infringed on human rights." He observes that "ideally the procurator generals, directors
of public prosecutions, and parliamentary commissioners could be effective instruments for holding govern-
mental officials accountable for their acts." Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in
Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTs 330 (L. Henkin ed. 1981). The Committee has
periodically prepared "general comments" interpreting specific articles of the Covenant.
147. Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex V, general
comment 7(16), para. I, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963 (1982) (emphasis added).
148. The obligatory nature of these measures is suggested by comparing the use of the term "muse'
in the quoted language with the word "may" in the discussion that follows. Immediately following the
above-quoted passage, the Committee introduces a series of additional measures, such as training of law-
enforcement personnel, with the phrase, "Among the safeguards which may make control effective are .... "
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Whether the requirement that offenders "be held responsible" necessarily
connotes criminal penalties is unclear. The United Nations Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 49 suggests, however, that
criminal punishment would be appropriate with respect to torture, while other
disciplinary action might be appropriate for less serious forms of ill-treat-
ment.150
Subsequent decisions on individual communications have reinforced the
Committee's "general comment" on Article 7.151 For example, in Muteba v.
Zaire,51 the Committee found that the government of Zaire had committed
torture in violation of Article 7, and concluded that the government was "under
an obligation to ... conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the victim's]
torture, to punish those found guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that
similar violations do not occur in the future."' 53
b. Extra-legal Executions
In a case involving the arrest and subsequent killing of "15 prominent
persons . . ., including journalists, lawyers, professors and businessmen,"' 54
the Committee found that Surinamese military police had intentionally deprived
the victims of life in violation of Article 6(1) of the Covenant, and urged the
government "to take effective steps (i) to investigate the killings ... ; (ii) to
149. G.A. Res. 3452,30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doe. A/10034 (1975). This declaration
was a precursor to the 1984 Convention Against Torture.
150. Article 10 of the Declaration provides that criminal proceedings should be instituted against
persons who allegedly committed torture, and that, "[ilf an allegation of other forms of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is considered to be well founded, the alleged offender or offenders shall
be subject to criminal, disciplinary or other appropriate proceedings."
151. The Committee is empowered to "receive and consider" communications from individuals who
are subject to the jurisdiction of states that have ratified an Optional Protocol and who claim to have suffered
a violation of any of the rights protected by the Covenant. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966). While the Optional Protocol does not empower the Committee to order states to afford
remedies for violations, it authorizes the Committee to "forward its views to the State Party concerned and
to the individual" after considering the communication in closed session. Id., art. 5(4) and (3). In practice,
the Committee has expressed (and published) its views as to whether States Parties' conduct violates their
duties under the Covenant, and regarding the steps that should or must be taken to rectify a breach. Pursuant
to Article 41 of the Covenant, States Parties can also recognize the competence of the Committee to receive
inter-state complaints and to attempt conciliation between the complaining state and the state allegedly in
breach of its obligations. No such complaint has ever been filed. See supra note 89.
152. Comm. No. 124/1982, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XIII, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984).
153. Id., para. 13. Curiously, in a case preceding Muteba v. Zaire, the Committee found the Uruguayan
government responsible for torture but did not state that an investigation or prosecution was required. The
Committee did, however, express the view that the government was "under an obligation ... to take steps
to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future," Estrella v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 74/1980, 38
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XII, para. 11, U.N. Doe. A/38/40 (1983), a mandate broad enough to
include investigation and prosecution. See also Gilboa v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 147/1983, 41 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 40) Annex VIII, U.N. Doc. A/41/40 (1985).
154. Baboeram v. Suriname, Comm. Nos. 146/1983 and 148-154/1983, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
40) Annex X, para. 13.2, U.N. Doe. A/40/40 (1985).
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bring to justice any persons found to be responsible for the death of the victims;
(iii) to pay compensation to the surviving families; and (iv) to ensure that the
right to life is duly protected in Suriname."' 55 Similarly, finding the govern-
ment of Uruguay in breach of Article 6 for the death-in-detention of Hugo
Haroldo Dermit Barbato, the Committee expressed "the view that the State
party is under an obligation to take effective steps.., to establish the facts
of Hugo Dermit's death, to bring to justice any persons found to be responsible
for his death and to pay appropriate compensation to his family."' 56
c. Disappearances
Although "disappearances" are not proscribed as such in the International
Covenant,157 the Committee has interpreted the Covenant to impose a duty
to "investigate, punish and compensate" when disappearances occur. In the Ble-
ier'58 and Quinterost59 cases, the Committee concluded that the government
of Uruguay should take effective steps: (a) to establish what had happened to
the victims, and, in the Quinteros case, to secure the victim's release from
detention; (b) to bring to justice any persons found to be responsible for the
victims' disappearance and ill-treatment and, in the Bleier case, for the victim's
155. Id., para. 16. In earlier "general comments" on Article 6, the Committee alluded to a duty to
punish, but did not elaborate: "The Committee considers that States Parties should take measures not only
to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own
security forces." Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex V, para.
3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.I/963 (1982).
156. Dermit v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 84/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex IX, para. ll.a,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983) (emphasis added). In one case in which the Committee found a State Party's
conduct to have violated Article 6, it found compensation due but did not urge the State to undertake an
investigation and prosecution. In that case, however, the government had already carried out an administra-
tive inquiry into the incident, dismissed responsible police officers and criminally prosecuted the alleged
offenders. The defendants were acquitted on the basis of an emergency decree in force at the time of their
conduct; the Human Rights Committee expressed the view that "the right to life was not adequately
protected by the law of Colombia as required by article 6 (1)," Camargo v. Colombia, Comm. No. R.1 1/45,
37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XI, para. 13.1, U.N. Doc. At37/40 (1982), and that "the State party
should take the necessary measures . . . to ensure that the right to life is duly protected by amending the
law." Id., para. 15.
157. A "disappearance" is a forced abduction by agents of the state, followed by a complete denial
of knowledge of the victim's whereabouts and of other forms of accountability by state officials. Disap-
pearances violate the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention, which is protected by guarantees
set forth in Articles 9 and 14. When followed by torture or summary execution, a disappearance also entails
a violation of Article 7 or 6, respectively. In "general comments" on Article 6, the Committee has observed
that"... States should establish effective facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly cases of missing
and disappeared persons in circumstances which may involve a violation of the right to life." Report of the
Human Rights Committee, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963
(1982).
158. Bleier v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.7/30, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex X, U.N. Doc
A/37/40 (1982).
159. Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex QI, U.N.
Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
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probable death; (c) to pay compensation for the wrongs suffered; and (d) to
ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. 10
Because the Committee has not set forth a rationale for its views in these
cases, it is not clear whether it regards investigation and punishment to be
generally required when torture, extra-legal killings, or disappearances occur,
or merely the most appropriate response in the cases it has considered. 16 The
distinction may, in any event, be inconsequential. Implicit in the Committee's
decisions is the view that investigation and prosecution are the most effective
means of securing the right to life and the right to be free from torture and
forced disappearance. In view of the paramount importance that the Committee
has attached to these three rights, it is reasonable to assume that States Parties
must use the most effective means available to ensure their enjoyment. 62
Under this interpretation of the Committee's jurisprudence, prosecution
leading to an appropriate sanction is generally required when a disappearance,
an extra-legal execution, or torture is credibly alleged. Some departures from
160. Bleier v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.7/30, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex X, para. 15, U.N.
Doe. A/37/40 (1982); Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex
XXII, para. 16, U.N. Doe. A/38/40 (1983). The Committee's views in the Quinteros case make clear that
a duty to clarify the fate of the "disappeared" is owed to the victim's family for reasons distinct from the
deterrence rationale supporting the general duty to investigate possible criminal conduct. The case had been
submitted by the mother of a woman who had been missing for five years. The Committee found that, in
light of the "anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the
continuing uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts... [the mother] too is a victim of the violations
of the Covenant suffered by her daughter in particular, of article 7." Accordingly, the Committee asserted,
the mother "has the right to know what has happened to her daughter." Id., para. 14.
The duty to investigate, prosecute and provide compensation may not apply if the disappearance is
later acknowledged and the victim survives. In Derit the Committee found the government of Uruguay
in violation of Article 6 because of the death-in-detention of Hugo Dermit and in violation of Articles 9
and 14 because of the arbitrary arrest and detention of Guillermo Dermit. Guillermo Derinit's arrest and
detention was unacknowledged for 17 days, leading the Committee to assert that he "disappeared on 2
December 1980." Dermit v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 84/1981, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex IX, para.
8.3, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983). While finding the government liable to provide an investigation, prosecution
and compensation with respect to Hugo Dermit's death, in his younger brother's case the Committee found
Uruguay responsible for "ensurling] strict observance of all the procedural guarantees prescribed by...
the Covenant"; for transmitting a copy of its views to Guillermo Dermit; and for ensuring that similar viola-
tions did not recur. Id., para. 11. Compare A. & H. Sanjuan Arevalo v. Colombia, Comm. No. 181/1984,
45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex IX, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (1989) (in case involving unresolved
disappearance of two brothers, Committee finds breach of Articles 6 and 9 despite ongoing investigations
and disciplinary proceedings by State Party).
Although the decisions in Bleler. Quinteros and Sajtuan Arevalo implied that disappearances are a
continuing violation of the Covenant as long as the fate of the victim is unresolved, the Committee has held
inadmissible a communication concerning disappearances that took place before the Covenant entered into
force with respect to the respondent state, even though the victims' fate had never been clarified. S.E. v.
Argentina, Comm. No. 275/1988, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex X, para. 5.3, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990).
161. In the Bleier case the Committee "urge[d]" the government of Uruguay to take the steps enumera-
ted supra; in the subsequent Quinteros case it expressed the view that the government "should" take those
steps.
162. This interpretation of the Committee's jurisprudence is similar to another legal argument advanced
by several international law experts: Under both customary and conventional law, a narrow class of funda-
mental rights are nonderogable. If governments are required to uphold those rights in all circumstances,
including situations of public emergency, they should not be permitted to suspend operation of the legal
machinery necessary to ensure the rights. See Goldman, supra note 5, at 11; see also Part III, Section B.
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this norm might be justified, however. The clearest justification would be
evidentiary constraints, provided they were not the product of government
malfeasance. A measure of flexibility is implied, moreover, in the Committee's
use of such phrases as "bring to justice" and "hold responsible." While these
terms seem to contemplate appropriately severe criminal penalties, in some
instances administrative disciplinary procedures might satisfy a state's duty.
Clearly, however, a State Party's routine failure to punish extra-legal killings,
torture, and disappearances would constitute a breach of its duties.
While the Committee has made clear that punishment plays a necessary part
in States Parties' fulfillment of certain duties under the Covenant, it has stopped
short of recognizing a right by individuals to ensure that a particular person is
prosecuted. In H.C.M.A. v. the Netherlands,63 the Committee rejected the
complainant's claim that Article 14(1) of the Covenant, which guarantees the
right to a fair trial, establishes a right "to see another person criminally prose-
cuted."'"
2. American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention, like the International Covenant, has been
interpreted to require States Parties to investigate and punish serious violations
of physical integrity. 65 In its first contentious case,'66 the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights interpreted Article 1 (1) of the American Convention
to impose on each State Party a "legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent
human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a
serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify
those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation."' 67 The decision was rendered in the Velds-
163. Comm. No. 213/1986, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40), U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
164. Id., para. 11.6. The complainant had unsuccessfully challenged a Dutch military prosecutor's
decision not to prosecute a police officer who had allegedly maltreated the complainant at the time of his
arrest. There was no suggestion in the Committee's decision that failure to prosecute police for violating
citizens' rights was a general pattern in the Netherlands. The Committee noted that the Dutch Parliament
was then considering legislation that would enable citizens to appeal decisions by the military prosecutor
not to prosecute cases-a right already available with respect to civilian prosecutors' determinations. Id.,
paras. 4.4 and 4.5; see also S.E. v. Argentina, Comm. No. 275/1988,45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex
X, para. 5.5, U.N. Doc. A/45140 (1990) (citing H.C.M.A. v. the Netherlands in dictum).
165. The travaux preparatoires contain little indication that punishment was contemplated as a
necessary means of enforcing the American Convention. Discussion of the role of the judiciary arose
principally in the context of Article 25, which establishes a right to effective remedies, and of provisions
prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention and ensuring due process protections for criminal defendants.
166. The Court is empowered both to render advisory opinions interpreting the Convention (as well
as other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the Americas), American Convention, supra
note 92, art. 64, and to consider "contentious cases" alleging a violation of the Convention by a State Party
that has recognized its competence, id., art. 62. See generally Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1982); Mdndez & Vivanco, Disappearances and the Inter-American
Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507, 527-30 (1990).
167. Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 174 (1988) (judgment). The
Veldsquez Rodriguez Case was one of three cases filed with the Court by the Inter-American Commission
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quez Rodriguez Case, brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights against the government of Honduras for the unresolved disappearance
of Manfredo Veldsquez in September 1981. Although the fate of the victim
could not be established conclusively, the Court heard testimony indicating that
he had been tortured and killed by Honduran security forces.
The Court found the Honduran government responsible for multiple viola-
tions of the American Convention, basing much of its analysis on the affirma-
tive duties established by Article 1(1).161 Writing of the duty, pursuant to
Article 1(1), to "ensure" rights set forth in the Convention, the Court asserted:
This obligation implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridicaly ensur-
ing the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of
this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if
possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation
as warranted for damages resulting from the violation .... 119
These obligations are not fulfilled if an investigation is a "mere formality
preordained to be ineffective"; instead, it "must be undertaken in a serious
manner ... ."170 Significantly, the Court found that Honduras' duties under
the Convention persisted even though the government in power at the time of
its decision was not the same one that had presided over the practice of disap-
pearances whose victims included Manfredo Vel6,squez. 171
on Human Rights alleging Honduran government responsibility for disappearances, and was the first to result
in a decision on the merits. The chief findings summarized below were affirmed in the judgment of January
20, 1989 in the Godfnez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5 (1989). The Court did not find the
Honduran government responsible for the disappearances alleged in the third companion case. See Fair~n
Garbi and Solfs Corrales Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 6, para. 158 (1989) (judgment).
168. See supra note 132. The Court found Article 1 (1) to be "essential" in determining whether conduct
infringing one of the rights set forth in the Convention could be attributed to the government, giving rise
to state responsibility for a violation of the Convention. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4, para. 164 (1988) (judgment).
169. Id., para. 166 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court asserted:
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected
by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished
and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State has
failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons
within its jurisdiction. The same is true when the State allows private persons or groups to act
freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention.
Id., para. 176; see also id., para. 174.
170. Id., para. 177. The Court implied that an investigation undertaken by the same body accused of
responsibility for alleged disappearances prima facie fails to satisfy this standard. See id., para. 180.
171. The Court wrote:
According to the principle of the continuity of the State in international law, responsibility exists
both independently of changes of government over a period of time and continuously from the
time of the act that creates responsibility to the time when the act is declared illegal. The
foregoing is also valid in the area of human rights although, from an ethical or political point of
view, the attitude of the new government may be much more respectful of those rights than that
of the government in power when the violations occurred.
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Although the judgment suggested that a duty to punish applies to "every"
violation of the American Convention,'72 it is unlikely that the Court intended
the obligation to extend to all violations, regardless of the severity of the
breach. Instead, the Court's reasoning should, pending further clarification, be
confined to the especially serious violations raised in the case before it-disap-
pearances, probable torture, and probable extra-judicial execution. 73
The judgment in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case was prefigured by numerous
decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights interpreting the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 74 ("American Decla-
ration") and the American Convention.' In cases involving violations of
Article I of the Declaration, which assures the right to life, liberty, and personal
security, the Commission has repeatedly recommended that the offending state
"order a thorough and impartial investigation" and, in accordance with domestic
law, "punish the individual or individuals responsible."' 176 It has similarly
recommended that States Parties to the American Convention investigate serious
Id., para. 184. The Court emphasized that the duty to clarify the fate of someone who has disappeared, and
to inform the victim's relatives of the results of these efforts, persists as long as the victim's fate remains
uncertain. Id., para. 181.
172. Id., para. 176.
173. It is also unclear why the Court, in ordering remedies, did not direct the Honduran government
to institute criminal proceedings against those responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Veldsquez.
The most likely explanation is that the Court viewed the acts of declaring Honduras in breach of its duties
and of enunciating States Parties' affirmative obligations under the American Convention to be less of an
intrusion on sovereignty than ordering the government to institute criminal proceedings. Cf. T. MERON, supra
note 57, at 145 (decisions ordering injunctive relief"tend to generate tension between international authority
and state sovereignty," whereas "a declaration of a right by an international judicial body does not
significantly clash with the right of a sovereign state to choose the necessary remedies"). Still, the Court
found that Honduras was required to pay compensation to the victim's relatives. See Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 194(5) (1988) (judgment). In its judgments on damages in
Veldsquez and Godlnez, the Court referred to its earlier judgments on the merits as establishing a duty to
prevent, investigate and punish violations and stated that the duty remains binding until the government
fully complies. Judgment of July 21, 1989 (damages), Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, paras. 34-36; Judgment
of July 21, 1989 (damages), Godinez Cruz Case, paras. 32-34.
174. Adopted May 2, 1948, OEA/ser.L.[V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979).
175. The Commission was created to further respect for human rights among O.A.S. member states.
Declaration at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, Aug. 12-
18, 1959, Final Act, OAS Official Records, OEA/ser.C./II.5, at 4-6 (1959). The Commission's statute
provides that it promotes the observance of human rights. "Human rights" refers to rights set forth in the
American Convention in relation to States Parties, and to rights set forth in the American Declaration with
respect to other states that are O.A.S. members. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
art. 1. In 1965, the Second Special Inter-American Conference empowered the Commission to examine
communications alleging human rights violations, to request information from the relevant government, to
make appropriate recommendations and to publish observations on matters covered in the communications
in its annual report. Resolution XXII, "Expanded Functions of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights," Final Act of the Second Special Inter-American Conference, OAS/ser.E./XIII.1, at 45-46 (1965).
The American Convention, adopted five years later, explicitly authorizes the Commission to receive both
individual and inter-state petitions alleging violations of the Convention by States Parties. 1985 INTER-AM.
Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 66-68. For a description of the Commission's powers and activities, see Mtndez &
Vivanco, supra note 166, at 519-27.
176. Case 1870, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 52, OEA/ser.L./VIII.43, doe. 21(1978); see also Case 1967, INTER-
AM. C.H.R. 55, OEA/ser.L./V/II.43, doc. 21 (1978); Case 1783, para. 3, IACHR, TEN YEARS OF ACTIVlmES,
1971-1981 at 142-46; Case 2126, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 77, OEA/ser.L./V/II.47, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1979); Case
2088, INTER-Ahl. C.H.R. 38, OEA/ser.L./V/II.50, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1980).
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violations of physical integrity and that they "try and punish those responsible
for their occurrence," as well as provide compensation. 177
Despite these decisions, in 1986 the Commission expressed a general
inclination to allow national authorities to determine the validity of amnesty
laws enacted by previous governments, subject to the qualification that the truth
about past violations must be fully known.1 78 More recently, however, the
Commission's Chairman has voiced strong opposition to amnesty laws that
foreclose prosecution of atrocious crimes:
A compact by which a whole nation is called upon to suspend its
memories of torture, murder, forcible "disappearances" of loved ones,
a compact which would have citizens pretend that the tragic losses and
suffering which they have undergone never occurred, this ... is no bar-
gain. This is not amnesty; it is forcible amnesia. The "peace" that is
bought at this price is supported by a thread slenderer even than the
thread by which the sword of Damocles was suspended. 179
The Chairman suggested that such amnesties violate rights set forth in the
American Convention and Declaration: "The rights set out in the American
Convention on Human Rights and in the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man by their very nature cannot be subject to extinction by
national fiat."
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms
The European Court and Commission of Human Rights 80 have had com-
paratively few occasions to elucidate the role of punishment in securing rights
set forth in the European Convention. Decisions of both bodies make clear,
however, that punishment plays a part in Contracting States' fulfillment of
certain duties under the Convention.' s
177. E.g., Case 10.150, Informe 3/90 (Suriname), OEA/ser.L.N/II.77, doc. 23, at 14 (1990).
178. INTER-AM. HUM. RTS., OEA/ser.L./V/II.68, doc. 8 rev.l (1986).
179. Speech by Ambassador Oliver H, Jackman before the First Committee of the XIX Regular Meeting
of the General Assembly to Present the Annual Report of the IACHR, Nov. 1989.
180. The European Commission can receive both individual petitions and inter-state complaints alleging
violations of the Convention by Contracting States. European Convention, supra note 34, arts. 24, 25. When
it finds a petition admissible, the Commission attempts a friendly settlement of the dispute. When this cannot
be achieved, the Commission prepares a detailed report setting forth its finding of facts and its conclusions
regarding whether there has been a breach of the Convention. Id., arts. 28-31. Within three months of the
transmittal of such reports to the parties and to the Council of Ministers, the government-parties or the
Commission can refer the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Id., art. 48. If the Court determines
that it has jurisdiction over the case, it determines whether there has been a breach of the Convention; its
judgment is final and binding. Id., arts. 50, 52. See generally Higgins, The European Convention on Human
Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 505-11 (T. Meron ed.
1984).
181. The European Commission has, however, repeatedly rejected claims that Article 6 of the Conven-
tion, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, establishes a right to have criminal proceedings instituted
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In X and Y v. Netherlands,182 the Court found the Dutch government in
breach of the European Convention by virtue of a gap in Dutch law that had
precluded a victim of rape from instituting criminal proceedings against her
attacker. The victim, Miss Y, was mentally handicapped, and had been deemed
incompetent to initiate a criminal complaint. The relevant provision of the
Netherlands Criminal Code could be invoked only by a victim, and Miss Y's
attacker escaped prosecution.18
The Court found that the respondent state's failure to provide for prosecu-
tion of Miss Y's assailant violated its affirmative duty to secure her enjoyment
of the right to respect for private life, as guaranteed in Article 8 of the Conven-
tion. Acknowledging that in general Contracting States enjoy a "margin of
appreciation" in determining the means they will use to secure rights protected
by Article 8,114 the Court found, nonetheless, that only the criminal law is
an adequate means of protecting the crucial values at stake in this case:
[T]he protection afforded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing of
the kind inflicted on Miss Y is insufficient. This is a case where funda-
mental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Effective
deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by
criminal-law provisions; indeed, it is by such provisions that the matter
is normally regulated." 5
On this basis, the Court rejected the Dutch government's claim that the appli-
cant's ability to seek civil damages or an injunction against her attacker dis-
charged its duties under the Convention. 86 Finding the Dutch government
partly responsible for the harm suffered by the applicant in consequence of her
rape, the Court ordered the government to pay compensation. 87
against officials or third persons. See, e.g., X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 24 Collection of Decisions
50, 61-62 (1967); Kiss v. United Kingdom, 7 Decisions and Reports 55, 64 (1976).
182. 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) (judgment).
183. Miss Y's father believed her to be incapable of signing a complaint, and signed one on her behalf.
The police officer who received the complaint also regarded Miss Y to be incapable of signing the complaint
in light of her "mental condition." Id., paras. 9-10. Despite the father's complaint, the public prosecutor
decided not to prosecute the attacker provided he did not repeat the crime. Id., para. 11. The victim's father
appealed this decision to a Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that the principal
provision of Dutch criminal law that might have been a basis for prosecution could be invoked only if the
victim herself took action-but this was precluded by virtue of her incapacity. Id., para. 12. The gap in
protection afforded by Dutch law was narrow; under most provisions of the Netherlands Criminal Code
establishing sexual offenses, institution of criminal proceedings did not require a complaint by the victim.
See id., paras. 15, 27. Still, the lacuna was substantial enough to place the Dutch government in breach of
the European Convention. See id., para. 30; infra text accompanying notes 184-87.
184. 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 24 (1985) (judgment).
185. Id., para. 27.
186. See id., paras. 24-25. The Court noted that the Delegate of the European Commission of Human
Rights had argued that "the need for protection existed erga omnes, whilst an injunction could only be
directed to a limited circle of persons," and that "the civil law lacked the deterrent effect that was inherent
in the criminal law." Id., para. 26.
187. Id., para. 40. The only remedial power explicitly given the Court under the European Convention
is to "afford just satisfaction to the injured party." European Convention, supra note 34, art. 50. The Court
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In their analyses of the European Convention's admissibility requirement
that applicants exhaust domestic remedies, the Court and Commission have
indirectly affirmed the principle that punishment plays a necessary part in
Contracting States' duty to secure certain rights set forth in the Convention."'8
Both bodies have found that applicants need not exhaust domestic remedies if
their complaint concerns an "administrative practice," 189 characterized by
"repetition of acts, and official tolerance."' 9 The term "official tolerance"
means
that, though acts of torture or ill-treatment are plainly illegal, they are
tolerated in the sense that the superiors of those immediately responsible
though cognisant of such acts, take no action to punish them or prevent
their repetition; or that higher authority, in face of numerous allegations,
manifests indifference by refusing any adequate investigation of their
truth or falsity, or that in judicial proceedings, a fair hearing of such
complaints is denied.191
can afford just satisfaction if it finds that a Contracting Party has violated the Convention and the Party's
domestic law "allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences" of the breach. Id. In Ireland
v United Kingdom, the Court held that it "cannot direct the respondent State to institute criminal or
disciplinary proceedings against those members of the security forces" found to have violated Article 3 by
inflicting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment on detainees or against "those who condoned or tolerated
such breaches." Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 95, concluding para. 10 (1978)
(judgment); see also id. at 72, para. 187.
188. In various other contexts, the Commission has seemingly assumed that criminal prosecution plays
a necessary part in Contracting States' fulfillment of their duty to secure certain fundamental rights. For
example, the headnote to one decision, in which the Commission rejected a claim that the U.K. government
should have done more than it did to prevent the murder of the applicant's brother by Irish Republican Army
terrorists, asserts: 'The obligation to protect the right to life is not limited for the High Contracting Parties
to the duty to prosecute those who put life in danger but implies positive preventive measures appropriate
to the general situation. In the present case, however, this obligation did not go so far as to provide
individual protection." Mrs. W. v. United Kingdom, 32 Collection of Decisions 190, 190 (1983) (emphasis
added). (Curiously, the decision itself is not so explicit in recognizing a "duty to prosecute those who put
life in danger." The Commission noted that an alleged killer was awaiting trial for murder, id. at 199, para.
10, and that the applicant had argued that the European Convention required the U.K. to take measures
beyond criminal prosecution to protect the right to life. Id., para. 11. But its conclusions on this issue were
confined to the observation that the Convention "may indeed give rise to positive obligations on the part
of the State," id. at 200, para. 12, and that the Commission "cannot find that the United Kingdom was
required under the Convention to protect the applicant's brother by measures going beyond those actually
taken by the authorities .... " id., para. 15.) The Commission's report of the friendly settlement reached
in the case of France. Norway, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands v. Turkey noted that measures taken
by Turkey to respond to allegations of torture included "criminal prosecutions and convictions concerning
cases of torture." 8 EUR. HUi. RTs. REP. 205, 213 (1985).
189. The Court has defined an administrative practice as "an accumulation of identical or analogous
breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents
or exceptions but to a pattern or system .... Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 64,
para. 159 (1978) (judgment). Where there is an administrative practice, the Commission has reasoned, the
assumption underlying the exhaustion requirement-that an effective remedy is available in domestic
law-does not apply. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 194, paras. 24, 25 (Eur.
Comm'n of Hum. Rts.).
190. Id. at 195, para. 28.
191. Id. at 196, para. 29 (emphasis added).
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The European Court has termed such a practice "incompatible" with the
European Convention,'92 reasoning that "under the Convention [higher State]
authorities are ... under a duty to impose their will on subordinates and cannot
shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected."' 93
D. Customary Law: Disappearances, Extra-legal Executions, and Torture
Although publicists disagree about the range of human rights protected by
customary law,194 there is general agreement that customary law prohibits
torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions and that these prohibitions
are peremptory norms. 95 But if the legal status of these prohibitions is clear,
their precise meaning is not. Some experts believe that a single violation of a
right protected by customary law engages international responsibility, while
others assert that state responsibility is generated only when violations have
occurred on a systematic basis' 96 or as a matter of state policy.'97
Still less clear is whether customary law's prohibition of torture, extra-legal
killing, and involuntary disappearance imports a duty to prosecute violations
when they occur, or whether, instead, customary law requires only that govern-
ments not directly inflict these abuses. Even under the latter view, however,
it is necessary to determine what constitutes sufficiently direct government par-
ticipation in violations to generate state responsibility.
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
adopts the view that a complete failure to punish repeated or notorious viola-
tions of rights protected by customary law renders a government sufficiently
complicit to generate state responsibility. Asserting that a state violates custom-
ary law "if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones,"
inter alia, torture, murder, or disappearances, 9 ' the Restatement suggests that
192. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 64, para. 159 (1978) (judgment).
193. Id. The Court linked this obligation to Contracting States' affirmative duty to "secure" rights:
The Convention does not merely oblige the higher authorities of the Contracting States to respect
for their own part the rights and freedoms it embodies; as is shown by Article 14 [rights in
Convention to be "secured" without discrimination on any ground], and . . .Article 1 ("shall
secure"), the Convention also has the consequence that, in order to secure the enjoyment of those
rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or remedy any breach at subordinate levels.
Id. at 91, para. 239.
194. For discussion of different catalogues of human rights protected by customary law, see T. MERON,
supra note 57, at 94-99.
195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 702 comment n and reporters' note 11; J. BURGERS
& H. DANELIUS, supra note 92, at 12; Goldman, supra note 5, at 4. For general discussion of peremptory
norms (rules that have jus cogens status), see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 338-50 (1980); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 512-517; see also Vienna
Convention, supra note 62, art. 53.
196. For discussion of these issues, see T. MERON, supra note 57, at 103.
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, § 702.
198. Id. Other practices which the Restatement identifies as violations of customary law are genocide;
slavery or slave trade; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention;
systematic racial discrimination; and a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. Id.
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"[a] government may be presumed to have encouraged or condoned [these] acts
... if such acts, especially by its officials, have been repeated or notorious and
no steps have been taken to prevent them or to punish the perpetrators."' 99
The Restatement's approach is not novel. Arbitral tribunals have interpreted
the traditional rule of customary law establishing state responsibility for injury
to aliens to require states to "act vigorously and diligently to punish crimes
against aliens."' 0 The analysis of the Mexican-American Claims Commission
in the Janes case evokes the reasoning of the Restatement: "If the nonprose-
cution and nonpunishment of crimes (or of specific crimes) in a certain period
and place occurs with regularity such nonrepression may even assume the
character of a nonprevention and be treated as such. 20 t
A wide range of activities of the United Nations and other intergovern-
mental organizations reinforce the view that punishment plays a necessary part
in states' duty under customary law to ensure the rights to life, freedom from
torture, and freedom from involuntary disappearance. For example, reports pre-
pared by Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, and Working Groups
appointed by the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations to report
on human rights conditions in particular countries2°2 or on particular types
of human rights violations 2 3 have repeatedly condemned governments' failure
to punish torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions.2°4 Echoing the
199. Id., comment b.
200. Id., § 711, reporters' note 2, citing the following decisions of Mexican-American Claims Commis-
sion: Kennedy, G.C.C. 289 (1926) (responsibility generated by failure to impose adequate penalty); Mallen,
id. at 254 (1927) (responsibility generated by failure to enforce penalty); West, id. at 404 (1927) (amnesty
and pardon unduly granted).
201. In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 82, 89-90 (1926). In this case the
Commission ordered the Mexican government to provide damages to the United States on behalf of relatives
of a United States citizen whose murder had been inadequately investigated by Mexican authorities,
constituting a denial of justice.
202. Reports have been prepared on such countries as Chile, El Salvador, Afghanistan, Iran, and
Guatemala. Reports have also been prepared by special "experts" appointed by the Commission to provide
advisory services in the field of human rights to particular governments. The latter, like the former, have
given substantial attention to the role of investigation and prosecution of serious human rights violations.
See, e.g., Report on Haiti by the Expert. Mr. Philippe Texier. prepared in conformity with Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1989173, 46 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts., paras. 55, 61, 67, 87, 91, 102,
106(c) & (e), U.N. Doc. F/CN.4/1990/44; Report by the Expert, Mr. H~cror Gros Espiell, on Guatemala,
prepared in accordance with paragraph 9 of Commission resolution 1989174, 46 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., paras. 48, 49, 57, 66(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/45.
203. "Theme" rapporteurs and working groups have been appointed to report upon such violations as
religious discrimination, torture, disappearances, extra-legal executions, and arbitrary detention. For discus-
sion of three of the theme rapporteurs, see Weissbrodt, The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN
Commission on Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 685 (1986).
204. These reports often cite the International Covenant, various U.N. human rights declarations and
customary international law as the bases of the rights examined. Several resolutions adopted by the
Commission on Human Rights suggest that a duty to prevent human rights violations may inhere in member
states' human rights obligations under the U.N. Charter, a legally binding instrument. Article I provides
that the purposes of the United Nations include the achievement of international cooperation "in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights .... Pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, member
states pledge to take action to achieve "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." In language
that evokes the human rights provisions of the Charter, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
has asserted "that the obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms calls not
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reasoning of the Restatement, these reports have asserted that a state's failure
to punish repeated violations of physical integrity encourages further viola-
tions. 5 Although these reports are not authoritative interpretations of interna-
tional law, resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly have endorsed many of
the reports' conclusions regarding punishment of persons responsible for torture,
disappearances, and extra-legal executionsY 6
The duty to prosecute grave violations of physical integrity has been
rendered explicit in a number of international instruments drafted in recent
years. These include the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Tor-
ture;2°7 a Draft Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearances 208 prepared under United Nations auspices;
20 9
a Draft Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Per-
only for measures to guarantee the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms but also for
measures intended effectively to prevent any violation of those rights." Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1988/51;
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1988/50.
205. E.g., Report prepared by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Chile in
accordance with paragraph 11 of the Commission on Human Rights resolution 1983138 of 8 March 1983,
U.N. Doc. A/38385, para. 341 (1983) (impunity enjoyed by Chilean security organs "is the cause, and an
undoubted encouragement in the commission, of multiple violations of fundamental rights"); Final report
on the situation of human rights in El Salvador submitted to the Commission on Human Rights by Mr. Josg
Antonio Pastor Ridruejo in fulfillment of the mandate conferred under Commission resolution 1986139, 43
U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 13, para. 60, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/21 (failure of Salvadoran
courts to render convictions that bear reasonable relationship to number of violations of right to life creates
"climate of impunity"); Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 45 U.N.
ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 85, para. 312, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/18 (impunity in the face of
repeated disappearances "creates conditions conducive to the persistence of such practices"); Report of the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 47 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at
86, para. 406 ("impunity is perhaps the single most important factor contributing to the phenomenon of
disappearance. Perpetrators of human rights violations ... become all the more irresponsible if they are
not held to account before a court of law.").
206. E.g., G.A. Res. 37/185, para. 10 (1982) (urging Salvadoran judiciary to "assume its obligation
to... prosecute and to punish those found responsible for assassinations, acts of torture and other forms
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"); G.A. Res. 36/157, para. 4(e) (1981) (urging Chilean authorities
to "investigate and clarify the fate of persons who have disappeared for political reasons, to inform the
relatives of those persons of the outcome of the investigation and to prosecute and punish those responsible
for such disappearances"); G.A. Res. 33/173, para. l(b) (1978) (calling upon governments to "ensure that
law enforcement and security authorities or organizations are fully accountable, especially in law, in the
discharge of their duties, such accountability to include legal responsibility for unjustifiable excesses which
might lead to enforced or involuntary disappearances .....
207. Supra note 92.
208. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/49 [hereinafter "Draft Declaration on Disappearances"].
209. The draft declaration provides that every state "shall ensure that all forms of partipation in
enforced or involuntary disappearance... are specific crimes of the gravest kind under its criminal law,"
id., art. 4, and that, "[wihenever there are reasonable grounds to believe that an enforced or involuntary
disappearance has been committed, the State shall promptly refer the matter [for an impartial] investigation,
even if there has been no formal complaint." Id., art. 13(1). The draft further provides that states shall ensure
that a person alleged to have committed a disappearance is brought to justice either through prosecution
or extradition "regardless of the individual's nationality or the place where the offence was committed."
Id., art. 14. The draft also asserts a duty to ensure that persons alleging that an involuntary disappearance
has occurred have a right to file a complaint and to have the complaint promptly and impartially inves-
tigated. Id., art. 13(l).
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sons;2" ' and Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-
legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions2"' endorsed by the U.N. General
Assembly.212 While not conclusive, the frequent reiteration of a duty to punish
grave violations of physical integrity in international instruments is evidence
that the duty is-or is emerging as-a customary norm.
213
E. Customary Law: Crimes Against Humanity
The search for legal standards governing transitional societies' policy toward
past abuses has led to renewed interest in the substantive law generated by the
Nuremberg prosecutions. Several analysts and organizations interpret that law
to require punishment of crimes against humanity.214 While their view is well-
founded, the law of crimes against humanity is difficult to apply. in part
because the meaning of the term is shrouded in ambiguity. With no precedent
210. INTER-AM. C.H.R. 352, OEA/ser.L./V/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1988). The draft convention requires
States Parties "to prevent and to punish the perpetrators of forced disappearance of persons," id., art. 1, and
to establish jurisdiction over acts constituting forced disappearances committed in their jurisdiction and under
several other circumstances. Id., art. 5. The draft convention also provides that "perpetrators of forced
disappearances shall not benefit from any legal act adopted by the Executive or Legislative branches of
government that might have the effect of exempting such persons from punishment." Id., art. 8.
211. Ecosoc. Res. 1989/65, Annex (endorsed by G.A. Res. 44/162 (1989)). These principles, which
seek to give effect to the internationally-recognized right to life, provide, inter alia:
1. Governments shall prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions and shall
ensure that any such executions are recognized as offences under their criminal laws, and are
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences.
The first principle appearing under the heading "Investigation" begins: "9. There shall be a thorough, prompt
and impartial investigation of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions ......
The Principles further establish a duty to "bring to justice" persons identified in the investigation under the
principle aut dedere autjtdicare (either extradite or try). Id., para. 18. The Special Rapporteur on Summary
or Arbitrary Executions has expressed the view that "[a]ny Government's practice that fails to reach the
standards set out in the principles may be regarded as an indication of the Government's responsibility, even
if no government officials are found to be directly involved in the acts of summary or arbitrary execution."
Report by the Special Rapporteur Mr. S. Amos Vako, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution
1988138, 46 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 105, para. 463, E/CN.4/1990/22.
212. Moreover principles designed to implement the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 213, U.N. Doe.
A/40/53 (1985), call upon states to investigate deaths and serious injuries apparently caused by law
enforcement or other professional personnel and to prosecute or extradite those who are responsible.
Implementation Principles R4(d).5 andR4(d).6, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF VIcIMs 31-32
(M. Bassiouni ed. 1988). The implementation principles also prohibit immunity from prosecution for public
officials and agents. Id., Implementation Principle R4(d).8.
213. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-884 (2d Cir. 1980); T. MERON, supra note 57, at
93-94. Further evidence that a rule has attained the status of customary law may be found in the practice
of states in their diplomatic relations. In this regard it is noteworthy that the U.S. government has repeatedly
pressed foreign governments to prosecute serious human rights violations. See. e.g., Salvador Promises
Quayle Full Inquiry on Jesuits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1990, at A3, col. 1, Salvadoran Chief, in U.S., Vows
to Solve Jesuit Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1990, at A3, col. 3: Samuel T. Dickens, Assassins in Managua,
N.Y. Times, April 16, 1991, at A23, col. 2 (opinion piece).
214. See, e.g., AMERICAS WATCH CHILE REPORT, supra note 3, at 84; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SPECIAL
ISSUE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 2 (Dec. 1989); Zalaquett, From Dictatorship
to Democracy: Kicking Out the Generals Is Only the First Chapter, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1985,
at 20; see also Rogers, supra note 5, at 276: AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTI-
NA 81 (1987) [hereinafter AMERICAS WATCH ARGENTINA REPORT].
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to guide them, the Nuremberg tribunals developed somewhat differing interpre-
tations of the scope of the crime.215 Subsequent legal developments have done
little to clarify the issues raised by Nuremberg case law: the most significant
efforts to clarify and codify the law applied at Nuremberg have occurred
outside the rubric of crimes against humanity,216 and various efforts to enlarge
the scope of the crime have generated more controversy than consensus. 217
Further, it is not immediately obvious that Nuremberg law establishes an obli-
gation to punish crimes against humanity; the most controversial legal issue
surrounding the prosecution of those crimes at Nuremberg was whether the
Allied nations had the power to prosecute acts committed by German nationals
against other Germans.211
But if the law of crimes against humanity is somewhat lacking in clarity,
its normative implications are clear. The Nuremberg precedent, as subsequently
ratified, reflects the international community's resolve that atrocious crimes car-
ried out as part of a mass campaign of persecution must not go unpunished.
215. See infra note 231. Although prosecuting German nationals for offenses against other Germans
represented an innovation in international law, the offense of crimes against humanity had been prefigured
by the 1907 Hague Convention's reference to "laws of humanity" as a principle governing the conduct of
international war, Preamble, Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
done October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; a 1915 declaration of the governments of France, Great
Britain and Russia describing the massacres of Armenians in Turkey as "crimes against humanity," see
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRISs CoMMISsION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF
WAR 189, compiled by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, His Majesty's Stationery Office (1948);
and the determination of a commission appointed by the Preliminary Peace Conference at the conclusion
of World War I that the Allied nations should prosecute "persons belonging to to enemy countries... who
have been guilty of offences against... the laws of humanity," quoted in Schwelb, supra note 79, at 181.
216. Crimes against humanity prosecuted at Nuremberg fell into two categories: 1) violations of the
rights of civilian populations in German-occupied territories, and 2) violations of the rights of civilian
populations in Germany. The first category overlapped with the category of "war crimes" subject to the
jurisdiction of the IMT, and some offenses prosecuted at Nuremberg were found simultaneously to constitute
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity that were also war crimes were sub-
sequently codified and clarified, along with other rules of humanitarian law, in the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949. Although each of the conventions requires High Contracting Parties to punish certain offenses that
were punishable as war crimes/crimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter, see supra note 100,
the term "crimes against humanity" does not appear in any of the four conventions. The Genocide Conven-
tion establishes a duty to punish the principal crime against humanity committed in German territory against
German nationals-genocide-but its definition of the crime is not coextensive with crimes against humanity
punished at Nuremberg. The conduct made punishable by the Convention does not require a nexus to war,
and in that respect is broader than crimes against humanity as defined in the Charter. See infra text
accompanying notes 220, 229. But the Convention's definition of genocide is narrower than the Charter's
definition of crimes against humanity insofar as the former imposes an intent requirement that was not
included in the Charter. Moreover the Genocide Convention excludes "political groups" from targets of
genocide; in contrast, the Nuremberg Charter included political grounds as a basis of persecution constituting
a crime against humanity. See infra text accompanying note 220. While numerous other conventions adopted
since World War H have expanded the catalogue of rights that governments must assure to individuals
subject to their jurisdiction, these conventions generally have not purported to develop the law of crimes
against humanity.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 70-83.
2586 [Vol. 100: 2537
1991] Settling Accounts 2587
1. Definition of Crimes Against Humanity
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, as amended by the so-called "Berlin
Protocol, 219 defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated. 0
The definition of crimes against humanity set forth in Control Council Law No.
10, which established the jurisdiction of military tribunals operating in the
Allied Powers' respective zones of occupation,221 closely tracked the Charter
definition.
222
As interpreted by the IMT and the U.S. Military Tribunals in Nurem-
berg,M crimes against humanity had several elements. First, they comprised
only grave crimes such as murder and extermination, and not less serious forms
of "inhumane acts." 4 Second, inhumane acts constituted crimes against hu-
219. Executed Oct. 6, 1945, E.A.S. No. 472.
220. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 83, art. 6(c). The Berlin Protocol substituted a comma for a semi-
colon between "war" and "or" in the English and French texts of Article 6(c). The Protocol essentially
brought the English and French texts into conformity with the Russian text.
221. Article III of Control Council Law No. 10, which was adopted by the Allied Powers on December
20, 1945, delegated to each occupying power the right to arrest suspected war criminals and to initiate
prosecutions within its zone. For data relating to prosecutions undertaken pursuant to this instrument, see
A. RUCKERL, THE INVESTIGATION OF NAZI CRIMES 1945-1978, at 29-31 (1980).
222. Article II(1)(c) defined Crimes against Humanity as:
Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the
domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
223. See supra note 72. The twelve prosecutions undertaken by U.S. tribunals in Nuremberg began
in October 1946 and ended in April 1949. The U.S. tribunals prosecuted 185 defendants who had held
important positions in the German High Command, government ministries, private industry, the Gestapo,
the SS and other organizations.
224. See infra note 227. The definition of crimes against humanity in both the Charter and Control
Council Law potentially covered a sweeping range of conduct. Both instruments defined the crime to include
not only enumerated acts such as murder and extermination, but also "other inhumane acts," and the Control
Council Law used the phrase "including but not limited to . . ." in its enumeration of acts constituting crimes
against humanity. See supra text accompanying note 220 and supra note 222. But as one legal expert
observed, applying the eiusdem generis rule, the term "other inhumane acts" in Article 6(c) of the Charter
should be interpreted to include "only serious crimes of a character similar to murder, extermination,
enslavement, and deportation." Schwelb, supra note 79, at 191. This principle of construction is equally
pertinent to the enumerated "inhumane acts" set forth in Control Council Law No. 10, which specifically
mentions imprisonment, rape and torture in addition to the acts set forth in the Charter's definition. Applying
the ciusdem generis rule, the term "imprisonment" should probably be understood to refer to the type of
internment in concentration camps for which Nazis were prosecuted by the Allied nations.
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manity only when committed on a mass scale.' Further, despite language
in the Charter and Control Council Law indicating that "inhumane acts" and
"persecutions" are distinct crimes against humanity, 6 the decisions of vari-
ous Nuremberg tribunals suggest that "persecution" constitutes a crime against
humanity only when it entails atrocious "inhumane acts."' 27 Summing up the
law generated by the twelve post-IMT prosecutions in Nuremberg, Brigadier
General Telford Taylor, United States Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, wrote
that "the concept of 'crimes against humanity' comprises atrocities which are
part of a campaign of discrimination or persecution."'
225. This element is implied in the phrase "any civilian population," which appears in both the Charter
and Control Council Law's definition of crimes against humanity. A U.S. military tribunal endorsed this
interpretation of the Control Council Law in the Justice Case. Making clear that it was interpreting Control
Council Law No. 10 in a manner consistent with its view of international law, the tribunal asserted "that
crimes against humanity as defined in C. C. Law 10 must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases
of atrocity or persecution." United States v. Altstoetter (Case No. 3), 1II TRIALS OF VAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 68, at 982; see also id. at 984-85. The tribunal noted that, although the record was "replete with
evidence of specific criminal acts," they were "not the crimes charged in the indictment," but instead
constituted "evidence of the intentional participation of the defendants and serve as illustrations of the nature
and effect of the greater crimes charged in the indictment." Id. at 985. Still, defendants in the Einsatzgruppen
Case were charged with direct responsibility for numerous specific atrocities, and a particular murder was
also specifically charged in the Ministries Case. See TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 32, at 73. Thus, it appears
that individual instances of murder and the like were punishable as crimes against humanity if undertaken
as part of a mass program of similar crimes.
According to one writer, the Supreme Court of the British Zone found in one case that a mass element
was not essential to the legal definition of crimes against humanity since isolated acts, such as torture or
rape, fall within the concept of "inhumane acts." Meyrowitz, La ripression par les tribunaux allemands
des crimes contre l'humanitJ et de l'appartenance d une organisation criminelle en application de la loi
no. 10 du Conseil de contrile allig (Paris 1960), at 347, cited in Fourth Report on the Draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/398, at 59, para. 44 (1986). Yet
any "isolated acts" considered in the British-prosecuted case presumably took place in the context of massive
Nazi atrocities. Although some writers have asserted that a mass element is not necessarily integral to crimes
against humanity, see id. at 58-59, paras. 33-42, the view asserted in the Justice Case is a more authoritative
statement of the law.
226. See supra text accompanying note 220 and supra note 222.
227. For example the tribunal that presided over the Flick Case concluded that discriminatory expropria-
tion of Jewish property did not constitute a crime against humanity. Applying the eiusdem generis rule, the
tribunal reasoned that the phrase "other persecutions" in Control Council Law No. 10 "must be deemed
to include only such as affect the life and liberty of the oppressed peoples." United States v. Flick (Case
No. 5), VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 1215. Citing the Flick Case, the tribunal that
presided over the I.G. Farben Case ruled that plunder and spoliation of properties located in German-
occupied countries, while constituting war crimes, "would not constitute crimes against humanity, as the
acts alleged related wholly to offenses against property." United States v. Krauch (Case No. 6), VIII TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 1129. The tribunal that presided over the Ministries Case found that
certain decrees that discriminated against Jews in food rationing, while evincing "rank discrimination" and
a "callous social sense," did not produce sufficiently harsh consequences to constitute crimes against
humanity. United States v. von Weizsaecker (Case No. 11), XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
68, at 558.
228. TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 32, at 64; see also id. at 69 (referring to crimes against humanity
as "atrocities committed in the course or as a result of racial or religious persecutions"). The quintessential
crime against humanity punished at Nuremberg was genocide. Although neither the Charter nor IMT used
this term, it appeared in the indictment of the Major War Criminals. U.S. prosecutors frequently charged
defendants with genocide in the subsequent Nuremberg trials, and various U.S. Military Tribunals cited
genocide as the principal crime against humanity committed by Nazi defendants. E.g., United States v.
Altstoetter (Case No. 3), III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 983; United States v. Greifelt
(Case No. 8), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 88. Rendered before the United Nations
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Finally, crimes against humanity were punished at Nuremberg only if they
had a nexus to war. 9 The legal status of the nexus requirement-then and
now-is ambiguous, however. The IMT interpreted Article 6(c) generally to
exclude acts of persecution against Germany's Jewish population committed
before the onset of war in 1939, but the judgment left unclear whether the tribu-
nal believed the nexus requirement to be an element of crimes against humanity
as prohibited by the law of nations, or merely a limitation on its jurisdic-
tion.?30 Decisions of U.S.'tribunals in subsequent Nuremberg trials failed to
resolve this ambiguity. 31 And while post-Nuremberg developments have
adopted the Genocide Convention, these judgments generally used the term "genocide" in a less restrictive
sense than it was defined in that Convention. For example in the Justice Case the U.S. tribunal cited the
definition of genocide set forth in a then recently-adopted resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly, which declared genocide to be "a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups...
." United States v. Altstoetter, supra, at 983 (quoting The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946)).
229. By substituting a comma for a semi-colon in the Charter's definition of crimes against humanity,
see supra note 220, the Berlin Protocol indicated that the phrase "in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal" qualified the entire definition of crimes against humanity, and
not just acts involving persecution. See Schwelb, supra note 79, at 188. As previously noted, the other two
crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the IMT were crimes against peace and war crimes. See supra text
accompanying note 83.
230. After reviewing conduct involving persecution of Jews in Germany before 1939, the IMT, which
declared that it was "bound by the Charter, in the definition which it gives [of] Crimes against Humanity,"
IMT Judgment, supra note 60, at 248, concluded:
The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has
not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any
[crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunall. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general
declaration that the acts before 1939 were Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the
Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939 War Crimes were committed on a vast scale,
which were also Crimes against Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the
Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not constitute War Crimes, they
were all committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore
constituted Crimes against Humanity.
Id. at 249 (emphasis added). See generally Clark, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE NUREMBERO TRIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195-96 (G. Ginsburgs & V. Kudriavtsev eds. 1990) (expressing view that, in
applying nexus requirement, the IMT was concerned with questions of its jurisdiction and proof, and not
with concept of crimes against humanity more broadly).
231. Although the definition of crimes against humanity set forth in Control Council Law No. 10
closely tracked the Charter definition, it omitted the language requiring a nexus to a war-related offense.
See supra note 222. Other provisions suggested, however, that the linkage persisted in the Control Council
law. The Preamble asserted that the law "was enacted to give effect to the ... London Agreement of 8
August, 1945 and the Charter issued pursuant thereto," and Article I provided that the Nuremberg Charter
was made an integral part of the Control Council Law.
The judgment in one case brought under this law asserted that crimes against humanity were not limited
to war-related acts, United States v. Ohlendorf (Case No. 9), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
68, at 499, and the decision in another case contained language that was supportive of this view. United
States v. Altstoetter (Case No. 3), I1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 974, 979. But two other
tribunals concluded that they had no jurisdiction over conduct charged as crimes against humanity that
occurred before the war. United States v. Flick (Case No. 5), VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
68, at 1213; United States v. von Weizsaecker (Case No. 11), XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note
68, at 553, 558.
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tended to free crimes against humanity from a wartime context,232 the trend
has been inconclusive.233
If post-Nuremberg developments have failed decisively to resolve the nexus
issue, they have removed the requirement's justification. Subsequent ratification
of the principles of law applied by the IMT1 has obviated the ex post facto
concerns underlying insistence on the nexus requirement at Nuremberg.235
And there are compelling reasons to punish crimes against humanity regardless
of their nexus to war. As Justice Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United
States, argued in his opening speech before the IMT, a crime against humanity
is an offense that becomes the concern of the international community not only
when its repercussions literally traverse national borders, but also when (and
because) it surpasses "in magnitude and savagery any limits of what is tolerable
by modern civilization." 6 Punishment of such conduct-whether or not con-
nected to war-is necessary to vindicate constitutional principles of the interna-
tional legal order. 7
A variety of post-Nuremberg efforts to enlarge the scope of crimes against
humanity have brought more confusion than clarity to the term's meaning.
These initiatives range from U.N. resolutions, conventions, and other documents
denouncing apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination as crimes against
232. See Carey, Procedures for International Protection of Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 291, 299
(1967) and infra notes 233, 238-39.
233. A codification of the "NUrnberg Principles" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1950 preserved a nexus requirement, but the principles were intended to be a restatement of Charter/IMT
law rather than of potentially broader international law. Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in (1950] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 374. When, at the request of the General Assembly, the International Law Commis-
sion (ILC) prepared a Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, it omitted a
nexus-to-war element from the definition of crimes against humanity set forth in this draft international
criminal code. See 1954 U.N.Y.B. at 409. In the ILC's fourth report on the draft code, its Special Rapporteur
asserted that the autonomy of crimes against humanity from war crimes "has now become absolute. Today,
crimes against humanity can be committed not only within the context of an armed conflict, but also
independently of any such conflict." Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, 38 U.N. GAOR C.4 at 56, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/398 (1986). But the draft code remains just that, and is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable
future-if ever. Various other international instruments purporting to expand the concept of crimes against
humanity have omitted a nexus requirement, but these have failed to command the consensus necessary
to generate a new rule of customary international law. See infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 241-45.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74, 82-83.
236. Opening Speech of Justice Robert H. Jackson, supra note 75, at 127.
237. Violations of fundamental human rights committed on a mass scale are, in general, of paramount
concern in international penal law. This is reflected in the ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
which provide that "international crimes"--a term the ILC uses to refer to crimes of a state rather than of
an individual-include "a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential
importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid."
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19, para. 3(c), [19761 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2), at 95,
U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Ser.A/1976/Add.I (Part 2) (1977). Cf. T. MERON, supra note 57, at 215 (ILC's "concept
of state crimes suggests that the international community cannot be relied upon to tolerate endlessly certain
egregious violations of human rights").
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humanity 8 to a draft international criminal code including breaches of inter-
national obligations essential to safeguarding the environment in its definition
of the crime. 9 Although numerous, efforts to broaden the scope of crimes
against humanity have typically failed to garner broad consensus. 0
238. E.g., G.A. Res. 2022, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 150, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966)
(condemning "the policies of racial discrimination and segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia, which
constitute a crime against humanity"); G.A. Res. 2074,20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14), para. 4, U.N. Doc.
A6014 (1966) (condemning "the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the Government
of South Africa in South West Africa, which constitute a crime against humanity"); G.A. Res. 2189, par.
6 (1967) (declaring "that the practice of apartheid, as also all forms of racial discrimination, constitutes a
crime against humanity"); G.A. Res. 2202, para. 1 (1966) (condemning "the policies of apartheid practised
by the Government of South Africa as a crime against humanity"); Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1968,
754 U.N.T.S. 73, G.A. Res. 2391, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40, art. l(b), U.N. Doc. A17218 (1968);
and Apartheid Convention, supra note 66, art. 1. The former convention incorporated apartheid-related
conduct in its definition of crimes against humanity, and added a new category-eviction by armed attack
or occupation. This clause was proposed by representatives of the United Arab Republic and Lebanon, who
argued that Israel's occupation practices had resulted in "some of the most evil crimes against humanity
which were being committed at present." Quoted in Miller, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. 3. INT'L L. 476, 490 (1971).
The apartheid resolutions and conventions enlarge the concept of crimes against humanity beyond that recog-
nized by the Nuremberg tribunals, which effectively linked the element of "persecution" to "inhumane acts"
entailing extraordinary savagery, such as mass extermination and enslavement. See supra text accompanying
notes 226-28. While apartheid itself may not constitute a crime against humanity under customary law,
atrocious crimes carried out on a mass scale as a means of enforcing apartheid would fail squarely within
the definition of the customary law crime. Outside the rubric of crimes against humanity, systematic racial
discrimination violates customary law. RESTATEMENT (THRD), supra note 6, § 702.
239. Fourth report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr.
Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, 38 U.N. GAOR C.4 at 86, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/398 (1986). In addition,
the General Assembly of the Organization of American States has affirmed that involuntary disappearances
constitute crimes against humanity. E.g., AG/RES.742 (XIV-0/84); AG/RES.666 (XIII-0/83). See also
Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. CL H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 153 (1988) (judgment); Godfnez Cruz
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, para. 161 (1989) (judgment) (noting that international doctrine and
practice have often characterized disappearances as crimes against humanity); see also Draft Inter-American
Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 210, art. 4 (declaring forced disappearance
to be a crime against humanity). There can be no doubt that forced disappearances constitute "inhumane
acts" within the Nuremberg Charter's definition of crimes against humanity. See supra text accompanying
note 224. Moreover the type of disappearances condemned by the O.A.S. General Assembly would generally
fall within the rubric of politically-based persecutions recognized in the Charter definition; disappearances
in Latin America have typically been directed against perceived political opponents of the government. If,
however, the O.A.S. resolutions purport to recognize disappearances as crimes against humanity regardless
of the scale on which they are carried out (this is unclear from the text of the resolutions), the O.A.S. actions
would enlarge the crime beyond that recognized by the Nuremberg tribunals. See supra note 225 and
accompanying text. While such an expansion might enjoy the consensus necessary to establish a new rule
of customary law within the Inter-American system, a similarly strong consensus probably has not yet
emerged beyond the O.A.S. member countries. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities has, however, suggested that the Economic and Social Council
request the U.N. General Assembly to invite the ILC to consider including disappearances in its draft code
of offences against the peace and security of mankind, with a view to declaring disappearances a crime
against humanity. E.S.C. Res. 1982/12, U.N. Doc. E/1982/12.
240. In contrast to the General Assembly's 1948 resolution recognizing genocide as an international
crime, supra note 228, which was adopted unanimously, the previously-cited resolutions condemning
apartheid as a crime against humanity were adopted by a predominantly African-Asian majority, with most
Western nations abstaining. See Goldenberg, Crimes Against Humanity--1945-1970, 10 WESTERN ONT.
L. REV. 1, 38 (1971). Similarly, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 238, was supported by less than half of the member states
of the United Nations. Miller, supra note 238, at 477. Much of the dissension surrounding this convention
pertained to its inclusion of apartheid and "eviction" as crimes against humanity. See generally id. The
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In contrast, the international community has been far more united in affirm-
ing the law of crimes against humanity applied at Nuremberg. Significant acts
of ratification include the following:
*On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously adopted a resolution "[a]ffirm[ing] the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter of the Nuirnberg Tribunal and the judg-
ment of the Tribunal.' ' 4t
*On November 21, 1947, the General Assembly established the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) as a permanent body whose purpose
would be to promote "the progressive development of international law
and its codification, '242 and adopted a resolution directing the ILC to
"[flormulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter
of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal."" 3 On
December 12, 1950, the General Assembly adopted the "Niirnberg Prin-
ciples" prepared by the ILC pursuant to its earlier resolution.'
*The principles of law applied at Nuremberg subsequently were incor-
porated into the municipal law of numerous countries.245
The Nuremberg principles of law have had an enduring impact on one
category of offenders in particular: Nazi war criminals. Many countries have
prosecuted Nazi criminals in the decades since the Nuremberg prosecutions
were concluded,246 and efforts to bring World War II criminals to justice
continue to the present day.247
Convention's provisions relating to crimes against humanity were so controversial that another convention
on the same subject was subsequently drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Dinstein, supra
note 57, at 232. The European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes, opened for signature Jan. 25, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540 (1974),
omits apartheid from its definition of crimes against humanity.
241. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nfirnberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946).
242. G.A. Res. 174 (I) Annex, art. 1(1) (1947).
243. G.A. Res. 177 (I), para. (a) (1947).
244. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
12) at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
245. R. WVOETzEL, supra note 74, at xii; see also U.N. Study on Punishment of War Criminals, supra
note 91, at 4, para. 10.
246. See id. at 107-10 (summarizing data regarding thousands of prosecutions undertaken by various
countries against persons suspected of committing war crimes and/or crimes against humanity during World
War II). Some countries whose domestic law does not provide for prosecution of Nazi war criminals,
including the United States, nonetheless actively cooperate with prosecuting nations by extraditing alleged
war criminals.
247. See Britain Moving to Allow Trials of Suspected Nazis, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1991, at A6, col. 1;
Delay in Trial of Suspect Accused of War Crimes Has France Astir, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, at 16, col.
1; Var-Crimes Suspect Seeks to Stay in Canada, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1990, at A2, col. 2; Israel Court
Hears Appeal in War Crimes Case, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1990, at A 1l, col. 1; Argentina to Extradite Ex-SS
Man, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1990, at 25, col. 4.
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2. Punishment: Permissive or Obligatory?
U.N. actions ratifying the law applied at Nuremberg have, on the whole,
maintained that law's emphasis on permissive international jurisdiction. 8
Despite this focus, the law is fairly interpreted to require, and not merely to
authorize, states to punish crimes against humanity when committed in their
own jurisdiction. Correctly understood, the emphasis on permissive international
jurisdiction signifies the strength of international law's insistence that crimes
against humanity must be punished: that principle is so important that it justifies
an exception to the bedrock principle of international law-respect for national
sovereignty.249
Post-Nuremberg developments have underscored the international commun-
ity's resolve to ensure that crimes against humanity are punished. For example,
Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition,
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humani-
ty" ("Principles of Cooperation"), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
in 1973, provide that "crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed,
shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is evidence
that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial
and, if found guilty, to punishment."2'' Two conventions adopted since 1968
248. For example, the "Ntlrnberg Principles" adopted by the General Assembly declare that "[a]ny
person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and
liable to punishment," Principle I, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), and identify crimes against humanity-along
with crimes against peace and war crimes-as acts that are "punishable as crimes under international law."
Principle VI, id. at 13-14 (emphasis added). Despite this phrasing, an expert on these legal developments
has characterized the "Ntlrnberg Principles" as "confirming that international law required international
crimes to be punished .... 2 B. FERENCZ, supra note 66, at 22.
249. The nature of crimes against humanity made it virtually impossible to address the question of
punishing Nazi criminals from any perspective other than that of international enforcement. The U.S.
Military Tribunal that presided over the Einsatzgrnppen Case reasoned:
Crimes against humanity are acts committed in the course of wholesale and systematic violation
of life and liberty. It is to be observed that insofar as international jurisdiction is concerned, the
concept of crimes against humanity does not apply to offenses for which the criminal code of
any well-ordered state makes adequate provision. They can only come within the purview of this
basic code of humanity because the state involved, owing to indifference, impotency or complicity,
has been unable or has refused to halt the crimes and punish the criminals.
United States v. Ohlendorf (Case No. 9), IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 68, at 498. Cf. 2 B.
FERENCZ, supra note 66, at 23 (asserting that, "[bly its very nature 'crimes against humanity' seemed to
recognize the need for a Court representing all of humankind"). When, however, a democratic government
took root in Germany, it assumed responsibility for prosecuting Nazi criminals. Between 1959 and 1981,
German courts convicted some 6,000 war criminals. Herz, Denazification and Related Policies, in FROM
DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 20 (J. Herz ed. 1982).
250. G.A. Res. 3074, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 79, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
251. Id., Principle 1. Other resolutions calling on states to cooperate to ensure prosecution and punish-
ment of crimes against humanity include G.A. Res. 2583, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 58, U.N. Doc.
A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2712, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 78-79, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); and
G.A. Res. 2840, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 88, U.N. Doe. A/8429 (1971). A resolution adopted in
1967 provided that states would not grant asylum to any person who was seriously suspected of committing
war crimes, crimes against peace or crimes against humanity. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res.
2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 81, U.N. Doe. A/6716 (1967).
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provide that crimes against humanity shall not be subject to any statute of
limitations. 2
Preeminent values underlying the international legal order are best served
if a government whose predecessors committed crimes against humanity
assumes responsibility for punishment. Prosecution under these circumstances
reconciles international law's insistence on the one hand that crimes against
humanity must not escape punishment, and its concern on the other hand to re-
spect national sovereignty. The Principles of Cooperation exemplify this
approach. Principle 2 provides: "Every State has the right to try its own nation-
als for... crimes against humanity," and Principle 5 provides: "Persons against
whom there is evidence that they have committed.., crimes against humanity
shall be subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a general rule
in the countries in which they committed those crimes. In that connexion, States
shall co-operate on questions of extraditing such persons."
3. Enduring Significance of Crimes Against Humanity
While some aspects of the law relating to crimes against humanity remain
ambiguous, that law's core principle is both clear and widely accepted: atro-
cious acts committed on a mass scale against racial, religious, or political
groups must be punished. To some extent, the significance of this law as a
distinct source of obligation has been eclipsed by the development of more
expansive duties to punish atrocious human rights violations. States Parties to
the conventions examined in Section II.C are generally required to punish
torture, illegal killings, and disappearances, a broader duty than that imposed
by the customary law of crimes against humanity. And customary law is now
breached by a state's complete failure to punish repeated or notorious instances
of these offenses, regardless of the animus of the violations. 53 Further, cus-
tomary law relating to genocide imposes a duty to punish conduct that overlaps
substantially with crimes against humanity.14
But if the law of crimes against humanity is increasingly redundant of other
law, it has not become superfluous. In the absence of effective enforcement
machinery, international law's power to induce compliance with its prescriptions
turns on the strength of the norms themselves.1 5 It is, perhaps, in this respect
252. See supra note 240. Although the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 238, does not explicitly provide that States Parties
must prosecute crimes against humanity, it was adopted to fill what the drafters perceived as a gap in
international law which, in their view, already required punishment but failed to make clear that no statute
of limitations should apply. See Miller, supra note 238, at 477. In the Barbie case, the French Court of
Cassation found that the non-applicability of statutes of limitations to crimes against humanity is a rule of
customary law. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 132, 135 (1988) (Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Cass. Crim., Fr.).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
254. See supra notes 216, 228.
255. See Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The Impact of United States Human Rights Policy, 1
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 43, 65 (199 l);Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL
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that the enduring significance of crimes against humanity is best understood.
The law proscribing crimes against humanity has commanded a uniquely
powerful commitment by the world community, which has resolved emphatical-
ly that it will not countenance impunity for massive atrocities against persecuted
groups.
III. APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE
TO TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES
If international law generally requires states to punish serious violations of
physical integrity, 6 must a successor government attempt to prosecute every
such violation committed with impunity during a recent dictatorship? Or does
international law provide a basis for "mitigating" the duty in light of the
peculiar constraints prevailing in transitional societies?
In addressing these questions, it is important to begin by making clear what
is not at issue. First, the fact that a democratically elected government succeeds
a repressive regime has no bearing on the state's international obligations. It
is well-established that a change in government does not relieve a state of its
duties under international law. 57 Accordingly, if an outgoing government
failed to discharge its duty to punish atrocious crimes, its successor is generally
bound to fulfill the obligation.
Second, that prosecutions may be inexpedient politically is no excuse for
a government's failure to discharge its legal obligations. International law does
not, of course, require states to take action that poses a serious threat to vital
national interests.~ But a state cannot evade its duty to punish atrocious
crimes merely to appease disaffected military forces or to promote national
reconciliation 9 However desirable the objectives, the government must find
other means to achieve them. Ratification of an amnesty law through some form
of democratic procedure26 would not alter this conclusion; nations cannot
LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 403 (M. McDougal
& W. M. Reisman eds. 1981).
256. The phrase "serionus violations of physical integrity" is used here to refer to torture, disappearances
and illegal killings; it is not intended to cover other violations of physical integrity proscribed by human
rights conventions, such as subjecting detainees to inhumane conditions.
257. See Velisquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 184 (1988) (judgment);
L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 266 (2d
ed. 1987).
258. See infra Section B.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 38.
260. Jos6 Zalaquett urges that a policy addressing abuses of the past-including an amnesty---"must
be approved in a manner that reflects the will of the people," such as by popular referendum. Zalaquett,
supra note 8, at 34. Others have challenged this view, asserting that only the victim of a violation can
forgive her tormentor. See L. WESCHLER, supra note II, at 244. Zalaquett's suggestion is particularly
troubling in light of the fact that victims of human rights violations are usually members of politically weak
social groups. Surely a political majority should not be allowed to determine whether these victims' rights
will be protected by law enforcement. Cf. L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 80 (1990) ("The
wholepoht of an independent judiciary is to be 'antidemocratic,' to preserve from transient majorities those
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extinguish their international obligations by enacting inconsistent domestic
law.21
A. Mitigating the Burden
Somewhat more difficult issues are raised by the question whether interna-
tional law can accommodate the peculiar constraints faced by nations that have
recently emerged from a protracted period of lawlessness. In a country like
Argentina, where some 9,000 persons are estimated to have disappeared during
the military juntas' "dirty war against subversion," 262 a requirement that the
government attempt to prosecute everyone who may be criminally liable could
place impossible demands on the judiciary.263 Even a well-functioning judicial
system would be incapable of discharging such a burden;26 much less can
this be expected following the wholesale collapse of judicial process.
Further, the experiences of countries that have recently emerged from dic-
tatorship suggest that post-transition trials may provoke political instability if
the prosecutions are not confined within principled limits. A particularly instruc-
tive example is the experience of Argentina, where the most ambitious effort
to prosecute past violations among countries swept by the recent tide of demo-
cratic transitions was undertaken by the government of Raill Alfonsfn. His
government, which entered office in December 1983, prosecuted nine former
junta members and several other officers for abuses committed during Argen-
tina's "dirty war against subversion" in the late 1970's and early '80's. But
military uprisings provoked largely by efforts to prosecute active-duty, mid-
level officers led the government to retreat from further prosecutions; ultimate-
human rights ... to which our legal and political system is committed. Without this role there would be
nothing to stop a bare majority of our citizens from deciding tomorrow that the minority should be en-
slaved .... ") (emphasis in original).
261. See Montealegre, supra note 35, at 50 ("Only the community of nations that created [a crime
defined by international law] can abolish it."); see also sources cited supra note 62.
262. NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED
10 (1986).
263. Some experts on Argentina believe, however, that evidentiary constraints could have confined
the number of human rights trials to a manageable level even without laws limiting the scope of prosecu-
tions. E.g., Interview with Professor Alejandro Garro, New York City (July 31, 1990).
264. It has been observed that a key reason why some continental European countries have been able
to maintain a system of mandatory prosecution for serious offenses is that their criminal justice systems
are capable of processing the cases. See Damagka, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on
a German Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 119, 122-24 (1981); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 466-67 (1974) [hereinafter Langbein, Controlling
Discretion]. In contrast, prosecutorial discretion is thought to have developed in the United States in large
part because the combined impact of high crime rates and extensive procedural rights makes it impossible
for U.S. courts to process every serious crime that is potentially prosecutable. See Langbein, supra, at 445-
46; Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW AND SOc'Y 261, 265, 267
(Winter 1979). As these analyses suggest, a prerequisite of any law requiring prosecution of particular
offenses is that the national judiciary must be capable of handling the burden imposed by that law.
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ly, it secured passage of two laws that effectively amnestied most violations
by junior and mid-level officers. 265
By all accounts, a key flaw in implementation of Alfonsfn's prosecution
program was its protracted nature.26 The prosecutions extended substantially
longer than the architects of the program had anticipated. 7 While there was
strong public support for prosecutions at the outset of Alfonsfn's presidency,
this waned as time elapsed and other issues-in particular, those pertaining to
Argentina's disintegrating economy-rose to greater public prominence.268
Simultaneously, the military, which at the outset of Alfonsfn's term was weak-
ened by its recent humiliation in the Falklands/Malvinas war, gradually recom-
posed itself and become a more viable threat to the Alfonsfn government.269
For a variety of reasons, then, it became increasingly clear that the nation could
not sustain indefinitely drawn-out prosecutions. 20
The Alfonsin government also faced growing hostility from military factions
as the scope of prosecutions broadened beyond the top commanders. Although
265. In December 1986, President Alfonsin secured enactment of the "full stop" law (ley de punto
final), Law No. 23492, December 24, 1986, which set a 60-day limit on the initiation of new criminal
complaints relating to human rights violations committed during the "dirty war." Although the law was
designed to bring a close to prosecutions of military officers, it instead drew a flood of new complaints filed
before the deadline. This stoked military discontent, which President Alfonsfn sought to quell by securing
passage of the "due obedience" law (ley de obediencia debida), Law No. 23521, June 4, 1987. That law
established an irrebuttable presumption that military officials, with the exception of certain commanders,
committed human rights abuses under coercion, and rendered them immune from prosecution on this basis.
The Alfonsfn government's unseemly retreat detracted from its achievement in bringing past junta members
to account, and arguably emboldened military rebels to launch further revolts. See Neier, supra note 22,
at 34. In consequence, even those who endorse the general outcome of Alfonsin's prosecutions-convicting
high-level officers without completing more wide-ranging prosecutions-believe that the manner in which
the result was achieved was detrimental. See id.; AMERICAS WATCH ARGENTINA REPORT, supra note 214,
at 83.
266. Several developments caused delays that the Alfonsfn government did not anticipate. Substantial
time was lost when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which had original jurisdiction over the trials
of military officers, resisted judging them. See Garro & Dahl, supra note 9, at 319-20. Pursuant to legislation
enacted at the instance of the Alfonsfn administration, the cases were removed to a civilian court. In the
meantime, the better part of a year was lost due to the Supreme Council's recalcitrance. Further, the civilian
courts that had jurisdiction over cases filed by private parties tended to move slowly on those cases until
prodded into swifter action by enactment of the "full stop" law. See supra note 265.
267. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 10, at 74.
268. This phenomenon is common to many countries in which an elected government succeeds a
repressive one. Elsewhere I have argued that the most auspicious time for Philippine President Corazon
Aquino to institute prosecutions of military personnel for crimes committed during the tenure of her
predecessor, Ferdinand Marcos, was in the months immediately following Aquino's inauguration. During
that period Aquino had a strong mandate to redress the rights violations of the Marcos period, and enjoyed
greater power over the military than she would ever again possess. D. Orentlicher, supra note 37. Telford
Taylor, the chief United States prosecutor of war criminals at Nuremberg following the Allied Powers' joint
prosecution of Major War Criminals, similarly found that public support for prosecutions waned as time
passed and international concerns shifted elsewhere. See TAYLOR REPORT, supra note 32, at 105.
269. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 10, at 74.
270. Various efforts by the Alfonsin administration to restrict the scope of prosecutions were thwarted
by other branches of government. For example, a bill prepared by the Alfonsfn government establishing
the basis of prosecutions was amended, at the instance of a Senator from a small provincial party, in a
manner that opened the possibility of prosecuting a relatively large number of soldiers. For further
discussion of this subject, see L. Moreno Ocampo, supra note 31, § 1.3.
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many officers had accepted prosecution of the commanders most responsible
for implementing the "dirty war," the military grew restive when prosecutions
began to sweep more broadly, in large part because this was thought to tarnish
the military institutionally."7'
Prosecutions in the mid- 1970's of Greek military police for torture commit-
ted during the preceding period of military rule provide a contrasting example.
From the outset, the Karamanlis government made clear that prosecutions would
not be indefinite. It set a six-month deadline on the filing of private prosecu-
tions against high-level officials, and a three-month deadline for suits against
other officials."z2 Although the prosecutions in Greece provoked military
discontent, the response was far less destabilizing than the military backlash
in Argentina. z73
The contrasting experiences of Argentina and Greece suggest that the
demands ofjustice and political stability are best reconciled through a program
of prosecutions that has defined limits. To the extent that the purpose of
prosecutions is to vindicate the authority of the law and deter repetition of
recent crimes,274 it is not necessary that a transitional government prosecute
all who participated in a previous system of violations. These and other objec-
tives served by post-transition prosecutions can be accomplished with exem-
plary trials,275 provided the criteria used to select defendants do not vitiate
the justifying aims of prosecutions by, for example, cynically targeting scape-
goats. Once the chief aims of criminal law enforcement are achieved, further
271. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 10, at 73-74; Neier, supra note 22, at 34. Neier speculates that,
"if the prosecutions had been limited to Uunta members], the military uprisings against the Alfonsfn
government might never have taken place." Id.
272. All of the prosecutions for human rights violations that ensued were the result of private initiative.
273. The Karamanlis government was threatened by four conspiracies to re-establish military govern-
ment. See Danopoulos, Beating a Hasty Retreat: The Greek Military Withdraws from Power, in THE
DECLINE OF MILITARY REGIMES 246 (C. Danopoulos ed. 1988). The Karamanlis government was more
successful than the Alfonsfn government in establishing control over the military. Although various circum-
stantial factors, such as the military's preoccupation with Turkish aggression, reduced the threat of a
successful military coup, the Greek military's ultimate acceptance of civilian authority is also a tribute to
the effectiveness of the Karamanlis government's policies. While responding to legitimate military needs
by increasing defense appropriations and maintaining generous benefits, such as medical care and housing
for military officers, the Karamanlis government constantly asserted the principle of civilian supremacy,
and made concerted efforts to persuade military officers of the merits of democracy. See id. at 249. For a
thoughtful analysis of these issues, see Keith Syrett, Torture Trials and the Transition to Democracy in
Greece from 1974 (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
275. As Professor Packer has observed, the social institution ofcriminal punishment achieves a deterrent
effect by establishing a general warning that violation of a law carries the threat of punishment, coupled
with the "occasional spectacle of its actual infliction." H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 42. Thus, while a
"minimum of punishment [is] needed to keep the threat credible," id. at 63, it is not necessary to prosecute
every violation to deter criminal conduct. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 168 ("The proper objective
of an enforcement program is not the unrealistic one of penalizing all violators but the practical one of
penalizing enough violators to induce a satisfactory degree of compliance.").
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prosecutions have "diminishing returns" and may reverse progress toward
consolidating a democratic transition.2 76
1. Application of Customary International Law
The duty to punish human rights crimes imposed by customary law can
readily accommodate the constraints faced by transitional societies. Applying
the Restatement rule, customary law would be violated by complete impunity
for repeated or notorious instances of torture, extra-legal executions, and disap-
pearances,277 but would not require prosecution of every person who com-
mitted such an offense. Prosecution of those who were most responsible for
designing and implementing a system of human rights atrocities or for espe-
cially notorious crimes that were emblematic of past violations would seemingly
discharge governments' customary-law obligation not to condone or encourage
such violations, 278 provided the criteria used to select potential defendants did
not appear to condone or tolerate past abuses.
2. Application of Comprehensive Human Rights Conventions
More complex issues are raised by the question whether a government of
a state that has ratified the International Covenant, the European Convention,
or the American Convention must attempt to prosecute all serious violations
of the right to physical integrity committed, following the convention's entry
into force for the state, by or with the acquiescence of a previous regime.
Decisions interpreting these conventions include some indications that States
Parties are in general expected to investigate every violation of the rights to life,
freedom from torture, and freedom from involuntary disappearances, and to
prosecute those who are responsible.279 A rigid application of the general rule
that a state's international obligations persist despite a change in govern-
ment?" might, then, require successor governments to prosecute virtually
276. Malamud-Goti, supra note 9, at 13-14. Jos6 Zalaquett suggests that a circumscribed program of
prosecutions might afford transitional governments an opportunity to offer inducements, such as immunity
or leniency in exchange for military testimony, that could both improve the prospects of establishing
responsibility and diminish the military's propensity to "close ranks." Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 57;
Zalaquett, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Kicking Out the Generals Is Only the First Chapter, THE NEW
REPUBLIC 20 (Dec. 16, 1985).
277. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
278. Id.
279. For example, in the Veldsquez Rodr[guez Case the Inter-American Court repeatedly asserts that
a State Party to the American Convention must investigate and punish "any" and "every" violation of the
rights protected by the convention. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. In X and Y v. Netherlands,
the European Court found the Dutch government responsible for violating the European Convention because
a gap in Dutch law prevented the applicant from initiating a criminal complaint against her rapist, even
though Dutch law generally provided for such a procedure and, more generally, for prosecution of rape.
See supra note 183 and text accompanying notes 182-85.
280. See supra text accompanying note 257.
1991] 2599
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 100: 2537
every violation of those three rights that has not yet been punished. 1 Yet,
for reasons suggested above, such a requirement could produce untenable
results.
Pursuant to general canons of construction, the comprehensive treaties
should be interpreted in a manner that avoids imposing impossible obligations
or duties whose discharge would prove harmful.282 A functional analysis 3
of the general rule requiring prosecution of torture, extra-legal killings, and
disappearances provides a principled basis for such an interpretation.'
As noted earlier, the duty to punish these three crimes is squarely grounded
on a deterrence rationale.285 Believing criminal sanctions to be the most effec-
tive means of securing rights deemed of paramount importance, bodies such
as the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission have
found investigation leading to punishment to be the most appropriate response
to violations of those rights.286 The deterrence rationale supporting their deci-
sions generally favors prosecution of each violation, since criminal laws are
281. In the Velhsquez Rodrguez Case the Inter-American Court suggested that the American Conven-
tion is not necessarily violated by a State Party's failure to punish a violation: "In certain circumstances,
it may be difficult to investigate acts that violate an individual's rights. The duty to investigate, like the
duty to prevent, is not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a satisfactory result.
Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective." Velsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, para. 177 (1988) (judgment).
See also id. at par. 181 (alluding to "the hypothetical case that those individually responsible for crimes
... cannot be legally punished under certain circumstances"). The Court presumably intended to ac-
knowledge that legitimate factors, such as insufficiency of evidence, may justify a failure to prosecute,
provided an investigation was undertaken in good faith.
282. Cf. f 1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1), at 75, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977) (quoting
Schwarzenberger's view that treaty obligations "are likely to be interpreted in a manner which circumscribes
them so as to exclude situations of both absolute and relative impossibility from the very scope of such
duties"); id. at 133 (quoting assertion by Professor Alfred von Verdross of principle that "international duties
must not be taken so far as to result in self-destruction").
283. By "functional analysis," I mean an analysis of the application of a general rule of law to a
particular situation in light of the rationale supporting the general rule.
284. A functional analysis may be more appropriate with respect to the duty to institute criminal
proceedings imposed by comprehensive human rights treaties than with respect to the duty to punish
explicitly established by the Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture. In the former
instance, the duty has arisen as a matter of interpretation of States Parties' explicit duty to ensure several
enumerated rights; the duty to punish exists because it is deemed instrumental to the effective enjoyment
of those rights. Accordingly, a greater degree of flexibility may be justified in identifying the scope of that
duty than would be appropriate with respect to a duty to punish that is explicitly set forth in a convention.
Still, accommodation of the constraints faced by transitional governments may be possible under the torture
and genocide conventions on the basis that unforeseen developments-such as the debilitating effects of
a protracted period of lawlessness-render full compliance impossible. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note
62, arts. 61 (impossibility of performance) and 62 (unforeseen, fundamental change of circumstances).
Application of these excuses for non-compliance is problematic, however. Under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the excuses cannot be invoked by a State Party that brought about the conditions
of impossibility or the fundamental change in circumstances by breaching an obligation owed to another
State Party under the treaty or pursuant to another source of international duty. Id. For analysis of this issue
in another context, see infra text accompanying notes 333-45.
285. This is implicit in the fact that the duty to prosecute is consistently identified with, and based
upon, States Parties' obligation to "ensure" or "secure" enumerated rights. And, as the European Court
explicitly stated in its judgment in X and Y v. Netherlands, only criminal punishment is an adequate deterrent
to violations of rights that are of crucial importance. See supra text accompanying note 185.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62, 176-77.
2600
Settling Accounts
most likely to deter potential violators when the threat of punishment is as
nearly certain as possible. For this reason, the conventions can fairly be inter-
preted to require successor governments to investigate and seek to punish each
violation committed on their own watch. Similarly, the prior government should
have made good faith efforts to prosecute each violation committed during its
tenure. But the same logic would not compel prosecution of all offenders once
massive violations have occurred with impunity. In these circumstances, full
enforcement is neither capable of preventing the crimes that have already
occurred, nor necessary effectively to deter potential lawbreakers of the future.
A bounded program of exemplary punishment could have a significant deterrent
effect, and thus achieve the aim justifying the general duty to punish atrocious
crimes.
In contrast, a failure to punish any of the past violations would thwart the
deterrence objective underlying the general duty to punish. If a government es-
tablished complete impunity for atrocious crimes committed on a sweeping
scale, its action would, as the Restatement reasoned, have the effect of tolerat-
ing or condoning the past violations and thereby encouraging similar ones. 87
This result is plainly incompatible with states' convention-based duty to
undertake affirmative measures to prevent violations of physical integrity.s9
While limitations on prosecutions may be compatible with states' interna-
tional obligations, a policy that exonerates large numbers of persons who
committed atrocious crimes offends common standards of justice and diminishes
respect for the law. The best means of accommodating competing values might
be to combine a finite program of prosecutions with legislation establishing a
statute of limitations governing further prosecutions.2 9 Such legislation290
would minimize the destabilizing effects of trials2 91 while affirming the rule
of law.
3. Selection Criteria
The possibility of limited prosecutions raises the difficult issue of appropri-
ate criteria for selecting defendants. Although selective prosecution is accepted
287. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
288. A similar conclusion follows from application of the doctrine pacta sunt servanda, an integral
element of which is the principle of good faith performance. See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art.
26. Wholesale impunity for a system of atrocious crimes surely violates States Parties' commitment to
perform their duties under the comprehensive human rights conventions in good faith.
289. The distinction drawn here has particular relevance for countries in which both the government
and private parties can initiate criminal proceedings, but may also be pertinent to countries whare only the
government can institute prosecutions. In the latter, the "selective prosecutions" referred to would be pursued
as a matter of high governmental priority (in Argentina, prosecutions of former junta leaders were ordered
by presidential decree), while additional prosecutions would be left to the initiative of individual prosecutors'
offices.
290. Any time limit established by law should be reasonable. See supra note 126.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 265-73.
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in principle in virtually all legal systems,292 its exercise poses the risk of arbi-
trariness293 and may threaten the principle of equality before the law.29
These risks are minimized, however, if the criteria used to select defendants
reflect appropriate distinctions based upon degrees of culpability.295 Such
distinctions are drawn in every country's criminal law.296 They are reflected
both in gradations of punishment prescribed by penal law and in enforcement
patterns, which typically reflect a priority on prosecuting persons responsible
for the most serious offenses. Moreover, in cases involving criminal syndicates,
greatest priority is generally placed upon convicting leaders.297 Accordingly,
prosecutions by a transitional government that focused on those most respon-
sible for designing and implementing a past system of rights violations 29 or
292. Even legal systems that require prosecution of certain offenses generally allow prosecutors to
exercise discretion with respect to less serious offenses. See Damalka, supra note 264, at 122; Goldstein
& Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany,
87 YALE L.J. 240, 250 (1977); Langbein, Controlling Discretion, supra note 264, at 450-451.
293. See H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 290. See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 15. An effort to
prosecute virtually everyone who may be liable for crimes committed during a past program of repression
also can generate arbitrary enforcement practices. For an account of problems of this kind encountered in
the denazification program in post-war Germany, see Herz, supra note 249.
294. The right to equality before the law is enshrined in Article 7 of the Univeral Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 84, and in all of the comprehensive human rights conventions. International Covenant,
supra note 54, art. 14; Banjul Charter, supra note 131, art. 3; American Convention, supra note 92, art.
24; European Convention, supra note 34, art. 14.
295. Moreover the appearance of arbitrariness is lessened if it is clear that a failure to attempt full
enforcement is based in large part on resource constraints. Cf. H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 291 (when
enforcement of a criminal law is "taken seriously but resources are inadequate to provide anything like full
enforcement, the discrimination [in enforcement among violators] becomes less flagrant but remains objec-
tionable").
296. Whetherjustified on retributivist, utilitarian or other grounds, all legal systems assign more serious
penalties to more serious crimes. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY chs. 1, 7 (1968);
C. BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, chs. VII-VII, XXXVII (1872); J. BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, chs. XIV-XVI (1823). The seriousness of a crime is generally
thought to depend upon both the harm it produces and the culpability of the offender. See von Hirsh,
Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From "Why Punish?" to "How Much?." I CRM. L.
FORUM 259, 266 (1990).
297. This priority underlies the common practice in the United States of allowing low-level participants
in organized crime to plead guilty to a relatively minor offense or to receive immunity in exchange for
testimony that will help convict their superiors. Cf. H. ABADINSKY, SOCIAL SERVICE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
95 (1979) (factors determining whether charges will be brought include whether potential defendant would
be "valuable as a witness in another trial or against parties involved with him"); American Bar Association
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, §
3.9(b)(vii) (1971) (in exercising discretion in the charging function, a prosecutor may properly consider the
"cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others"); President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 503 (1968)
(addressing narcotics laws, asserting, "The objectives of law enforcement are to reach the highest possible
sources of drug supply ....").
298. Essentially this type of consideration, coupled with such other concerns as the availability of
evidence, guided the Allied nations' selection of defendants prosecuted at Nuremberg. See TAYLOR REPORT,
supra note 32, at 73-85. A study prepared by a U.N. Special Rapporteur suggests that amnesties should not
be available for torture, involuntary disappearances and summary executions committed in a systematic
fashion, and adds: "At the very least the authority granting amnesty, drawing on the legal theory of
conspiracy, can exclude the instigators and higher officials from amnesty, particularly those in charge of
agencies responsible for organizing and carrying out. .. 'administrative practices'." U.N. Study on Amnesty
Laws, supra note 26, at 13, para. 63.
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on the most notorious crimes299 would best comport with common standards
of justice.
Although a thorough consideration of appropriate selection criteria is beyond
the scope of this Article, several negative criteria should be noted. First,
consistent with universally accepted principles of law, individuals should never
be exonerated or exempted from prosecution for grave human rights violations
on the ground that they were "following orders," although this circumstance
can be considered in mitigation of punishment. 300 While a prosecution pro-
gram may in fact allow low-level officers and soldiers to escape punishment,
that result should never be achieved by endorsing a "superior orders" justifica-
tion for committing atrocious crimes.30'
Second, as suggested earlier, a government should not cynically prosecute
a group of scapegoats. This might happen, for example, if prosecutions were
directed against only low-level participants in a system of past atrocities or if
patently political considerations infected the determination of defendants.3°
Such prosecutions would vitiate the authority of the law and thereby deprive
the prosecutions of their deterrent power.
299. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Chile has urged Chilean authorities to make especially concerted
efforts to prosecute several exemplary cases that "have shocked Chilean society." Report prepared by
Professor Fernando Volio Jim~nez (Costa Rica), Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Chile, in accordance with paragraph 12 of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1987160 of 12 March
1987, U.N. Doc. A/42/556, para. 106 (1987); see also id., para. 126; Report on the question of human rights
in Chile submitted by Mr. Fernando Volio Jim~nez (Costa Rica), Special Rapporteur pursuant to the
mandate conferred under resolution 1988178 of the Commission on Human Rights, 45 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., paras. 54, 63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/19897.
300. The Nuremberg Charter provided that the fact that a defendant "acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation
of punishment ... " Nuremberg Charter, supra note 83, art. 8. This principle was subsequently ratified
by the United Nations General Assembly, Principle IV, Report ofthe International Law Commission to the
GeneralAssembly, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), and has been absorbed
into virtually all major legal systems. The principle has been incorporated, as well, in numerous international
instruments. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, art. 2(3); Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 92, art. 4; Draft Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappear-
ances, supra note 210, art. 9; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, art. 5, G.A. Res. 34/169,
Annex (1979); Draft Declaration on Disappearances, supra note 208, art. 6(1); Principles on the Effective
Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 211, Principle
19 (each asserting that acting pursuant to superior orders is no defense to proscribed conduct).
301. The "due obedience" law enacted in Argentina, see supra note 265, has appropriately been
criticized because it contravenes the Nuremberg principle regarding the invalidity of a superior orders
defense. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 5, at 274, see also AMERICAS VATCH ARGENTINA REPORT, supra
note 214, at 82 ("due obedience" law contravenes Argentina's obligations under Convention AgainstTorture,
which bars superior orders defense).
302. An apparent example of the latter is the program of prosecutions undertaken by the Romanian
government in the aftermath of the December 1989 uprising against Nicolae Ceausescu. Trials of former
Ceausescu aides undertaken shortly after the revolution focused on the defendants' conduct during the five
days of the revolution itself, and did not cover abuses during the previous twenty-five years of Ceausescu
rule. This narrow focus apparently allowed former members of the Ceausescu regime who were also
members of the successor government to escape accountability for their participation in past abuses. See
HELSINKI VATCH, TRIALS IN ROMANIA 1 (March 1990).
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4. Amnesty vs. Pardon
Some analysts0 3 have suggested that a pardon that spares a convicted
human rights offender from serving his sentence or from completing the full
term is less objectionable than an amnesty that forecloses prosecutions, consign-
ing past crimes to oblivion. 3° This claim has intuitive appeal: In many coun-
tries, democracy has been secured with the blood of men and women whose
suffering an amnesty would entomb forever in a grave of silence and denial.
A pardon, in contrast, would leave the judgment of guilt intact.
But if the moral distinction between amnesty and pardon seems clear, the
legal distinction is less so. On the one hand, the language of two conventions
examined in Part II seems to support the claim that a post-conviction pardon
might be permissible where an amnesty is not. As noted earlier, the Convention
Against Torture requires States Parties to "submit" cases involving allegations
of torture to the "competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution"; it does
not explicitly require that a prosecution take place,30 5 let alone that punish-
ment be imposed and served.306 And while the Genocide Convention explicit-
ly provides that persons who commit genocide "shall be punished," a criminal
conviction conceivably might satisfy this duty. For, as one writer has observed,
"[t]he essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal convic-
tion itself. '30 7 Similar reasoning would apply to the comprehensive human
rights conventions that have been interpreted to require States Parties to inves-
tigate grave abuses and to "hold responsible" or "bring to justice" those who
are guilty. Even when international law establishes a duty to prosecute particu-
lar offenses, it generally leaves the determination of penalties to the discretion
of national governments. 308
Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that international law is indifferent
to the use of pardons. The conventions on genocide and torture evince concern
that appropriately severe penalties be imposed on persons convicted of those
crimes: Article V of the Genocide Convention requires Contracting Parties to
enact legislation providing "effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide,"
while Article 4 of the Convention Against Torture requires States Parties to
make acts of torture "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature." Although these conventions do not prescribe
303. E.g., Rogers, supra note 5, at 304.
304. See supra note 14.
305. See J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 92, at 138.
306. The drafters presumably recognized that there might be legitimate reasons to terminate an
investigation without proceeding to trial, such as lack of necessary evidence. They also apparently sought
to respect the independence of national courts and the procedural rights of defendants by avoiding language
that suggested that a particular outcome of prosecutions was required.
307. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U.L. REv. 176,
193 (1953); see also H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 36 (identifying formal judgment of guilt as the crucial
element of punishment).
308. See Dinstein, supra note 57, at 224.
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specific penalties, their manifest intent is that persons convicted of genocide
and torture serve sentences that reflect the gravity of the offenses.3°9 And the
duty to punish grave violations of comprehensive human rights treaties surely
would be breached by a State Party's consistent failure to impose punishment
commensurate with the gravity of the crimes.
310
309. Commenting on Article V of the Genocide Convention, one writer has asserted that "insufficient
.. penalties may well be construed as representing a violation of this obligation." N. ROBINSON, supra
note 106, at 77. In practice, states have tended to prescribe severe penalties for genocide. See U.N. Study
on Punishment of Mar Criminals, supra note 91, at 78, paras. 264-65; id. at 106, para. 383. In the view
of two men who participated in drafting the Convention Against Torture, Article 4 "means that torture must
be punishable by severe penalties." J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 92, at 129. Messrs. Burgers
and Danelius note that
it was not possible to indicate in the Convention any particular penalty which should be applied,
such as imprisonment above a certain minimum [since] the practice with regard to criminal
sanctions differs very much from country to country, and the severity of a penalty must therefore
be assessed in relation to the severity of the sanctions which are generally applied in a particular
country.... In applying article 4 it seems reasonable to require, however, that the punishment
for torture should be close to the penalties applied to the most serious offences under the domestic
legal system.
Id. Whatever latitude these provisions allow, both would be violated by pardons that spared torturers or
persons responsible for genocide from serving any sentence or that rendered their punishment patently inade-
quate.
During drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, delegates repeatedly insisted
that a draft provision that entitled criminal defendants to benefit from changes in law establishing lighter
penalties should not apply to persons who committed genocide or other crimes against humanity; several
delegates stressed, in particular, that such criminals should not be allowed to benefit from an amnesty. See,
e.g., 15 U.N. GAOR C.3 at 131, paras. 20, 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1007 (1960) (remarks of delegate from
the United Kingdom).
310. This view is supported by the judgment in the Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, in which the Inter-
American Court stated that States Parties must impose "appropriate punishment" for violations of the
American Convention. See supra text accompanying note 167. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture, supra note 92, requires States Parties to make acts of torture "punishable by severe
penalties that take into account their serious nature." Id., art. 6. States could commit the customary law
violation of "denial of justice" to aliens not only by failing to prosecute and punish persons who committed
crimes against aliens, but also by "prosecution and light punishment; prosecution, punishment and pardon;
[and] prosecution and release .... In re Janes (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 32, 90 (1926).
A number of United Nations documents support the view that appropriately severe penalties are necessary
to ensure the right to physical integrity. See, e.g., Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation
of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, supra note 211, Principle 1 (extra-legal executions shall
be punishable by "appropriate penalties which take into account the seriousness of such offences"); Draft
Declaration on Disappearances, supra note 208, art. 4 (each state shall ensure that all forms of participaion
in disappearances "are specific crimes of the gravest kind under its criminal law"); Report on the question
of human rights in Chile submitted by Mr. Fernando Volio Jimnnez (Costa Rica), Special Rapporteur,
pursuant to the mandate conferred under resolution 1989162 of the Commission on Human Rights, 46 U.N.
ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 20, para. 23, U.N. Doc. EICN.41990/5 (although conviction was rendered
in case involving the burning of two student demonstrators, defendant's "penalty was light in relation to
the seriousness of the acts, thereby depriving the ruling of any exemplary value"); see also 42 U.N. ESCOR
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., para. 156, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2 (1986) (governments must make every effort to
investigate allegations of complaints of physical abuse of detainees "so that those who turn out to be
responsible may be punished harshly and without any lenience"); id., para. 52 (torture should be punishable
"by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature"); Report of the Special Rapporteur,
Mr. P. Kooijmans, pursuant to Commission on Human on Human Rights resolution 1989133, 46 U.N.
ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 84, para. 272(i), U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1990/17 (whenever a person is found
guilty of torture, "he should be severely punished"): Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans,
pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1987129, 45 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts.,
para. 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/17 (1989) ("heavy penalties whenever torture occurs are vitally necessary" in
countries where elected governments have replaced repressive regimes): Report of the Working Group on
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That abuse of the pardon power can undermine states' duty to protect
citizens from harm has long been recognized. The eighteenth century Italian
criminologist Cesare Beccaria made the point this way: "To shew mankind, that
crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary
consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity... ,31 Bentham
saw in the pardon power the potential for lawlessness:
From pardon power unrestricted, comes impunity to delinquency in all
shapes: from impunity to delinquency in all shapes, impunity to malefi-
cence in all shapes: from impunity to maleficence in all shapes, dissolu-
tion of government: from dissolution of government, dissolution of
political society.312
The harmful effects of pardons are compounded when they are granted in re-
sponse to military demands, thereby undermining the authority of civilian
institutions reestablished by prosecutions. 313
B. Derogation
Throughout this Article I have answered the claim that prosecutions are
destabilizing by asserting: They need not be. The threat of instability is mini-
mized when prosecutions are backed by unambiguous international law whose
requirements are confined within principled limits. Still, there may be times
when a fragile government lacks the power to comply with even the modest
requirements of international law outlined in Section II.A. The situation I have
in mind, of course, is one in which the military retains de facto power after
relinquishing office, and will not abide a legal accounting for its depredations.
When instituting prosecutions would pose a serious threat to vital interests-and
not merely provoke military disaffection-can a government be excused from
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 47 U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts. at 86, para. 408, U.N.
Doe. E/CN.4/1991/20 (problem of impunity is compounded by "reticence in the administration of jus-
tice"--particularly on the part of military courts-characterized by rare prosecutions, few convictions, and,
when violators are convicted, "sentences that, by any standard, are grossly disproportionate to the crime
committed."). These views comport with common conceptions ofjustice. In H.L.A. Hart's words, dispropor-
tionate sanctions pose the risk "of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing the law
into contempt." H.L.A. HART, supra note 296, at 25.
311. C. BECCARIA, supra note 296, at 158-59.
312. Quoted in K. MOORE, supra note 5, at 35.
313. See Timerman, Fear Returns to Argentina, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 21, col 1 (opinion piece);
Pardoning Mass Murder in Argentina, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1991, at A20, col. 1 (editorial) (both asserting
that Argentine President Saul Menem's pardon of convicted military leaders for human rights crimes will
embolden military to place itself above the law). Professor Moore has argued that, "[b]ecause pardons single
people out for special treatment, every pardon is potentially a comparative injustice, a violation of the
principle of equal treatment under the law." Moore, When Mercy Weakens Justice, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1989, at A23, col. 1 (opinion piece). She argues that the only legitimate use of pardons is to prevent
punishment of an innocent person or to "impose" the sentence that the offender deserves, on retributivist
grounds, for her offense-in effect, to correct a sentence that was (or has become) inappropriate in light
of retributivist-based criteria-and not to serve political or other interests. See K. MOORE, supra note 14.
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its general duty to punish atrocious crimes? The answers provided by interna-
tional law are, in some respects, unsatisfactory. For as the following analysis
makes clear, relevant law may not make adequate provision for situations in
which the military occupies an autonomous realm of power.
The three comprehensive conventions analyzed in Part II allow States
Parties to derogate from their duties in time of public emergency that threatens
the life of the nation when various conditions are satisfied.314 Under no cir-
cumstances, however, are derogations from the rights to life and freedom from
torture permitted."1 5 When applicable, the customary doctrines of state of
necessity and force majeure similarly preclude the wrongfulness of a state's
failure to comply with its international obligations in exceptional circumstanc-
es.316 But the prohibitions of torture, disappearances, and extra-legal execu-
tions have the status of peremptory norms: 317 they can never be abrogat-
ed.
31 8
The question arises, then, whether states' duty to prosecute these crimes
should also be treated as nonderogable on the basis that prosecution of violators
is necessary to secure the peremptory rights. Authoritative interpretations of the
conventions analyzed in Part II offer no clear guidance on this question; the
issue has never been squarely addressed. A plausible case can be made in
support of either possible position.
While similar considerations would apply to all three comprehensive
treaties, the issue is framed most sharply under the American Convention.
Article 27(2) provides both that several substantive rights are nonderogable and
that "the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights" are
likewise nonderogable. 319 Interpreting this provision, the Inter-American Court
314. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 4(l); American Convention, supra note 92, art. 27(1);
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 15(1).
315. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 4(2); American Convention, supra note 92, art. 27(2);
European Convention, supra note 34, art. 15(2). As noted earlier, none of these conventions explicitly
proscribes disappearances as such. Accordingly, the right against forced disappearances is not explicitly made
non-derogable. The draft Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note
210, explicitly prohibits suspension of judicial guarantees necessary to secure protection from forced
disappearances. See infra note 324.
316. These doctrines apply to obligations imposed both by customary law and by conventions that do
not have an explicit derogation clause or a provision governing States Parties' obligations in the event of
force majeure. See T. MERON, supra note 57, at 219 n.261; [ 1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1), at 74,
para. 32; 77, para. 39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977) (force majeure). Their application to conventions that
have derogation clauses is addressed in 11980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N (pt. I) at 45, para. 67; 51, Draft
Article 33 (state of necessity), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/3 18/Add.5-7 (1980).
317. See supra text accompanying note 195.
318. Although the principal effect of a rule's status asjas cogens is that it "cannot be set aside by treaty
or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect," I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 57, at 513, a peremptory norm's non-derogability in this sense also connotes its non-derogability
for purposes of applying doctrines of exception, such as state of necessity. See T. MERON, supra note 60,
at 60.
319. Although the other comprehensive treaties do not explicitly provide that judicial guarantees cannot
be suspended if they are essential to the protection of non-derogable rights, it is implicit in the conventions'
recognition of rights as non-derogable that States Parties must do that which is necessary to secure the rights.
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has concluded that States Parties to the American Convention cannot suspend
individuals' right to seek habeas corpus.3 20 Since the Court has found punish-
ment to be a necessary part of States Parties' duty to ensure rights under the
Convention,321 States Parties arguably may not be able to derogate from their
duty to prosecute violations of nonderogable rights.
Although plausible, this interpretation of the American Convention is not
inevitable. Habeas corpus and criminal prosecution could be distinguished for
purposes of determining whether derogation is permissible. Habeas corpus can
avert imminent or further harm; it can, for example, be used to locate a person
who has "disappeared" and thus secure her from physical danger, or to prevent
a detainee who has been tortured from suffering further abuse. 322 In contrast,
criminal prosecution cannot prevent the specific act for which punishment is
sought; it can only deter future instances of the offense.31 Thus, while prose-
cutions play a necessary part in States Parties' fulfillment of their duty to
ensure fundamental rights, they may not be deemed "essential" for the protec-
tion of those rights for purposes of Article 27(2). Applying similar logic, the
duty to institute criminal proceedings pursuant to other conventions may be
derogable, at least in principle.324
Still, in view of the consistent recognition by international bodies that
prosecution is necessary to secure certain nonderogable rights, a rule of law
allowing states to derogate from the duty to prosecute violations of those rights
would produce untenable results. Such a rule would have international laN
assert on the one hand that the rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom
from forced disappearances are nonderogable, and on the other hand that, under
certain circumstances, states need not do that which is necessary to secure the
rights.
Similar issues arise in applying the customary doctrine of state of necessi-
ty.3 s The International Law Commission's draft articles on state responsibility
320. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8, American Convention on Hum.
Rts.), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (advisory opinion), O.A.S. Doc. OC-9/87 (ser. A) No. 9 (1987).
321. See Part II, § C.2.
322. See Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8, American Convention on
Hum. Rts.), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (advisory opinion), O.A.S. Doc. OC-9187 (ser. A) No. 9, para. 35 (1987).
323. It is precisely this function that underlies the duty to punish certain human rights violations. See
supra text accompanying note 285.
324. The draft Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 210,
which requires States Parties to prosecute persons responsible for forced disappearances, provides that
"States Parties shall not suspend any judicial guarantee including habeas corpus as a means of determining
the whereabouts of a detainee, his or her state of health or the warrant from the authority leading to the
arrest," even during a state of emergency. Id. art. 15. It does not, however, explicitly prohibit suspension
of criminal prosecutions. Similarly, while the Convention Against Torture, supra note 92, requires States
Parties to prosecute torture, its non-derogation provision does not explicitly address the duty to prosecute,
providing only that "[no exceptional circumstances whatsoever. . . may be invoked as a justification of
torture." Id., art. 2(2). Article 5 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note
92, establishes a similar rule.
325. Although circumstances in which the state of necessity doctrine applies are similar to those in
which derogation is permitted under the comprehensive human rights treaties, the parameters of the
conventional rules of derogation and the customary state of necessity doctrine may not be identical. See
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frame the doctrine this way: the state of necessity doctrine precludes the
wrongfulness of an act of a state "not in conformity with an international
obligation" if "the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest
of the State against a grave and imminent peril." 326 This justification is not
available, however, "if the international obligation with which the act of the
State is not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law.' 327 As the earlier discussion makes clear, the customary duty
to prosecute torture, disappearances, and extra-legal executions "arises out of'
rights that have the status of peremptory norms.3"
Even if the duty to prosecute certain human rights crimes were derogable
in principle, states could rarely justify suspension of prosecutions. Both the state
of necessity doctrine and the derogation provisions of human rights treaties es-
tablish a high threshold for application, requiring a grave and imminent threat
to an essential state interest. 329 And when the applicable threshold is estab-
lished, States Parties to the comprehensive treaties may derogate only "to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. '330 As noted, the
state of necessity doctrine justifies noncompliance with international obligations
only if the state's action "was the only means" of safeguarding an essential
state interest against grave and imminent peril.331 The force majeure doctrine
also has a high threshold of application. The ILC's draft articles on state
responsibility frame the force majeure rule in the following terms: "The wrong-
fulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation
... is precluded if the act was due to an irresistible force... which made it
materially impossible for the State to act in conformity with that obligation.
S. .332 Under each of these standards, governments would not be excused
Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 20 (1986).
326. Draft article 33(1), [19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) at 33, U.N. Doe. A/35/10 (1980).
327. Id., Draft article 33(2)(a). Although the ILC does not specify what it means by "arises out of,"
a common sense interpretation is that which "is reasonably necessary to secure the observance of."
328. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 198-99. As noted earlier, that duty is significantly less
exacting than the corresponding duty established by various human rights conventions-except, perhaps,
in the special circumstances surrounding political transitions. See supra Part III, A.2.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 314, 326. Bodies responsible for supervising compliance with
the comprehensive human rights conventions have made clear that derogation is not justified if a threat
is not sufficiently imminent or grave, even if it has some basis in fact. See, e.g., The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B.
EtJR. CONV. ON HuM. RTs. 71-76, paras. 152-65 (Eur. Comm'n of Hum. Rts.).
330. International Covenant, supra note 54, art. 4(1); European Convention, supra note 34, art. 15(1).
The corresponding language in Article 27(1) of the American Convention, supra note 92, is: "to the extent
and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation .... " See Jorge Landinelli
Silva v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.8/34, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XII, para. 8.4, U.N. Doe.
A/36/40 (1981) (Human Rights Committee asserts that, even if situation of emergency existed in Uruguay,
measures taken by government exceeded those that could be justified as necessary to restore peace and
order).
331. See supra text accompanying note 326.
332. Draft article 31(1), 119801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) at 33, U.N. Doe. A/35/10 (1980).
Although more commonly applied to acts of nature rendering compliance with international duties impos-
sible, the force majeure doctrine has sometimes been applied to situations of insurrection causing injury
to aliens. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 466; [ 1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N (pt. 1) at 106-24, paras.
162-246, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977). The appropriateness of the latter application has been questioned
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from their duty to prosecute human rights violations merely to placate restive
military forces; the excuses are available only to avert a threat to the life of a
nation or, in the case offorce majeure, when compliance is rendered materially
impossible.
It is unclear, moreover, whether various excuses for noncompliance would
apply even if military conduct imperiled an essential state interest. The ILC's
draft articles on state responsibility assert that a state of necessity may not be
invoked to justify a breach of an international duty "if the State in question has
contributed to the occurrence of the state of necessity. 333 Similarly, the ILC
asserts that the force majeure rule does not apply "if the State in question has
contributed to the occurrence of the situation of material impossibility."3"
Under the law of state responsibility, conduct of a state organ-including the
military-is attributable to the state.335 Thus if a state failed because of mili-
tary intimidation to punish atrocious crimes that it was otherwise required to
prosecute, the state would be in breach of its international obligations.336
A decision of the European Commission of Human Rights suggests a
different approach under the derogation clause of the European Convention. In
The Greek Case, the Commission rejected the applicant states' argument that
the revolutionary military government of Greece could not invoke the Conven-
tion's derogation provision because it had, by overthrowing the previous gov-
on the basis that general rules governing state responsibility for injury to aliens caused by non-state actors,
such as those requiring states to exercise due diligence, determine the responsibility of the state without
having to resort to such doctrines as force majeure. See C. EAGLETON, supra note 95, at 125-26.
333. Draft article 33(2)(c), [19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 2) at 33, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980).
See also [19781 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) at 73, para. 29, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977).
334. Draft article 31(2), [19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) at 33, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980); see
also [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. I) at 69, para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977). Indeed,
publicists have distinguished the force majeure and state of necessity doctrines on the basis that the former
involves conduct that is "involuntary," having been brought about by an external and irresistible force, while
the latter involves a deliberate course of state action chosen to avert imminent harm to the life of the state.
See [19781 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. I) at 72-74, paras. 25-30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977); [1980]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) at 14, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (1980).
335. T. MERON, supra note 57, at 155-56. This is true even if the state organ exceeded its competence
or contravened its instructions pursuant to national law. Id. at 156-57; Draft article 10, [ 19751 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 60, U.N. Doc. A/10010/Rev.l (1975); see also id. at 66, para. 15.
336. See [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. I), at 111-112, para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/330 (1980)
(noting similarity of rules of attribution for purposes of establishing state responsibility and determining
whether conduct "contributing to" material impossibility restores full responsibility when force majeure
doctrine would otherwise preclude the wrongfulness of a state's conduct). This interpretation of international
law is reinforced by the views of several U.N. Rapporteurs and Representatives. For example, the Special
Representative on El Salvador has repeatedly faulted the Salvadoran judiciary for failing to pursue prosecu-
tions of military personnel who committed extra-legal executions-despite his acknowledgment that
Salvadoran judges face a serious threat of assassination and other forms of intimidation by Salvadoran armed
forces. See, e.g., Final report on the situation of human rights in El Salvador, submitted to the Commission
on Human Rights by Professor Jos6 Antonio Pastor Ridruejo in fulfillment of the mandate conferred under




emnment, brought about the revolutionary situation upon which it based its claim
of entitlement to derogate.
337
One can fairly question whether the widely recognized rules formulated by
the ILC are appropriate in the circumstances prevailing in many transitional
societies. Legal rules attributing military conduct to the state presuppose the
government's ability to control its armed forces. 338 But when countries
emerge from a protracted period of military rule, the armed forces often
continue to occupy a large realm of autonomous power, exerting more control
over the civilian government than it asserts over them.339 In these circumstan-
ces, a rule requiring civilian authorities to prosecute armed forces may seem
inappropriate, and even nonsensical-if not downright dangerous.
Yet the alternative-excusing states from compliance with their human
rights obligations-also poses troubling prospects. If transitional governments
were excused from their international duties when military obstruction accounts
for their noncompliance, international law would effectively reward the mili-
tary's behavior.34° Also, a formal recognition that the civilian government is,
in effect, rendered powerless by the armed forces would undercut the legitimacy
of the elected government when its authority is already imperiled.31
While applicable rules are probably best clarified on a case-by-case basis,
future legal developments should be guided by one overarching concern: rules
governing derogation should be fashioned to provide incentives for governments
to assert control over their armed forces. Customary law governing state
responsibility for injury to aliens caused by insurgent forces may offer a
productive analogy. International arbitral tribunals have found or intimated that
the wrongfulness of a state's noncompliance with international duties toward
337. The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUM. RTS. 31-32, paras. 58-60 (Eur. Comm'n of
Hum. Rts.). In reaching this conclusion, the Commission also rejected the respondent's claim that the
Commission could not pass judgment on its conduct since it was a revolutionary government. See id. at
31, para. 56. The Commission found, however, that the circumstances prevailing at the time of the Greek
government's derogation did not pose a sufficiently imminent and grave threat to justify its derogations.
See id. at 71-76, paras. 152-65; 100, paras. 206-07.
338. Cf. C. EAGLETON, supra note 96, at 26 ("When a state has been recognized by the community
of nations, it is presumed to be capable of exercising the rights and duties of membership in that communi-
ty."). Moreover the reasons why international law generally holds states to a high standard of accountability
for the behavior of their armed forces may not be fully pertinent to the circumstances considered here. It
is unclear whether standards of strict accountability designed, inter alia, to protect citizens of one state from
conduct by organs of another state during international armed conflict are equally relevant when applied
to protect the rights of citizens vis-a-vis their own government. See T. MERON, supra note 57, at 161-62.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 27-32. This has been notably true of Guatemala and El
Salvador since those countries' formal transition from military to civilian rule in the mid-1980's.
340. The right of derogation has been subject to substantial abuse by governments. See T. MERON,
supra note 60, at 53. See generally N. Questiaux, Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent
Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of Siege or Emergency, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/198-
2/15.
341. Cf. A. JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD 127-29 (1986) (noting reticence of other states to withdraw
formal recognition from "collapsing states"). For a thoughtful analysis of these issues, see Eric Lasker,
Possible Defenses to aTransitional Government's Prosecutorial Obligation Under International Human Rights
Law (Jan. 17, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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aliens might be precluded if the injury were caused by revolutionary forces over
which the government could not assert control.342 To avoid liability, a state
has had to establish that it exercised due diligence in seeking to prevent the
situation that made compliance with its international duties impossible.343 This
has been treated as a question of fact, to be determined on a case-by-case
basis,' 4I and the state's efforts to control revolutionary forces by punishing
their crimes have been deemed relevant to the analysis.345
Although these issues merit further study,346 the difficulty of satisfactorily
addressing prosecution-related risks through doctrines of exception underscores
the importance of interpreting general legal standards requiring prosecution in
a manner that accommodates constraints commonly faced by transitional gov-
ernments. As argued earlier, governments should be able to discharge their legal
duties without provoking the type of crisis that might, under various rules of
exception, justify noncompliance.
IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
In a period when democracies have replaced dictatorships in dozens of
societies, many successor governments have failed to establish criminal account-
ability for violations of the recent past.4 7 This sobering pattern raises the
question whether further elaboration of international standards is desirable' s
342. E.g., J.N. Henriquez (Netherlands/Venezuela), Mixed Claims Comm'n (1903), 10 REP. INT'L ARB.
AWARDS 714-17 (1903); In re Gill (Great Britain v. Mexico), 6 Ann. Dig. 203 (British-Mexican Claims
Tribunal 1931-32), 5 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 157, 159 (1931).
343. See C. EAGLETON, supra note 96, at 146.
344. Id.
345. According to Eagleton, "the grant of amnesty to insurgents ... has sometimes been regarded [by
arbitral tribunals] as revealing the lack of a sufficient desire on the part of the government to repress the
rebellion." Id. at 151; see also I. BRO\VNLIE, supra note 57, at 454. In the Gill case, the British-Mexican
Claims Tribunal asserted that, when conduct of revolutionaries causing injury to aliens was brought to a
government's attention, or was so notorious that the government could presume to have known of it, and
it was not shown that the government "took any steps to suppress the acts or to punish those responsible,"
the Commission could assume "that strong primafacie evidence exists of a fault on the part of the authori-
ties." In re Gill, supra note 342, at 158. Others have suggested that states can be presumed to have exercised
due diligence to supress an insurrection, though such a presumption can be overcome by evidence to the
contrary. See I. BROWNLIE, supra.
346. While troubling, the concerns addressed in this section would rarely be determinative of a state's
legal duties. The derogation clauses of conventions and the doctrines of necessity and force majeure justify
non-fulfillment of an international obligation only during the period of actual emergency or impossibility.
See [ 1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) at 69, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/315 (1977) (force majeure);
[19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1) at 20, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7 (1980) (state of
necessity). Since criminal prosecutions often extend over protracted periods, it should rarely, if ever, be
necessary for a government formally to suspend implementation of a duty to prosecute human rights
offenders. Instead, by their nature criminal proceedings allow governments the flexibility they may need
to adjust the timing of prosecutions to avoid exacerbating political tensions.
347. See supra note 36.
348. Problems relating to implementation of human rights conventions have often been addressed by
developing new declarations and conventions designed to improve compliance with duties that have been
inadequately implemented. For example, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Nov. 26, 1987, E.T.S. 126, Misc. 5 (1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1152 (1988) (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989), establishes obligations designed to
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or, instead, whether the gap between duty and compliance can effectively be
narrowed by invigorating efforts to implement current law. 349
The two options are not mutually exclusive, and the values promoted by
prosecutions350 may be best served if both approaches are pursued. Efforts
to secure compliance with current law can only be strengthened by states'
adherence to conventions that render explicit the duty to prosecute grave viola-
tions of physical integrity.35
While the Convention Against Torture serves this function, similar interna-
tional conventions on extra-legal executions and disappearances should be
adopted.352 Like the Convention Against Torture, the new conventions should
define the conduct that States Parties must criminalize; explicitly require States
Parties to investigate credible allegations that the crimes have occurred, even
if no formal complaint has been filed, and to prosecute those implicated by the
investigation or extradite them for trial in another country; and require that
national legislation provide for appropriately severe penalties.
The proposed treaties should include provisions designed to ensure prosecu-
tion in the event that a State Party abrogates the duties it has undertaken. To
this end, future conventions should require States Parties to afford victims, their
survivors, or their legal representatives a means of initiating a criminal proceed-
ing in the event that the state fails to do so, or of seeking review of a prosecu-
tor's determination not to press charges.353 The conventions should also estab-
eradicate torture-a practice prohibited by the European Convention, supra note 34, which was adopted
in 1950. For other examples, see supra note 92. The newer instruments have generally been thought to
reinforce the earlier-established legal norms, and not implicitly to call their validity into question. The
reiteration of a rule in numerous international instruments has, in fact, often been cited as evidence that the
rule has acquired the status of customary law. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d
Cir. 1980).
349. A case involving a challenge to Suriname's amnesty law, referred to the Inter-American Court
in August 1990, will afford the Court an important opportunity to affirm the duty to punish extra-legal
executions pursuant to the American Convention. See supra note 5.
350. See Part I, A.
351. Proposed rules of international law that would secure important values should not be rejected
because they would require some governments to aspire to standards they have generally failed to satisfy
-an argument advanced by some opponents of new law requiring prosecution. It is precisely the point of
human rights law to promote a higher standard of conduct than that which prevails in many countries when
the law comes into force. Cf. W. MOBERLY, RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT IN PSYCHOLOGY, IN THE LAW,
AND IN THE CHRISTIAN FAITH 23 (1956) ("In many circumstances to expect and to exact a high standard
is the most likely way to get it."). Ideally, new legal norms should raise standards of conduct prevailing
in countries where generally-accepted principles are routinely violated, without establishing standards that
cannot reasonably be satisfied by those subject to the law. I am indebted to Professor Henry B. Hansmann
for this insight.
352. The following discussion considers only provisions relating to investigation, prosecution and
punishment that should be included in future conventions. Any specialized conventions concerned with extra-
legal executions or disappearances should, of course, set forth other means of preventing and remedying
these abuses, including the assurance of effective civil remedies.
353. Many countries' legal systems enable individuals who have a direct interest in a case to initiate
criminal proceedings or to challenge the public prosecutor's decision not to press charges, and these
procedures help check abuses of prosecutorial discretion. See Damaka, supra note 264, at 135. Some
potential adherents to the proposed conventions-particularly countries whose legal systems allow broad
prosecutorial discretion and do not enable private parties to initiate criminal proceedings-may, of course,
be unwilling to accept the proposed provision. This possibility should not, however, deter its inclusion in
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lish an oversight body that is empowered, inter alia, to receive complaints from,
or on behalf of, individuals who claim that their convention-based rights have
been violated. Together, these provisions would enable victims to seek the
assistance of an international body to press their governments to initiate prose-
cutions when malfeasance accounts for a state's failure to do so.35 4
The proposed conventions should also authorize the oversight body to 1)
initiate an investigation of apparently well-founded reports that a State Party
has systematically violated the convention and failed to prosecute the offenders,
even if no complaint has been received; 3 5 and 2) receive inter-state com-
plaints alleging such a pattern.356 While the first power is not yet common
among bodies that monitor compliance with human rights conventions, it would
not be exceptional. The Committee that monitors compliance with the Conven-
tion Against Torture can initiate investigations of this sort;357 this approach
signals the direction that should be taken in future conventions. By declaring
a state to be in breach of its treaty obligations and urging corrective action, the
oversight body would provide a measure of accountability and build interna-
tional pressure in support of prosecutions that is now lacking.35 8
The proposed conventions should also explicitly require States Parties to
ensure protection of complainants and witnesses, to investigate allegations of
intimidation of participants in legal proceedings, and to prosecute those who
are responsible. Future conventions should also explicitly prohibit States Parties
from adopting laws or issuing decrees that preclude criminal punishment of
persons who commit atrocious crimes.359 Following the example of the Con-
a convention; States Parties unwilling to accept the obligation could enter a reservation to the relevant article.
354. The practice of such bodies as the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission
of urging states to investigate particular human rights violations and to bring to justice those who are
responsible, see supra text accompanying notes 147-60, 176-77, establishes a foundation for allowing
individuals to seek the assistance of an international body in compelling governments to initiate criminal
proceedings in particular cases. Such a body would, of course, only be able to accept complaints from
victims alleging a violation by a State Party that had recognized the body's competence.
355. Because many governments have been more inclined to ratify than to comply fully with human
rights conventions, adherents to the proposed conventions would likely include some governments that
systematically commit serious violations.
356. If there were any viable prospect of the creation of an international criminal court, it would also
be desirable to include a provision recognizing the tribunal's competence over systematic violations of the
conduct proscribed in the proposed conventions. As noted earlier, however, proposals to establish such a
court have languished at the United Nations. See supra note 86.
357. Article 20 of the Convention Against Torture, supra note 67, authorizes the Committee Against
Torture to initiate an investigation when it "receives reliable information which appears to it to contain well-
founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a State Party."
358. Cf. T. MERON, supra note 57, at 205-07 (declaratory judgment is an especially appropriate form
of relief in cases initiated by inter-state petitions alleging a system or pattern of human rights violations;
"[a] clear declaration that a government's conduct violates human rights sensitizes national and international
public opinion, thus bringing pressure to bear on the government to conform its conduct to international
standards."). Although the "sanction" of publicity may seem limp, it has in fact proved to be one of the
most effective means of promoting state compliance with internationally-recognized human rights standards.
See Orentlicher, supra note 93, at 84.
359. The draft Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 210,
contains such a provision. Id., art. 8.
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vention Against Torture, future specialized treaties should establish universal
jurisdiction over the proscribed conduct. 360 Finally, the conventions should
provide that the crimes they define shall not be considered "political offenses"
for purposes of extradition.
Never has the time been more auspicious to develop such conventions. As
countries emerge from periods of sweeping state violence, many of the new
governments are assuming international commitments to help assure that their
nations never again descend into an all too familiar chasm of lawlessness and
repression. 361
CONCLUSION
In a wide array of countries the specter of torture, political murder, and
forced disappearance has been dispelled by the dawning of freedom and the
revival of judicial process. But the transitions have rarely been smooth, and the
fledgling democracies face formidable challenges as they seek to balance the
demands of justice against the continuing threat of destabilizing force.
In these circumstances, can the insertion of this or that provision in an
international treaty possibly make a difference? For a new government precari-
ously perched atop a restless and long-oppressed polity, with the torturers still
controlling the guns, the threat of a coup may seem all too real. International
law seems not so much remote as beside the point.
And yet. If the international community cannot prevent, at least it must not
condone. Its words of censure or approval eventually filter through. For over
a decade the dissidents of Eastern Europe recited the human rights promises
of the Helsinki Final Act. With every recital the legitimacy of the governments
that had made and broken those promises crumbled a little more.
360. While states have been reluctant to assert universal jurisdiction to punish human rights crimes
committed in another country, it is conceivable that prosecution of some crimes by a "foreign" government
would be acceptable to both the prosecuting state and the government of the state where the crime occurred.
The Panamanian government of Guillermo Endara supported prosecution of General Manuel Antonio
Noriega (on drug-trafficking charges) in the United States, while the Philippine government of Corazon
Aquino supported the prosecution (on corruption charges) of former President Ferdinand Marcos-who died
before his case went to trial-and his wife Imelda in the United States. Still, enduring concerns about
sovereignty are likely to prevent frequent resort to universal jurisdiction as a basis for prosecuting human
rights crimes. It is noteworthy that, despite the Aquino government's support for the U.S. prosecution of
Imelda Marcos, the presiding judge questioned the propriety of prosecuting Mrs. Marcos in a U.S. court
for malfeasance allegedly committed in the Philippines, and jurors who acquitted Mrs. Marcos indicated
that they shared this concern. See The 'Wrong' Court: Marcos Acquittal Is Seen as Reaction of Jury to
Hearing Manila Case in U.S., N.Y. Times, July 3, 1990, at B3, col. 5.
361. Among the first acts of governments that have replaced dictatorships in such countries as
Argentina, the Philippines and Uruguay has been adherence to international human rights conventions. See
Nino, The Human Rights Policy of the Argentine Constitutional Government: A Reply, 11 YALE J. INT'L
L. 217, 220-21 (1986); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, VIGILANTES IN THE PHILIPPINES: A
THREAT TO DEMOCRATIC RULE x (1988): Zalaquett, supra note 8, at 38, 66 n.16.
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